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ABSTRACT
Arab states are ruled almost exclusively by authoritarian regimes, as
typified by Egypt, which enjoys a unique regional centrality in Arab politics,
Islamic activism and international relations. Opposition political
organisations are closely controlled, rarely functioning in a meaningful
capacity. Denied political access, radical Islamist groups embraced violence
in an attempt to overthrow regimes perceived as un-Islamic and closely
aligned with Western powers. However, Egyptian regimes highlighted the
power of entrenched personal-authoritarian rule; they have endured, and
have skilfully suppressed Islamic activism of all types, ultimately destroying
radical groups by force.
The wider, mainstream Islamic opposition movement is generally described
as ‘moderate’ because the groups within it eschew violence and recognise
established political structures. However, while a younger, more
democratic trend is emerging within it, it nonetheless contains enduring
fundamentalist factions that still share the radical aim of establishing an
Islamic state. The moderates proved adept at mobilizing support in
restrictive political environments, but have not subsequently gained official
political party status. If a resurgence of violent extremism is to be avoided,
a new political course is needed. This must be definitively Muslim in
character, democratic, just, and of direct popular appeal. It is such a
project that the nascent Islamist modernist trend in Egypt seeks to
construct. It is enormously ambitious, and currently lacks a unified
mainstream following; the concepts of Muslim democracy and an Islamic
state are presently mutually competitive.
The struggle between traditional moderate Islamists and the more
modernist influence emerging in Egypt is one among several factors that will
determine the future viability of moderate Islamism; there are powerful
external influences at play that will also shape the evolution of this
movement. At present, moderate Islamism is a movement in transition,
tending more towards democratic political participation, away from
autocratic religious utopianism; its disparate factions do not yet enjoy
complete unity of purpose. Looking to the future, it does, however, offer
significant potential as a catalyst for democratic transition.
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1CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
Research Issue
The Arab Middle East is dominated politically by authoritarian regimes that seek to retain their
own power and inhibit the development of democratic systems of governance. Opposition is
repressed or manipulated and there exists a widespread culture of abstention from those
electoral processes that are permitted. In this unpromising environment moderate Islamic
activist movements operate at the edges of legality in their parent states. Despite their
innovative practices in mobilizing grassroots support through alternative political structures,
the moderate activists have been unable to unseat repressive state regimes. A historical focus
on the religious and moral imperatives for an Islamic polity has exposed serious shortcomings in
the moderates’ thinking about the political and economic realities of governance. It remains
to be seen if these can be overcome in order to attract broader support, sufficient to force
entrenched regimes to abandon patronage politics and consider transitions to pluralist systems.
It is questionable that Islamists can develop policies that will stimulate economic development
and deliver social justice while remaining within an overtly Islamic ideological framework.
Indeed, doubts exist about whether their Islamic orientation can accommodate democracy at
all. However, the moderate movement has evolved markedly in the last decade, and
alternative approaches of a realistic, pragmatic focus are developing. In the short term, it
seems likely that these will be opposed by entrenched regimes, as have all moderate Islamist
attempts to bring about political liberalization to date. How then, can moderates overcome
their failure to transform mobilized support into enduring, institutional, political effect?
AIM: The aim of this thesis is to assess the potential of the moderate Islamist movements in
the Arab world to become a democratic and institutionally viable political force.
This thesis contends that any viable alternative to authoritarian rule must have an unequivocal
Islamic foundation, yet must also be compatible with United States foreign policy imperatives
for the region. Moreover, only by contributing to, and being included in, a process of wider
democratization, can the evolving Islamist movement expect to realise its full political
potential.
Research Significance
There are two contradictory premises upon which the significance of this study rests, and they
also define the dichotomy inherent in United States foreign policy towards the region at
2present. Ideologically, Western liberal democratic thinking assumes that ‘democracy’ is a
positive concept that will stimulate beneficial domestic and regional political discourse in the
Arab world. Strategically, the Middle East will remain important to Western powers as long as
their economies depend on oil to the extent they do at present. Thus, a stable political
environment in the region is a goal of all the major Western states, and ideological and
strategic aims appear to be complementary. However, because repressive and undemocratic
regimes are seen as guardians of that stability, the risk of upheaval associated with political
transition makes it an unattractive prospect and democracy remains an aspiration.
The United Nations Arab Human Development Report 20021 outlines regional demographic
trends, which will exacerbate unemployment, undermine the aspirations of the masses and
magnify the failure of regimes to find solutions. If socio-economic decline and political
stagnation are not to undermine the stability that the status quo is intended to preserve,
realistic alternatives must be found. The establishment of democracy in the Middle East is the
stated ideological objective of US foreign policy; if Arab regimes sensitive to US scrutiny of
their domestic political environment cannot implement some form of pluralist political system,
the US administration may be tempted to bypass them and meddle in Arab domestic affairs – a
self-defeating and potentially destabilizing eventuality. Democracy was not established
overnight in Europe or the US and it is entirely unreasonable to expect it to be so in the Middle
East; an extended process of gradual political liberalization is, realistically, the best that can
be hoped for.
The difficulty of such a task should not be underestimated; Arab states have varying
experiences of Western political systems and institutions, with one common thread among
them – failure. Islam has superseded these ideologies as the primary source of political
activism, enjoying a deep-rooted cultural coherence that Arab nationalism, socialism, Marxism
and other systems never did. Therefore, any potential successor to the existing repressive
regimes must have sound Islamic credentials to stand any chance of attracting significant
support. Moderate, gradualist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, or Ikhwan, advocate a
‘bottom-up’ programme of societal change designed to bring about irresistible popular support
for the establishment of a truly Islamic society. Others, of revolutionary outlook, see violence
as the only means of achieving the same end. It should be noted that ‘moderate’ in this
context does not equate to a Western, liberal democratic interpretation of the term; while
Muslim reformist groups do exist, they are very much a minority. In contrast, while pressure
1 The United Nations Development Programme, The UN Arab Human Development Report 2002. New
York, 2002 pp 37-38.
3for democratization slowly increases throughout the Middle East, the majority of Islamist
groups still seek to establish an Islamic state – they differ only in how that may be achieved.
They share a general anti-US outlook and pursue ideologies with a religious foundation that
enjoys far more resonance with the populace than Western liberal democracy. Islamists
occupy a crucial position in Middle East politics and an understanding of their collective
evolution and characteristics is an essential component of any analysis of their future political
potential. Fuller summarises neatly: ‘Islamist politics could not be more central to modern
political and social development; Islamists are struggling like so much…of the developing world,
with the genuine dilemmas of modernization: rampant change of daily life and urbanization at
all levels, social dislocation and crisis, the destruction of traditional values, the uncertain
threats of globalization, the need for representative and competent governance, the need to
build just societies, and to cope with formidable political, economic and cultural challenges
from the West’.2 Within Islamist politics, no state enjoys more importance and influence than
Egypt. Groups and ideologies originating in Egypt dominate the history and contemporary
status of Islamic activism throughout the Middle East; repressive Arab state responses to them
are modelled closely upon those developed by the three Egyptian regimes that have held power
since 1952. The Egyptian experience of Islamic activism appears to offer much of current
relevance in an age when the latter is more prominent than ever. This thesis examines
Egyptian moderate Islamic activism during this period in order to evaluate the future potential
of the movement throughout the region.
Some Islamic activist groups have shown significant mobilizational flair among particular
segments of society, demonstrating the effectiveness of Islamist outreach. Within small
communities, networks and professional organizations, they have capitalised upon their
advantage of authenticity and legitimacy of message, to earn a reputation for integrity and
trustworthiness. However, that reputation is at least partially a chimera; Egyptian Islamists
admit they have neither the capacity nor resources to meet the needs of their own supporters
alone, and have proved to be no different from other opposition groups, and the regime itself,
in their preparedness to use fraudulent methods in pursuit of electoral gain. Until now,
Islamist strengths lay in mobilizing support and infiltrating existing non-governmental
organisations to gain access to quasi-political opportunities. This constituency-building
expertise was not reinforced with policies of contemporary appeal, however; Islamist
programmes in most cases have been notable for their lack of real-world policy, and many
extended little further than the slogan that ‘Islam is the Solution’. The past ability of Islamist
groups to mobilize support, and their inability to translate it into institutional effect, suggests
2 Graham E Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004) pxii.
4that their ideology and methodology were only partially aligned with the political motivations
of Egyptian social classes, and that internal tensions within the movement led to the
recognition that a new approach was necessary. Recognition brought change; political Islam
has developed extraordinarily quickly and its evolution over the last decade has included
consideration of issues which had previously cast doubt on the viability of the movement as a
whole – democracy, civil society, parliaments and political parties.3
A new ‘Muslim Democratic Trend’ is beginning to form, recognising the significant difference
between a rigidly Islamic state and ‘a state for the Muslims’. The advocates of this approach
see democracy not as another imported Western concept, but as a vehicle for creating and
sustaining just governance with a distinctly Muslim identity. These Muslim thinkers are
devoting effort to defining political agendas compatible with the reality of modernity, but they
are a tiny minority with no meaningful constituency. The only significant organised movements
with a modernising Islamist agenda appear to be Egypt’s Wasat (Centre) group, an offshoot of
the Muslim Brotherhood, and the younger generation of the Brotherhood itself. In attempting
to combine both constituency and ideology into a coherent whole, a moderate traditional and
modernist Islamist coalition offers the only combination of realist message and mobilizational
power that could conceivably challenge an incumbent authoritarian regime. To attract the
widest possible support, and to exploit the increasing popular interest in democracy, it could
do so as part of a pluralist, democratic coalition including secular parties, hopefully leading to
the re-emergence of civil society and the inauguration of accountable governance. If
successful, this process could form a template for wider political reform in the region.
Clearly, any transitional process will depend greatly upon the attitudes of incumbent regimes.
In the short to medium term, prospects are far from encouraging. Authoritarian rule still
predominates, yet arguably, the future of Arab politics is predicated upon the inclusion of
Islamist groups; exclusion attracts too high a degree of risk if a return to violent radical excess
is to be avoided. Of course, this offers no guarantee that the Islamists will be successful in
governmental roles. They must, however, be given the opportunity to compete within a truly
participatory political system before any meaningful assessment of their ability to function
within such systems can be made. Western suspicion of Islamist groups must be overcome, and
their importance in the development of participatory political systems recognised. The
moderate groups are essential components of this process. As Abed-Kotob states:
3 Ibid pp xiv-xv.
5It is…. theoretically and practically important that we engage in unbiased discourse on the
thinking of the more moderate groups, in an attempt…..to deal with our own fears of the
unknown and alien, and ….to determine the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the
Islamist movement. Peaceful or violent, democratic or autocratic, political Islam deserves
scholarly attention as more than a threat to regional stability; it deserves treatment as a
probable contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue
relations.4
Methodology
The basis of this study is the importance of Egypt as a barometer of Islamic activism and
authoritarian government attitudes and techniques in the Arab world. In Chapter 2 it is argued
that Egypt is the state with the most influence in the Islamic activist movement, moderate and
radical, regional and international. Domestically, it enjoys the longest tradition of organised
Islamic opposition political activity, and the widest exposure to Western political systems and
institutions. It has an established and functioning state bureaucracy, a relatively well-
educated population that includes an influential middle-class – the support of which proved to
be instrumental in the management of opposition movements by the state. The Egyptian
influence in Islamic activism is widespread; groups in Syria, Jordan and Palestine, for example,
share a common Egyptian lineage. Internationally, Egypt is the second largest beneficiary of
US aid after Israel, and is the key Arab influence in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. As a
result of these domestic, regional and international characteristics, it is arguable that if
political pluralism is going to take root anywhere in the Middle East, it should be there. Taking
a more pessimistic viewpoint, it is also reasonable to suggest that if it can take root in Egypt,
in the face of expert and sustained repression, it can do so anywhere in the region. It thus
follows that any lessons drawn from a study of Egypt are likely to have applicability in the
wider Arab world, rather than any of limited or partial validity arising from a more disparate
study of several, less pivotal states.
If this premise is accepted, then a case study of Islamic moderate activism in Egypt can be
attempted. Chapter 2 seeks to establish an appropriate focus of the study, and a means of
investigation and analysis suited to producing useful empirical generalizations from a small
sample size. A general case study can provide a framework for an empirical investigation, but
also presents choices that must be considered carefully. Should a single case study be
4 Sana Abed-Kotob, ‘The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt’. International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol 27 (1995) p322.
6selected, providing a relevant but narrow focus, or a broader comparative study, offering
potentially greater integrity in its resulting generalisations, but perhaps reduced validity? The
comparative case study is usually well suited to this type of inquiry. In this specific
undertaking, the challenge is to draw meaningful generalisations from the study of a single
country; this can be achieved by studying the three separate political regimes that have held
power since 1952 – those of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. This technique not only expands the
number of available cases, thus lending enhanced credibility to the generalisations that arise
from it, but also allows uncontrolled variables to be kept to a minimum. As opposed to a
comparative case study of several different countries, this method allows many variables such
as ethnicity, religious orientation, activist groups, and demographic and economic
considerations to be kept constant. This means the focus of the study can be directed more
consistently at the core issues – the complex dynamic between state and activists. The specific
technique used to implement the case study is George’s Structured Focused Comparison, which
depends upon the formulation of Research Questions to direct work and order study. These are
therefore used to define the structure and content of Chapter 4 and 5. They are as follows:
RQ1: ‘Which factors affected the impact of the moderate Islamist movement upon Egyptian
politics since 1952’?
RQ 2: ‘What relevance have the existing characteristics of the moderate Islamist movement
to its potential future political role’?
RQ 3: ‘What exogenous influences are likely to be most significant to the future of
moderate Islamic politics’?
RQ4: ‘What capacity has the moderate Islamist movement demonstrated to formulate a
modern, realistic political project that will contribute to any process of democratization
and attract a politically meaningful constituency’?
Conceptual And Theoretical Grounding
Chapter 3 integrates the theoretical influences of this thesis. Islamic activism is a phenomenon
that is difficult to define and categorize in a useful manner. It embraces many approaches to
activism, from gradualist, legal activism among the community, to violent terror activity,
sometimes directed against that community. Islamic activists in Egypt have endured
repression, circumvented obstructive electoral legislation and countered the ideological
hegemony enjoyed by the regime; nonetheless, they have achieved little institutional political
7effect. This is explained in part by the many competing groups, influences and interests within
the Islamist movement itself. Also, Wiktorowicz makes the observation that the types of
contention used by Islamic activist groups transcend anything specifically Islamic in that they
do not differ greatly from those used by non-Islamic groups in other environments.5 If this is
so, then in the context of anti-regime contention in authoritarian Arab states, exogenous
factors must be indicated in the Islamists’ lack of political impact; the religious justification
behind the contention is clearly outweighed by influences that prevent significant political
consequences for entrenched regimes. These may be determined in an examination of the
state/activist group dynamic, and Social Movement Theory (hereafter abbreviated to SMT)
provides a tool for that purpose.
SMT is an evolving discipline, and work to date has concentrated largely upon Western liberal
democratic societies.6 The study of Islamic activism has taken place independently of
theoretical and conceptual research on social movements and contentious politics, tending to
portray Islamic activism as unique, or not suitable for scientific analysis. As a result Islamic
activism has yet to be integrated fully with SMT; the extent and significance of Islamic activism
at present means this is an omission of some consequence. SMT brings a new means of analysis
to the study of activist movements, but does not yet provide a complete explanation of the
Islamic groups among them. Sustaining support following mobilization, in the face of little
evident political gain, and attracting true political allegiance rather than the opportunistic
acceptance of patronage, is central to the future development of moderate Islamist
movements in the Arab Middle East. This is a key facet of Islamic activism examined in this
thesis, by selectively employing elements of SMT most relevant to a study of Egypt.
Literature Review and Analysis
The Literature Review and analysis are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 begins with a
brief summary of the factors that influenced the development of the moderate Islamist
movement since 1952. It then outlines the resulting characteristics of the present movement
that may define its future political utility, before concluding with an explanation of the
transitional phase in which moderate Islamism now finds itself. Following this, Chapter 5
explores how factors in the wider regional political sphere may influence the moderate
movement and be exploited by it. It is suggested that democratization in general, and the
pragmatic, realistic approach of the moderate Islamist modernist groups are not only mutually
5 Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed) Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington
Indiana: Indiana University Press 2004) p3.
8beneficial, but inseparable, if the current political stagnation is to be overcome in a manner
that will assuage US concerns and satisfy its foreign policy objectives in the region.
Conclusions
Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter 6. The unbroken progression of personal-
authoritarian rule in Egypt from 1952 until the present, combined with a political opposition
movement characterized by disunity and factionalism, has resulted in a political culture of
patronage and widespread apathy. The utopian Islamists failed to overcome internal class-
based cleavages and practiced patronage politics in another form; in their capability to address
the real underlying causes of mass disaffection (primarily socio-economic decline), the
Islamists were found severely wanting. Civil society has alternated between suppression and
extinction, and the denial of political access has directed discontent towards radical
expression, the violence used in the course of which granted regimes a widely supported
pretext for further repression. The strongly negative effects of radically inspired violence,
ideology and behaviour among Egyptian society resulted in moderate guilt by association
becoming implanted in the public consciousness, as extremist violence became the key
determinant of the regime/Islamists dynamic, a destructive confrontation that allowed the
moderate Islamists to be contained concurrently. All regimes exploited an ideological
hegemony to disrupt Islamist outreach, and the political opportunity structures used to conduct
this outreach proved only partially satisfactory for the purposes of mobilization, and rather less
so for nurturing enduring political support. The moderate focus on religious and moral purity
at the expense of real-world policy has led to widespread disappointment among supporters
and the transformation of traditional Islamism. Their limitations induced a resignation to a
future of permanent opposition, perhaps at their own choice in recognition of their real-world
political shortcomings. After the Mubarak regime crushed the radical Islamist groups in the
late 1990s, moderate Islamic activism appeared to be stagnating; from this period emerged
three groups of moderate Islamists, the Wasatiyya (Centrist) intellectuals, the Wasat Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) and the younger generation of the Muslim Brotherhood. For
the first time, they have formulated Islamist political programmes that extend beyond slogan
and include the tentative conceptual development of a specifically Muslim democracy. Despite
an antipathy towards the US that will have to be tempered if US influence is to be used
constructively in any democratization process, they offer what appears in the current
environment to be the only viable means of bringing Islamic politics into a meaningful future.
6 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New
York: Columbia University Press 2004) p5.
9The combination of old and new moderate Islamism extends the possibility of bringing a
convincing Muslim emphasis to Arab democratic coalition politics, while overcoming the
reservations held by many Muslims about a rigidly Islamic state. At present, however, the
initiation of democratic transitions will remain within the gift of authoritarian regimes alone
and a major revision of US foreign policy will be needed to stimulate any such transitions.
Using their concept of Muslim democracy to include moderate political groups of all
backgrounds, secular and religious, in a national transitional effort, the Islamist modernists
seek enduring change and improvement of the entire political culture in Egypt. For those who
fear a hidden agenda within Islamist politics, such democratic coalitions offer the potential to
limit the power of any single ideological grouping. Accepting that democratization processes
will develop a specific emphasis within each state, and indeed that national interpretations of
the democratic concept itself may also differ, the Egyptian experience of Islamic activism since
1952 nonetheless offers lessons of wider applicability throughout the Middle East, allowing an
assessment of the future potential of moderate Islamism to be attempted.
It is this future potential, rather than past experiences, that best defines the import and utility
of the moderate Islamists. As a catalyst for democratic reform, they harbour the ability to
transform the political complexion of the entire Middle East.
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CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines an appropriate focus of the study, and a methodology suited to
producing useful empirical generalizations from a small sample size.
The Centrality of Egypt in Arab Politics and Islamic Activism
While there is no ‘typical’ Arab state, it can be argued that Egypt, ‘the cradle of Islamism’,
is the state with the most influence in the contemporary Islamic activist movement, the
longest tradition of organised Islamic opposition politics and resistance to them, and the
widest exposure to Western political systems and institutions. It has an established and
functioning state bureaucracy, which has a complex colonial, revolutionary and
independent heritage, and has survived the influence of many different political ideologies.
The Egyptian population is relatively well educated in modern technical subjects and
includes an entrepreneurial, politically influential middle-class; it has had more than a
little exposure to Western cultural and consumer trends. The Egyptian external influence
in Islamic activism is also significant; groups in Syria, Jordan and Palestine, as well as
transnational movements, share an Egyptian parentage. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
states Dekmejian, ‘has been the ideological and institutional epicentre of fundamentalism
in the Arab and Islamic worlds. It has survived recurrent state repression and internal
conflict for over 50 years……[its influence] is evident throughout the Arab world’.1 Many of
the most significant Islamist ideologues, moderate and radical, are, or were, Egyptian, and
the legacies of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are still very much in evidence. The
fragmentation and diversification of the modern Islamist movement began in Egypt, and the
bulk of significant activist movements still exist in the Egyptian political and social
environment.
Egypt also exemplifies the many profound socio-economic difficulties faced by regimes and
populations across the Arab world. Population expansion in the late 20th Century has
caused an influx of young people into an already saturated labour market; regional
unemployment could entrap as many as 50 million people by 2009 and for those fortunate
enough to be employed, real incomes have declined by 40% since 1982. Relative
commercial and economic underperformance suggests a reversal of this trend is extremely
unlikely; Egypt enjoyed broad economic parity with Taiwan and South Korea in the 1960s,
but despite having a population larger than that of those two states combined, now exports
in one year less than they do in two days.2 The 2002 United Nations Arab Human
1 R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (New York, Syracuse
University Press 1995) p73.
2 Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, ‘Islam, Globalization and Economic Performance in the Middle
East’, International Economic Policy Briefs No PB04-4 (June 2004) pp1-3.
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Development Report highlights three regional ‘deficits’ (freedom, knowledge and gender),
the resolution of which it states is fundamental to future human development in the Arab
world. Richards believes these interrelated deficits collectively spawn a fourth, which he
refers to as the ‘democratic deficit’.3 All are evident in Egypt and contribute to the form
and longevity of domestic political opposition; the wide variance of Egyptian opposition
group views on these problems is reflected in Islamic activist movements throughout the
Middle East.
On the international stage, Egypt is the second largest beneficiary of US aid after Israel,
and is the key Arab influence in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. Egypt has weathered
the Arab hostility that followed the entry into peace negotiations with Israel in 1976, and
support for the US-led coalition in the Gulf War of 1990/91, to become the most
diplomatically significant Arab state. Springborg observes: ‘…Egyptian civilization offers an
irresistible lure to those…intent on proving the worth of their cultures and economic and
political systems on a global scale. If Egypt can be remade in the image of the conqueror
or patron, the rest of Africa and Asia has been put on notice’.4 The Mubarak regime,
despite its democratic shortcomings, is seen as stable and reliable by Western powers, and
especially since the cooling of US/Saudi Arabian relations following the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, is the most important Western ally in the Arab Middle East. Considered an apostate
government by fundamentalist extremists in consequence, and guilty of brutal repression of
all opposition groups, Egyptian authoritarian regimes have nonetheless endured; successive
regimes have spent 53 years preserving their own power and suppressing valid, meaningful
political opposition. That they have been successful reflects the conservative and devout
nature of the Egyptian populace; they are not extremists, and value consensus, stability
and unity – even if the power of such regimes is preserved as a consequence.
A paradox thus arises; it is arguable from an institutional perspective, that if political
pluralism is going to take root anywhere in the Middle East, it should be in Egypt.
Conversely, from an operational viewpoint, it could also be suggested that if democracy
can gain a foothold in such unpromising circumstances, it should be able to do so anywhere
in the region. The obstacles to pluralism that do exist arise from the failings of the regime
in power rather than any inherent defect in the apparatus of state or underlying public
resistance. It follows that any lessons drawn from a study of Egypt are likely to have
applicability in the wider Arab world, moreso than any of limited or partial validity arising
from a more disparate study of several, less pivotal states.
3 Alan Richards, ‘Modernity and Economic Development’, Middle East Policy Vol X No3 (Fall 2003)
p67.
4 Robert Springborg, ‘Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order’. (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press 1989) p2.
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The Comparative Case Study Methodology
A study of several states will provide a broader sample from which to collect data than will
one of a single state, thus enjoying greater statistical integrity. However, even a multi-
state study of moderate Islam will yield only a small number of cases with which to work.
Quantitative statistical methods therefore seem unsuitable for this study, and they can
stretch the connection with empirical evidence in the pursuit of universality. Also, the lack
of empirical work undertaken so far in this field may be better redressed by a qualitative
approach, and while a general case-study methodology appears capable of providing a
framework for an empirical investigation, a dilemma arises if this is chosen. Should a single
case study be selected, providing specific relevance but narrow focus, or a broader
comparative study, offering apparently greater integrity in its resulting generalizations, but
potentially reduced validity? The comparative case study methodology lends itself well to
this study of moderate political Islam and the comparative method is one of the basic
techniques used to establish general empirical propositions and discover empirical
relationships among variables’.5 As Stretton posits: ‘comparison is strongest as a choosing
and provoking, not a proving, device; a system for questioning, not answering’.6
Generalizations drawn from a comparative case study, even one of few cases, can perhaps
assist with further theory development when tested within a wider sample. Lipjhart
contends that the principal problems facing the comparative method are ‘many variables,
small number of cases’.7 He also opines that ‘a single case can constitute neither the basis
for a generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization’,8 but Stake
gives only qualified agreement. He believes comparative case studies are only of value
when the specific phenomenon to be studied is present in all cases. If there exists no
common thread of intrinsic interest then: ‘Generalizations from differences between any
two cases are much less to be trusted than generalizations from one’ as one cannot make
meaningful and objective comparison.9 This argument is, however, neatly circumvented by
the capacity of the longitudinal (cross-historical) expansion technique to reduce or control
variables, especially in cases where that common thread of interest is present as a
constant. In this study it is provided by the state/activist dynamic that pertained
throughout all three regime periods.
If this is used, the study must focus on properly ‘comparable’ cases. Lipjhart defines this
as: ‘similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to
5 Arend Lipjhart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, The American Political Science
Review 65/3 (Sep 1971) pp682-683.
6 H. Stretton, quoted in Arend Lipjhart, ‘The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research’,
Comparative Political Studies 8/2 (July 1975) p160.
7 Lipjhart (Note 5) p685.
8 Ibid, p691.
9Robert E Stake, ‘Case Studies’ in Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London:
Sage 1994) p98.
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treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants
to relate to each other. If such comparable cases can be found, they offer particularly
good opportunities for the application of the comparative method because they allow the
establishment of relationships among a few variables while many other variables are
controlled’. He recommends a diachronic longitudinal expansion as the best method of
maximising control – i.e. minimising the number of uncontrolled variables - and specifically
illustrates the utility of intra-state comparisons in achieving this, as such analysis can take
advantage of the many similar national characteristics serving as controls.10 Thus, careful
selection of cases within the setting of a single state increases sample size while reducing
concurrently the number of uncontrolled variables.
In distinguishing between method and technique, the comparative method is a broad,
general enterprise, whereas the Structured, Focused Comparison technique is used as the
instrument of the method, being much more specific in intent. Drawing on Lipjhart’s work,
George developed this technique to increase the effectiveness of comparative case studies.
He stresses the importance of general, unprescriptive and standardised research questions
in each case to ensure that comparable data is collected from the cases concerned;11 these
are presented in the introduction to this thesis and are also used to structure the
subsequent analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
Thus, having established the pivotal importance of Egypt in Arab Islamic politics, and
examined the means of maximising the validity of generalizations determined by a
relatively limited comparative case study, a methodology for this thesis may be
determined. Using the Structured Focused Comparison technique, it takes the form of a
comparative case study, set within Egypt, but expanded longitudinally to examine three
different political periods. Relationships between state and activist movement will be
examined during the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak regimes. While regime ideology, civil and
political institutions and treatment of opposition groups may have changed, the religious
orientation, ethnic composition and major grassroots political concerns of the Egyptian
populace did not; therefore, the pitfall of attempting to compare ‘apples, oranges and
pears’12 inherent in an inter-state approach can be avoided. Indeed, the changing nature
of political institutions and civil society has itself been a common phenomenon throughout
the Middle East since the mid-20th Century and is something influenced as much by external
actors as by indigenous or regional ones. This highlights further the difficulties associated
with an inter-state analysis, as change is evident to varying degrees in all Arab states. For
example, Egypt’s international status since 1952 has varied from Soviet client to non-
10 Lipjhart (Note 5) pp687-689.
11 Alexander L George, ‘Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison’, in P G Lauren (Ed) Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press 1979) p52.
12 Ibid, p55.
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aligned state to Western ally. Furthermore, the 1976 peace negotiations with Israel had
significant effects at national, regional and international level. When these concerns are
compounded by those applicable to other states in the region, the difficulties associated
with an inter-state study become apparent.
Common Factors and Trends of Wider Applicability in Arab Politics
From a SMT- influenced analysis of Islamic activism throughout the Nasser, Sadat and
Mubarak regimes, several factors can be identified that should have broader applicability
throughout the Middle Eastern political environment. This stems not only from the
centrality of Egypt in the regional geopolitical and socio-political contexts, but also from
similarities in the relationships between authoritarian regimes and opposition activist
movements. Despite apparent differences in the type of political elite, be it a
constitutional monarchy, a military government or a familial/sectarian regime, the
methods employed to control opposition groups are broadly similar. Equally, economic and
social pressures in the region, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, bring a degree of
universality to a political environment that might otherwise be dominated by intra-state
ethnic or sectarian contention. These and related factors shape the environment in which
the activists operate, and SMT helps to identify common influences and outcomes across
the region. This is reinforced by the close relationships and lineage enjoyed by activist
groups throughout the region with their Egyptian parent organisations, and the leading role
of Egyptian individuals and organisations in the emerging Muslim Democratic Trend. By
examining internal and external influences upon the activist groups, it may be possible to
identify factors that contributed to their success or failure in their dealings with the state.
It is thus reasonable to suggest that lessons arising from the Egyptian case study will have
wider validity, and applying them regionally exploits one of the potential strengths of the
comparative methodology, where generalizations determined from intra-state analysis are
then applied at inter-state level. In Chapters 4 and 5 the case study outcomes are used to
assess the potential of moderate political Islam in the region at large, and, where
appropriate, to make policy recommendations. Before that, the theoretical influences
within this thesis are outlined in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3 – CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL GROUNDING
In this chapter the religious, cultural and political influences that shape modern political
Islam are briefly examined. Current work in SMT is also summarized with specific reference
to Islamic activism, especially that which explores the practical conduct of that activity.
Political Islam
Constituent Groups and Doctrines
Dekmejian identifies a series of conflicts that originate from the evolutionary relationship
between Islamism and its social-economic-political environment. The basic dialectic in all
Muslim societies is the struggle between the proponents of a secular state (frequently
exemplified by incumbent regimes of little or no legitimacy) and the Islamists, who seek to
create an Islamic polity within, or beyond, their own state.1
‘Political Islam’, ‘Islamism’, and ‘Islamic activism’ are all terms that are used to describe
specifically political activity conducted within an Islamic frame of reference. The former
two terms describe the underlying political concept and ideology, while ‘Islamic activism’
refers to the practical activity undertaken in furtherance of that ideology. Islamism is a
constantly evolving doctrine and movement, reflecting the many competing influences
within the whole. Terms such as ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ are also applicable to secular
doctrines and are utilized generally to reflect the degree of radicalism associated with the
movements concerned. ‘Moderate’ in the Islamic context should not be interpreted in the
sense of a Western,2 democratic centrist political inclination; in this case it describes a
movement that is at once broad and ill defined. For example, old generation Islamic
moderates of the Muslim Brotherhood are fundamentalists in the purely religious sense, and
they share an ultimate aim with the more extreme groups – the establishment of an Islamic
state. They are classed as moderate because they eschew violence and revolution as the
path to that objective. However, younger generations of the same movement are
noticeably more pragmatic and realistic, following an agenda more politically orientated
and less religiously so. While they operate within an Islamic frame of reference, they seek
more of a Muslim society than an Islamic state and are far less strident in their approach to
the relevance and implementation of Shari’a. Islamism itself, argues Fuller,3 is so varied it
1 R Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (New York: Syracuse
University Press 1995) pp19-22.
2 James Bowen and Peter R Hobson (Eds), Theories of Education: Studies of Significant Innovation in
Western Educational Thought (Brisbane: John Wiley & Sons 1987) p11. The broad definition of
‘Western’, including Russia and some former colonial territories, to which this footnote refers, will be
used throughout this thesis.
3 Graham E Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p192.
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cannot meaningfully be placed on an ideological spectrum, and it is difficult to classify as a
distinct programme in its entirety. He describes Islamism as a political movement that uses
Islam as the centrepiece of its political culture, improvising meaning to suit local contexts.
It is thus not a strict ideology, but a religious/cultural/political framework for highlighting
issues that concern politically aware Muslims. This is a useful viewpoint to take, and will
be used throughout this thesis.
The dominant underlying doctrinal influence of political Islam is has long been that of
fundamentalism, but now more forward-looking stimuli are beginning to develop. While
secular liberal, revolutionary socialist, and Islamic fundamentalist ideologies were adopted
following the failure of pan-Arabism in the Middle East, the first two are minority interests
compared to fundamentalism, which continues to enjoy the mass appeal and familiarity of
an overtly Islamic grounding. Indeed, the current wave of Islamic revivalism (which began
following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967) is based firmly upon a strong trend of personal
religious practice and observance at grassroots level.4 However, Islamic fundamentalism,
like Islamism itself, is not a single, coherent creed, and the many groups that subscribe to
it illustrate the diversity and complexity of outlook within it.
The term ‘fundamentalism’ is thus not ideal to analyse the many and diverse political
movements that use Islamic references in politics – indeed, many fundamentalists do not
follow any political programme or enter the political arena at all. This is evident in Saudi
Arabia and Oman, where the national religious influences are among the more
fundamentalist in outlook – Wahabbism and Ibadism respectively. Despite the absolute
power these two monarchies enjoy, it is clear that there also exists a significant, apolitical
popular loyalty to them that is grounded in fundamentalist religious, rather than political,
teaching. Hence the emergence of the term ‘political Islam’ to refer to the hybrid
ideologies that mix concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition with ideas of more modern
origin. While true fundamentalists are concerned more with ideas and religious purity,
Islamists are action-orientated, believing political action is necessary to change society into
a truly Islamic one.5 Fundamentalists tend to be backward looking, rejecting modernity
and seeking a return to an Islamic ideal that in truth never existed. Islamists are very much
a product of modern, urban society; they are forward looking, and seek to apply, (or in the
case of the Islamic modernists, adapt) Islamic teaching and law to a contemporary society.
Generally, fundamentalists follow a ‘bottom-up’ approach to converting society through
emphasis on individual piety and behaviour; once this is achieved they believe an Islamic
state will automatically follow. Islamists originally adopted a more ‘top-down’
4 Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam. Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian Experience (New
York: Scribner 2002) p7; pp25-41.
5 Guilain Denoeux, ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam’, Middle East Policy Vol IX
No2 (June 2002 p63.
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revolutionary tack; establishing a truly Islamic state would generate the conditions in which
an Islamic society could develop. Latterly, following the manifest failure of this approach,
they have adopted a more gradualist, incremental one; it shares the ‘bottom-up’ approach
of the fundamentalists but is still primarily political in focus, rather than personal.
Two currents exist within the overall Islamist movement – the mainly religious revival
among the masses and the primarily political focus of activist groups. Dekmejian sees these
currents as competitive; Murphy interprets them as complementary, believing that pious
Islam is the soil in which Islamist seed is propagated.6 Within the political domain of Islam
there are two further, opposing, tendencies – the moderate proponents of gradual,
evolutionary, political action and those of radical, revolutionary change. Nor are the
gradualists a homogenous entity, and the division that exists within their ranks is a
generational one. The older generation of the Ikhwan pursue the same aim as the
revolutionaries, and are to some degree ambiguous in their approach to democracy.
Conversely, younger gradualists from the Brotherhood now show some ideological flexibility
and an evolving readiness to adapt their programme to the modern world.
The growing impact of globalization highlights the conflicting outlooks of Muslim modernists
and conservatives. Modernists seek to adapt Islam to contemporary life, while
conservatives adhere to traditional precepts and reject Western and other influences. The
modernists place great emphasis upon contemporary interpretation of Islamic sources,
stressing the primacy of context over text. There are many forms of modernism, including
rationalists and Muslim liberals. The latter are an important voice in the modernist camp,
arguing that Islam (if properly understood) is entirely compatible with Western liberalism.
They dislike the ‘liberal’ identification, as it can be associated with permissiveness in
Muslim society, preferring to be called modernists or moderates.7
In practice, all Islamist groups continually oscillate between political action and societal
change, constantly blurring internal boundaries as the movement develops and responds to
the challenges of modernity.
Neofundamentalism, Post-Islamism and the Muslim Democratic Trend
‘Neofundamentalism’ is used by Roy to denote what he describes as a degeneration of
Islamism, which is related to, but distinct from, fundamentalism.8 He maintains that the
Neofundamentalists are less politically active than the original Islamists, thereby
representing a continuing dissipation of political potential. They regard political action as
6 Murphy (Note 4) pp25-41.
7 Fuller (Note 3) pp50-51.
8 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
1996) pp75-88; pp194-203.
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only one of several means to achieve moral and spiritual reform at societal and personal
level. Unlike the original Islamists, their approach to politics places more emphasis on a
‘bottom-up’, grassroots activism and their doctrine devotes an unbalanced emphasis to the
Shari’a, at the expense of more practical concerns, according to Denoeux.9 Kepel chooses
to describe this as ‘post-Islamism’10 while Shadid ascribes a more Muslim, democratic
emphasis to the phenomenon, rather than anything too rigidly Islamic.11 This is arguably
the more reasonable view, as one of the pivotal characteristics of this developing Muslim
democratic tendency is an emphasis upon contextual ijtihad to define what form Shari’a
should take in a contemporary setting – this is an issue of great significance to Muslims and
warrants the most extensive debate. Both of these nascent developments could usefully be
grouped together under the loose description of the ‘New Muslim Democratic Trend’; this is
evident throughout the Middle East, and embraces ideas and issues previously considered
difficult obstacles to Islamic political development – such as democratic politics,
recognition of the state as the only realistic vehicle for the conduct of politics, human
rights and diffusion of religious authority. Central to this trend is the definition of
‘democracy’ that is considered suitable for Muslim society - not another imported Western
ideology, but something more aligned with the provision of just and democratic governance
in a distinctly Muslim context. Despite the importance of these issues to the evolution of
moderate Islamic politics, the New Muslim Democratic Trend is currently largely
intellectual in expression and, with the exception of the younger factions of the Ikhwan,
attracts no significant constituency, hence the considerable reservations expressed by Roy.
Moderate Islam versus Radical Islam
Denoeux defines radical Islam as ‘a politico-religious movement which, through extreme
methods, strives to bring about drastic socio-political changes based on a revolutionary
reinterpretation of Islamic doctrine that claims to go back to the fundamental meaning and
message of the faith…violence is legitimised as a way of bringing down a social and political
order deemed un-Islamic…replacing it with one that will restore Islam’s original purity’.12
The ‘radical fringe’ is mainly clandestine and certainly tiny, while the moderate movement
is large, overt and mainstream. The most obvious difference between them is the advocacy
of violence by the radicals, and this is also the most important. Moderate groups seek a
gradualist, legalist approach to change that relies heavily on grassroots activism, social and
charitable activity and winning mass popular support. They also embrace, at least
partially, the concept of democracy, claiming Islamic precedent in concepts such as shura
9 Denouex (Note 5) pp65-66.
10 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
the Harvard University Press 2003) pp 366-373.
11 Anthony Shadid, The Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 2002) p71.
12 Denouex (Note 5) pp67-68.
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(consensus) and ijma (consultation). Crucially, they assert that should they gain genuine
political power, they will respect democratic rules, abide by the will of the majority as
expressed in elections, protect human rights and encourage pluralism in society.
Once again, reality is more complex, and many Islamist groups do not fit into either of
these categories; additionally, social movements frequently change their identities with
time, responding to the pressures of the political environment in which they operate.
Indeed, this is the main reason for the emergence of the neofundamentalist strand of
political Islam – the resistance of extant states and regimes has parried the original
revolutionary thrust of the Islamist movement.13 As both moderates and radicals share the
goal of establishing either an Islamic state or a Muslim society ruled by Shari’a, then the
moderates could be said to be closer to the radicals than they are to true democrats; the
moderates’ public statements about democracy, human rights and pluralism may well be
very different from their real positions – the real test of this will be the exercise of power.
Another complicating factor is that moderate and radical wings can exist within the same
overall movement (as in the Algerian FIS and the Palestinian Hamas); the actions of radicals
can undermine disastrously the objectives of the moderates in this case. Conversely,
radical groups have demonstrated willingness to participate in, and ability at, democratic
politics, as shown by the competence of Hizbollah deputies in the Lebanese parliament
since 1992.14
‘Moderate Islam’ – A Working Definition
Islamists are those who use an overt Islamic frame of political reference, and take
advantage of the current cycle of popular religious revivalism, ‘pious Islam’, to pursue
specifically political objectives. They are also influenced to varying degrees by secular
concerns – nationalism and ethnicity among them – that form part of their overall political
complexion. Politics lies at the very core of Islamism, and this is concerned much more
with power than it is with religion. Islamism and it’s moderate sub-division both
incorporate diverse groupings and motivations; moderate groups, for the purposes of this
study, shall be defined as those that do not use violence in pursuit of political ends in the
contemporary political environment. It is recognised that some of them have done so in
the past, and that their commitment to non-violent expression may be a temporary tactical
move. This definition incorporates significant latitude, but it is sufficiently practical to
meet the purposes of this paper. This thesis will focus upon the gradualist, realist
movements that are attempting to construct a political project that is rooted in the
contemporary world rather than the dawn of Islam. Collectively, this comprises moderates
13 Roy (Note 8) pp194-195.
14 Denoeux (Note 5) p75.
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of old and young generations, modernists, Muslim liberals, reformed radicals and
rationalists.
A SMT Perspective On Islamic Activism
Background
Islamic Activism is the most widespread political activism in the world yet it is frequently
regarded as a unique form that cannot be analyzed using techniques employed in the study
of other Social Movements. While the fact that the influence of religious ideology extends
to all elements of the Islamic movement, and this distinguishes it from all other social and
political movements, proponents of SMT argue that not only is this view untrue, it also
explains the lack of empirically based analysis of Islamic activism from this perspective.
The study of Islamic activism and the development of SMT have thus far followed parallel
courses; this thesis seeks to facilitate an intersection of them in an Egyptian context in the
hope that wider regional applicability of outcomes may ensue.
Islamic activism may be undertaken by religious propagation movements, terrorist groups
and specific-issue collective action organizations in addition to the mainstream politically
orientated groups. Wiktorowicz defines it in suitably broad terms as: ‘the mobilization of
contention to support Muslim causes’.15 This is the definition that will be used throughout
this thesis. He also observes that the modes of contention used by Islamic activist groups
do not differ greatly from those used by non-Islamic groups in other environments, many of
them rooted in Western democratic society or Third World post-colonial struggle. As a
result, the underlying dynamic, processes and organization of the contention itself
transcend anything specifically Islamic.16
The Application of SMT to Islamic Activism
Previous SMT work has concentrated largely upon Western liberal democratic societies, and
the study of Islamic activism has taken place largely independently of theoretical and
conceptual research on social movements and contentious politics. Wickham outlines in
detail the importance and influence of Egypt in the overall arena of Islamic activism and
suggests that understanding the rise of Islamic Activism in Egypt (and by extension,
elsewhere) can be assisted by SMT research.17 It may, according to Wiktorowicz and others,
15 Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington
Indiana: Indiana University Press 2004) p.2.
16Ibid p.3.
17 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt
(New York: Columbia University Press 2004) pp4-5.
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‘provide an efficient shared language for comparative analysis and theory building’,18 and it
will be used for the former purpose in this thesis. First generation SMT sought to establish
a link between causal factors such as societal strains (economic and industrial decline,
encroaching modernity) and personal grievance, which led individuals to activism.
Precipitating factors were identified, and those of relevance to Egyptian Islamic activism
can be grouped as follows:
Reinforcement of Inferiority: The military strength and economic power of Western
states and Israel, in sharp contrast to the clear lack of such attributes in Arab states,
were highlighted starkly by the 1967 Arab/Israeli War, the collapse of Arab
nationalism, the failure of many secular modernization projects, the ongoing
Israeli/Palestinian dispute, the 1991 Gulf War and the most recent invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. All these events reinforced in the Arab psyche pre-existing
views of their own backwardness and shortcomings.
Cultural Imperialism: The growing and pervasive influence of Western culture,
supported by industrial, economic and military might, generates the perception that
a deliberate and orchestrated campaign to undermine Islam is in train. Anti-regime
activism in the Arab Middle East incorporates in many cases an anti-Western
dimension, especially in states perceived by activists as ‘clients’ of the US. Anti-
Western sentiment is a powerful motivator used extensively by activists to exploit the
resentment many Muslims feel at what they see as the cultural imperialism and
aggressive penetration of their societies practiced by the Western political
commercial complex, and permitted by illegitimate, un-Islamic regimes.
Socioeconomic Causes: The emergence of an educated lower-middle class, coupled
with economic stagnation, declining employment prospects and eroded real incomes,
has produced a significant, disaffected sector of society in Egypt that is a specific
recruiting target of Islamic activist movements.
Political Strains: Authoritarian rule, lack of access to political systems and
institutions and violent repression have allowed an attitude of political abstention
and cynicism to prevail, compounding political activists’ problems in attempting to
mobilize supporters and build constituencies.
The first two of these factors form what is generally known as the Cultural Identity model;
in this, the resurgence of Islamic identity is a response to decades of Western cultural
domination. The latter two groups form the Political Economy model, and Islamic activism
18 Wiktorowicz (Note 15) pp3-5.
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from that perspective could be interpreted as a ‘no’ vote – that is, a rejection of the status
quo rather than a positive embrace of an Islamic alternative.19 In both contexts however,
Islamic activism became a natural vehicle for the expression of political discontent and now
represents the most realistic option for confronting political exclusion in Middle East states.
However, social movements cannot simply exploit discontent, but must also provide
motivations, resources and opportunities for such action. In the Egyptian context, the rise
of Islamic activism stemmed from a considered mobilization process, initiated and
sustained by Islamic counter-elites.20
Islamism has emerged as the only ideology that enjoys sufficient coherence with the
populace to enable it to generate mass mobilization. The relevance of this to more
enduring forms of political change could possibly be determined by examining the actual
dynamics of contention, including political opportunities and constraints, and the
mechanisms of collective action - mobilizing structures and resources, and ideological
framing. This should allow comparison of Islamist movements with other opposition groups,
and illustrate why mobilizational power never brought true political access.
The Dynamics of Contention
The dynamics of contention include the relationship between political activists and the
regime, the nature of anti-regime activity and repressive state measures. These
continually vary in response to prevailing circumstances in the political environment.
Dekmejian argues that the precise form of Islamic activism is determined by the intensity of
the crisis situation the activists believe themselves to be in, which in turn is contingent
upon primarily local precipitants – illegitimate regimes, political opportunities and
constraints, repression, and state violence.21
Political Opportunity and Constraint Structures
Social movements are deeply influenced by exogenous factors of economic, social, political
and cultural origin. These affect movement viability itself, strategy and tactics,
mobilization capacity and other instrumental aspects of movement development and
sustainability. They generate what are known as structures of opportunity and constraint,
the greatest of which is access to political space. This encompasses the level of formal
access to political institutions, regime receptivity towards political challengers, the
presence and power of political opponents, the stability of the ruling elite, levels and
19 Wickham (Note 17) pp6-7.
20 Ibid p8.
21 Dekmeijan (Note 1) p6.
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nature of repression and the institutional capacity of the state. These structures may
present or prevent opportunities for activism, but movement responses are entirely
dependent upon their own recognition and interpretation of opportunities and threats.
In Arab states, institutions of civil society, such as student associations and professional
syndicates, often serve as apparent surrogate political fora in view of the lack of formal
participation permitted by the ruling elite. Egyptian Islamic activists have been notably
effective in infiltrating these institutions to propagate their own religious and political
message and compete for control of executive positions and material resources. In Jordan,
Morocco, Turkey and Yemen, where the political systems are arguably more open,
moderate activists have skillfully exploited whatever opportunities have arisen from the
ability to form formal political parties. Even radicals-cum-reformists, such as the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad organization and the Islamic Group, have attempted to create political
‘parties’ (Islam Party and Shari’a Party respectively) despite state refusal to grant them
formal status as such.22 The political gain derived from these ‘opportunity’ structures was
minimal. In Chapters 4 and 5, the limitations of these approaches will be highlighted and
explained; the dividing line between opportunity and constraint is very fine indeed.
Repression and State Violence
Repression and institutionalized state violence also shape the political environment in
which the moderates compete for support; they are not immune to state retaliation or
public outcry in response to violent acts, as all activist groups can be associated with
perpetrators of violence. As Burgat notes: ‘the attitudes and propaganda of violent armed
Islamic groups are used to discredit all Islamic opposition by entrenched governments. This
approach is used to justify the repressive power of the regime and strengthen the position
of the secularist Arab elites which support them’.23 Violence is not the sole means of
political expression, but in states where other means are restricted or absent, it becomes
much more likely to occur. Two factors in particular are indicated as significant in the
emergence, or not, of political violence, and they exert an unavoidable influence on
moderate politics within the same environment. They are: access to institutionalized
politics and the nature of state repression.
 Exclusion from participatory politics can frequently bring advantage to the
extremists, supporting their contention that violence is the only way to achieve
political change. Strongly exclusionary regimes tend to encourage more extreme
22 Wiktorowicz (Note 15) p13.
23 Francois Burgat, ‘Ballot Boxes, Militaries and Islamic Movements’, in Martin Kramer (Ed), The
Dayan Centre Papers No 120: The Islamist Debate (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle East
and African Studies 1997) p40.
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collective action as the radicals can be seen as potentially more effective than the
moderates. Thus, extreme groups often originate from moderate Islamic
movements operating within closed or semi-open political systems.
 In Egypt, the Islamic Group reacted violently to severe state repression and the
exclusion from institutional politics of all Islamic activist groups. This indicated
that the nature of repression itself is directly linked to the type and severity of
political violence employed by terror groups; selective, pre-emptive repression,
which may be coercive but non-violent, attracts a far lower-key reaction than does
violent, indiscriminate, reactive repression. Similarly, severe repression directed
against moderate groups can also produce an extreme backlash. Policies of co-
option are employed by repressive regimes in an attempt to control moderate
groups without attracting such a reaction.24
Mechanisms of Collective Action
Mobilization: Structures and Resources
A subdivision of SMT, known as Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), was developed to
indicate the crucial role of established social networks and organizations (in the Islamic
context, most particularly the mosque) in the mobilization process.25 Social Movement
Organizations, as these are known, combine both resources and organizational capacity to
marshal what would otherwise remain as individual grievance; they can be viewed as the
catalyst that organizes contention, structures it through mechanisms of mobilization and
provides strategic resources to facilitate sustained collective action. They include Islamic
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), medical clinics, charities, and cultural centres
which collectively provide many basic goods and services that the state cannot or does not.
RMT distinguishes between Social Movement Organizations and Social Movement
Communities; the latter are very informal and flexible networks of activists that operate
without the need for the structure of a formal organization. This is an important difference
in the context of Islamic activism, where such communities include extended family groups,
mosque congregations, neighbourhood groups and local business networks. Use of these
communities has been a key element of the Islamist mobilization strategy, and a conduit
for their message and patronage. They assume particular importance in societies where
24 Mohammed M Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic
Movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (Ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach
(Bloomington Indiana: Indian University Press 2004) pp68-70.
25 Wiktorowicz (Note 15) pp 10-12.
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repression is severe and the more formal Social Movement Organizations, such as NGOs and
professional syndicates, are easier to monitor and control.
Networks and Alliances
Middle Eastern society is, effectively, a ‘network of networks’. Even the more established
and formal political organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, comprise dynamic and
evolving networks of their own that extend beyond the boundaries of the core political
movement itself. Alliances of convenience are also a feature of political activism in the
Middle East; such pragmatism may take the form of temporary accommodations forged
between rival activist groups to face a common threat. SMT highlights the fact that these
mobilization structures are notably less effective in authoritarian settings as vehicles for
converting mass support into tangible political gain. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt used
its ‘quasi-party’ structure to exploit support mobilized through informal networks on the
periphery of the political space. But, in the ‘semi-open’ environments that existed at
times during the Sadat and Mubarak years, such exploitation at the political level alarmed
the regimes sufficiently to cause the re-instigation of repression. Progress towards
participatory politics was therefore entirely a function of regime tolerance, and the
question of how genuinely productive were the ‘quasi-party’ structures in securing political
gain from mobilized support will be examined later.
Culture and Ideological Framing Processes
The ways in which meaning is produced, articulated and disseminated by movements is
referred to as ‘Framing’. ‘Frames’ are the conceptual and descriptive tools used by groups
in the production and dissemination of the collective interpretation of local events.
Framing thus describes the process of constructing meaning to facilitate the mobilization of
participants and support.26 Islamic movements rely heavily on the careful and selective
construction of meaning and framing processes. It achieves three core tasks for social
movements:
 The diagnosis of a problem in need of redress, including the apportionment of
blame and responsibility.
 The provision of a solution to the problem in the form of specific strategies and
tactics to ameliorate injustice.
 The provision of a rationale to motivate and support collective action.
26Ibid pp15-18.
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The Islamists must compete with regime framing which is employed widely against them.
Political elites frequently manipulate elements of the Islamic movement to combat
challenge, and state control of official mosque sermons allows regimes to amplify their own
frames while stifling those of others. The success of activist framing processes is acutely
dependent upon the reputation and credibility of those who articulate the group message
within the community, and the use of familiar language and cultural symbols designed to
maximize the coherence of the specific ideology. ‘Official’ Islam (i.e. that practiced by the
state-endorsed ulema) is largely discredited throughout the region and people turn to a
vernacular ‘popular’ Islam and respected community leaders, including Islamic activists, to
fill the resulting void. The activists have skillfully exploited this, but also realize that some
potential recruits are deterred by the overtly Islamic nature of their message; they
therefore astutely blend the religious and the secular in their framing processes and social
programmes to avoid alienating this sector of the populace. In repressive political
environments, Islamists are careful not to present too robust a challenge to the regime and
thus also produce a clandestine message that is circulated through informal, safe, Social
Movement Communities that escape state surveillance. While this may be considered to be
an effective tactic, the need to resort to it highlights the enduring power of the state to
control outreach and ideological propagation by activist movements.
Framing processes are, thus, interpretive devices that help to convert personal grievance
and political opportunity into motivation and collective action. Islamic activism is deeply
rooted in the culture of Islamic society, utilizing a shared language, theological
underpinning and common history. It has identified and utilized the disillusionment of the
populace arising from institutionalized corruption, economic stagnation and political
exclusion. Because it takes place almost entirely in an atmosphere of repression, the
framing processes employed are different from those used by activist groups operating in
Western liberal democracies. This is evident in outreach programmes and recruiting
activity where the Islamist message is transmitted by a process known as da’wa (‘the call to
God’) and activism is framed as a moral obligation; in Egypt, this was the catalyst that
converted supporters motivated by purely rational interests into activists willing to
undertake high-risk activity that would seem to contradict that very rationality.
The theoretical and conceptual influences outlined in this chapter provide a specific
perspective from which to view the material discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Despite the
importance of the dynamics of contention between regime and activist movements, and the
reliance the latter placed upon particular mechanisms of collective action, other influences
were also at play that proved to be at least as instrumental in determining the political
impact of moderate Islamist movements.
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CHAPTER 4 – PAST AND PRESENT – THE EVOLUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
MODERATE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIST MODERNIST
TREND
This Chapter is sub-divided into three parts: Part 1 deals with the major influences acting
upon moderate Islamist opposition politics in Egypt throughout the Nasser, Sadat and
Mubarak eras. In Part 2, Moderate Islamism in Egypt is considered from the perspective of
extant characteristics of the moderate movement, and their likely influence upon its
ongoing development. Part 3 examines the continuing transition from ‘Old Islamism’ to
‘New Islamism’ that began towards the end of the 1990s.
PART 1- MODERATE ISLAMISM AND EGYPTIAN POLITICS SINCE 1952
THE TENURES OF INDIVIDUAL REGIMES
The Nasser Regime
Gamal Abdul Nasser assumed power following the coup of the ‘Free Officers’ in 1952, and
rejected a power-sharing approach to government, believing it would threaten his
anticipated reform programme. He and his Free Officer colleagues established an
authoritarian regime based upon a foundation of military rule under charismatic leadership.
Democracy was to them a much lower priority than establishing the national discipline and
political will to carry out the projects they envisioned. They immediately strengthened
and enlarged the domestic security apparatus and implemented a programme of expansion
of the state bureaucracies, thereby fortifying what were to become two bastions of state
power.1
The regime maintained throughout it’s rule an impressive stability based upon an effective
combination of Nasser’s charisma, underlying nationalism, expanded opportunity and
equality. Apart from the opposition groups of the extreme left and the Islamists, which
only really became viable during the later years of Nasser’s office, the regime built an
enduring ‘populist coalition’ that included the great majority of Egyptians.2 Nasser
pressed home this advantage, allowing him to achieve the almost complete elimination of
opposition political groups throughout his tenure as President, replacing them with national
rallies to channel popular ‘representation’ in directions approved by the regime itself.
Nasser refused to allow them to be termed ‘parties’ because ‘parties meant partisanship,
1 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Routledge
2000) pp288-290.
2 Raymond A Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an
Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1988) pp15-29.
28
and partisanship meant dividing the body politic, and that would not be tolerated’.3 As
mechanisms for genuine political participation, the rallies were largely pointless, but
provided the corporatist means by which the regime could control Egyptian society. Nasser
deepened and continued a crisis of participation that began in the late 1940s by creating an
authoritarian, nationalist, populist state, wherein power was concentrated in the office of
President and political organizations were dedicated to boosting his personal popularity and
reinforcing his power to impose a nationalist revolution. A central pillar of this popular
appeal was the implementation of measures such as expanded free educational
opportunities and the promise of state-sector employment for all university graduates. This
effectively created a ‘social contract’ between Nasser and the masses, allowing him to
pursue the complementary aims of modernizing the economy through the use of a large
public sector while mobilizing the masses against the landed and private business elites.4
The masses had in turn to honour their side of the bargain, the price of which was complete
political acquiescence.
Civil society in its most basic form was both incorporated and extinguished under the
populist policies of Nasser. Civil associations found themselves incorporated into the
formal state structure, dissolved or rendered obsolete. The trade unions remained weak
and factionalised throughout Nasser’s rule, and the professional associations, with their
additional political dimension, were subjected to especially close control and publicly
portrayed as organizations that pursued ‘their own selfish class interests’.5 As the state
was by far the largest employer of professionals, their dependence upon it for employment
and patronage, combined with constrictive laws, allowed Nasser to divide the political
bases of the syndicates and control them. Nasser’s corporatist political system, in which
such interest groups were organized along functional lines and placed within a single
representative body, destroyed their function as alternative sites of political opportunity or
access. Rendered compliant, the public institutions thus offered utility to the regime as
channels for the propaganda that was a central component of a resocialization programme
based on a loose combination of themes – Islam, Arab nationalism and socialism. From 1954
until 1967 therefore, the educated element of Egyptian society ceased to function as
anything other than a loyal, uncritical tool of the regime.6 Throughout the Nasser era, the
professional associations were essentially directed by the state and were even used at
times to mobilize support for the regime. While this secured their long-term survival, it
rendered them politically impotent during his tenure, and ensured what Owen describes as
3 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press 1998) p279.
4 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers 2004) p13.
5 Ibid pp 88-97.
6 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New
York: Columbia University Press 2004) pp30-32.
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‘controlled collaboration’ was available to the regime to the exclusion of much else.7 As an
alternative means of political access for the Islamists, the utility of the professional
associations was thus much reduced during the Nasser era compared with that of the Sadat
and Mubarak regimes. Moderate Islamists achieved little during the remainder of Nasser’s
tenure, only resurfacing under the relative liberalization of the early Sadat years.
However, several factors from the Nasser era were of significance in the moderate Islamist
campaigns of the Sadat and Mubarak periods.
Nasser’s suppression of the Brotherhood, and the imprisonment of many of its most
influential figures, was to have unforeseen consequences for Egyptian politics, because it
stimulated a much more radical, reactionary Islamic ideology that was to lead to the
emergence of more extreme Islamist groups towards the end of his tenure as President.
Originally, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only political group left in existence by the
regime, which tried to co-opt it by offering the leaders three ministerial posts; the
Brotherhood refused, being unwilling to appear to support to the regime over issues where
it took an opposing stance. As a result, the regime dissolved the group – by then the largest
organized popular force in Egypt – in January 1954. Brotherhood activity assumed
thereafter a decidedly radical hue, leading to an attempt to assassinate Nasser in
Alexandria in the following October. Nasser thus had to deal with the Islamist movement at
large. He did so in an uncompromisingly brutal manner, concurrently crippling the
moderate mainstream of the Islamist movement, preventing it from either ‘holding the
alliance or nourishing the religious commitment of a new generation of fundamentalists’.8
Throughout the Nasser period, the moderate Islamist movement therefore existed in a state
of political and organizational limbo. The extreme approach of the radical Islamists,
coupled with the widespread public support for the social contract at that time, allowed
the regime to execute an indiscriminate, reactive policy against the entire Islamist
movement, moderate and radical alike. Despite the fact that Islamic activism was much
less significant as a political force during the Nasser era than it became later, this lesson
seems to have been well-noted and would be re-applied during the Sadat and Mubarak
periods.
From a SMT perspective Nasser was successful in pre-empting or suppressing opposition
politics because his regime acted against all the agents, sites and targets of mobilization
activity simultaneously. A key pillar of the Nasser strategy was to control the educational
and legal systems, the religious establishment and the press and media. This illustrated
that the regime clearly understood the opportunities and methodologies exploited by
opposition groups in the repressive environment of the time, and was quick to exercise the
capabilities of an expanded internal security apparatus. This served two complementary
7 Owen (Note 1) p32.
8 Kassem (Note 4) pp137-140
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aims; firstly, to control the political space afforded by the school, university, court and
mosque to opposition activism, and secondly, to appropriate opposition ideas and actions to
enhance the legitimacy of the regime.
Nasser was politically astute from the outset, and the regime exploited the strong emphasis
in Egyptian society on education as the prime means of advancement.9 The importance of
this approach should not be underestimated, as it had direct, strong emotional appeal
among a significant sector of the populace and allowed the regime to deny alternative
channels of political access to the opposition. Education was seen by the middle classes as
the key to a better future and was valued accordingly – almost regardless of the cost to
them under the social contract. This was set against a background of urgent need for
national economic growth, and thus betrayed a policy conflict – the demands of economic
growth compete directly with those of economic redistribution. This was to prove the
Achilles Heel of Nasserist policy, steadily undermining the social contract upon which the
political acquiescence of the population was based. Among those segments of society
considered ‘strategic’ by the regime, especially educated youth, genuine support existed as
they had been granted a symbolic and material stake in the revolutionary order.10 This
extra entitlement came at a political cost of course, and it was intended to neutralize their
potential to threaten the regime then and in the future. However, it was made on a largely
ad-hoc basis, and as a result of the conflicting economic pressures inherent in the
reform/redistribute policy nexus, it became concurrently unaffordable and difficult to
withdraw. After the 1967 war with Israel, the worsening economic pressures that
developed originally in 1965/66 produced an environment in which anti-regime contention
began to re-emerge.
Initially, frustration among university students and bureaucrats initiated sporadic public
protest – in contrast to the political abstinence of the population at large. A number of
Marxist and Islamic underground cells also began to form, but they were tiny in number and
size. Nasser was forced, in 1968, to grant more political freedom to the student
movements – these improved political opportunities allowed them to become the only
organised opposition to the government at that time. With an interesting irony, those most
indoctrinated by the regime became the most disaffected when the regime failed to
maintain the patronage bargain on which their support was based. This wave of protest
towards the end of Nasser’s rule was not significantly Islamically – motivated and thus
differed markedly from political contention during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. This
contention actually emerged in an environment of political upheaval – the military defeat in
1967, the death of Nasser in 1971, and economic recession – and brought into question for
9 Wickham (Note 6) p26.
10 Ibid pp21-23.
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the first time it’s underlying legitimacy.11 During the decline of the Nasser regime, the lack
of an organized party structure, weak institutions and corruption encouraged
patrimonialism and clientelism, and greater factionalism within the regime itself. Nasser
originally overcame these problems with the power of his personal charisma and
reputation, but the disastrous showing of Egypt in the 1967 war with Israel signalled the
end of mass political quietism.
Thus, Nasser quickly secured absolute power for his regime through a process of
institutional control, ideological dominance and an undeniable populism based on post-
independence optimism and personal charisma. However, his regime made a little terror
go a long way towards enforcing order; together with the police, military and security
forces, they crushed any opposition to Nasser’s rule and ‘crippled the people’s ability to
think and act’.12 It was, therefore, a de-facto police state that Nasser had established;
despite setbacks and concessions following the war of 1967, he managed to maintain it as
such until his death. During the convulsive end to the Nasser regime, Anwar Sadat was no
doubt aware of the twin dangers posed to him by the legacy redistribution policy and the
surviving Nasserist influence. He was also clearly alive to the importance of the student
protest movement in countering the latter, and the significance of patronage in securing its
support.
The Sadat Regime
When Anwar Sadat became President he attempted to reconcile the Egyptian state with the
dominant forces in its environment and adapt its institutions to the post-revolutionary
era.13 His overall approach to political reform was ambiguous in that the situation at the
end of his rule was not significantly different to that at the beginning – personal
authoritarian rule had been preserved, and any liberal measures that had been introduced
were almost always accompanied by limitations that prevented them achieving any real
impact.14
Sadat launched his ‘corrective revolution’, promising improved living standards and greater
democracy. This was a courageous undertaking, as establishing stronger links with the
West, and his as yet undisclosed intention to pursue peace with Israel, both essential pillars
of the revolution, were bound to stoke up resentment among the Islamist opposition. Sadat
was no doubt aware of this, and his co-optation of the Islamists against the Nasserites
11 Ibid pp33-34.
12 Ninette S Fahmy, The Politics of Egypt: State-Society Relationship (London: RoutledgeCurzon
2002) p60.
13 Hinnebusch (Note 2) p1.
14 Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I B
Tauris 2001) p20.
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suggests that he was perhaps also keen to stress the Islamic credentials of his regime in
order to temper that resentment. Like Nasser before him, his immediate preoccupation
was to cement his own power and influence within the regime; nonetheless, Sadat did
allow a more liberal political life to return to Egypt, implementing a programme of limited
electoral reform that resulted in the formation of ‘independent’ political parties.
However, Sadat actually transformed the Arab Socialist Union into a tame political party by
stimulating the development of several competing, pre-existing political tendencies within
it, ultimately allowing three of them – his own National Socialist Rally, the Liberal Socialists
and the National Progressive Unionists – to contest the 1976 election as separate political
organizations. By manipulating electoral law and procedures Sadat ensured that all three
parties came to represent broadly similar and unthreatening ideologies rather than
independent economic, social or cultural interests. Large segments of the population,
especially the lower classes, were thus disenfranchised, as they had no organization of their
own to represent them. This tentative ‘liberalization’ eventually foundered in the face of
growing popular opposition, especially to cuts in food subsidies in 1977 and Sadat’s entry
into peace negotiations with Israel. Law 40/1977 banned the two largest opposition groups
–the Nasserites and the Muslim Brotherhood - from participation as formal parties. This
strengthened further the power of the President at the expense of parliament in what was
to become a continuing trend in Egyptian politics. In reality, Sadat introduced political
diversity rather than genuine pluralism, and Fahmy speculates that this could have initiated
a transitional phase ahead of a truly pluralistic system, enquiring also why this did not
occur.15 The answer is provided by Sadat’s focus upon foreign policy and economic issues –
the need to be free of the Israeli threat and to attract substantial foreign investment,
especially from the US, as part of his infitah (‘open door’) economic policy. This provided
the impetus for a political liberalization that was in reality anything but, and replaced a
weak single-party system with an equally weak multi-party one.
Sadat had identified two potential threats to the survival of the regime – the emergence of
an independent civil society and a resurgent Islamist movement. In dealing with civil
society, Sadat took an opportunistic approach, maintaining the tactics of his predecessor to
control and contain opposition to the regime. The institutions of civil society remained
incapable of mounting any degree of organised protest and offered only limited utility to
the Islamists as alternative political opportunity structures. While his approach to trade
unions remained broadly similar to that of Nasser, the professional associations were more
directly affected by his economic policies than the unions were. The ability of the
associations to establish independent financial resources undermined the relative
importance of government-connected leaders who until then had brought access to state
resources; a degree of political independence was therefore possible, and on occasion
15 Fahmy (Note 12) p62.
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exercised – the associations maintained a degree of unity in opposition to unpopular policies
such as the peace agreement with Israel. Towards the end of Sadat’s tenure, the
professional syndicates began to free themselves of state control, becoming the primary
opportunity structures within which opposition political activity could take place. However,
there was no doubt where the real power lay, and Sadat did not hesitate to dissolve
syndicate councils as a demonstration of what little real autonomy from state control they
enjoyed.16 Kienle also identifies the imposition of illiberal pressures on civil society as a
direct consequence of reduced regime influence stemming from increased economic
freedom as a result of the infitah policy. The redistribution of resources that occurred had
the unforeseen side-effect of reducing the regime’s capacity for patronage, and this was
countered by new restrictions on liberties to preserve governmental control.17 Once Sadat
had secured his position, he thus built a new legal and constitutional framework to
underpin a system of personal authoritarian rule not so very different from that enjoyed by
Nasser.18 While the policies he implemented may have provided justification or motivation
for Islamic opposition activity, it was this fundamental dynamic of governance that
determined the rules of the game of regime/activist interaction.
Because of the political danger inherent in a retreat from the Nasserite social contract,
Sadat not only retained the educational and state employment provisions it offered, but
extended them. As university output grew, the state sector became increasingly bloated
and inefficient as it struggled to absorb it. This produced a social strata known as the
‘lumpen intelligentsia’ – a large pool of unemployed, undervalued and disenfranchised
young university graduates. In an attempt to align university output with employment
capacity, the regime introduced in the mid-1970s a period of delay between graduation and
employment by the state. What had previously been a distinct social class – the
professional, university-educated middle class – thus began to accommodate graduates
without means, as graduate earnings declined by about 20% over the remaining years of
Sadat’s tenure.19 In so doing it became a less distinct social entity, containing within it an
aggrieved constituency available for mobilization. Sadat had overextended the Egyptian
patron-state by retaining the social contract in order to buy political support and the
effects for the state were crippling in the long term. This was perhaps the beginning of the
developmental crisis that Ayubi believes to be the primary cause of the upsurge in Islamist
political activity which continues to the present, and in which ‘many new social forces were
unleashed without their energies being politically absorbed and without their economic and
social expectations being satisfied’.20 Sadat soon faced economic strains and unrest on a
16 Kassem (Note 4) pp99-104.
17 Kienle (Note 14) p5.
18 Kassem (Note 4) p23.
19 Wickham (Note 6) p38-41.
20 Quoted in Fawaz E Gerges, ‘The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt: Costs and Prospects’.
Middle East Journal Vol 4 Fall 2000 p611.
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politically significant scale, the latter for the first time concurrently from the excluded
lower class and the undervalued middle class.
Part of Sadat’s strategy to defeat the Leftist challenge and the remaining Nasserites within
the regime was to allow the moderate Muslim Brotherhood to re-establish its organization
to counter their influence. Sadat did not grant legal recognition to the Islamist groups, but
did allow them to function within the Egyptian state, even extending financial and
organizational support to them until his power was secured. In the vacuum created by
Nasser’s suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, many smaller, secretive Islamist groups
had come into existence, functioning through the extensive local and familial networks that
characterise Middle Eastern society. These covert groups were bolstered, as was the re-
emerging Brotherhood, by the release of Islamic activists imprisoned during the Nasser era,
and the Islamist movement was becoming increasingly widespread and powerful. At this
point, and throughout most of the 1970s, the moderate Muslim Brotherhood was still
severely depleted and proved less attractive than many of the more extreme groups to the
new generation of fundamentalist Islamic activists. In this environment were formed
groups such as Islamic Jihad and the alliance of Islamic student groups, the Islamic Group,
and Sadat at first supported them as their ideology and methodology utilized what he
perceived as politically neutral da’wa. This accommodating approach also allowed the
Muslim Brothers to stage a strong re-emergence during the 1980s, strengthened by a new
generation of younger, more politically aware activists who grasped the importance of
playing by the political rules. Responding to Sadat’s apparent liberalization, they
challenged the government in parliament or by using the political opportunities offered by
the institutions of civil society, such as the professional syndicates. Actually, two mutually
reinforcing and distinctly illiberal forces strictly limited their prospects – the self-interest
of an authoritarian regime, and the almost prohibitive regulation of opposition political
activity. The Islamists were excluded from the formal political system, so directed their
efforts at institutional outlets beyond direct regime control. It can be seen that this partial
reform helped to undermine the legitimacy of Egypt’s political institutions and elites. This
was not lost on the educated youth, who became further alienated, nor on the Islamists
who began to exploit this alienation. As a result, a political system ‘with a hollow core and
a dynamic periphery’21 evolved.
However, as Sadat’s policies became more unpopular, the radicals began to draw support
away from the Islamic student groups and a re-grouping Muslim Brotherhood. To counter
this unpopularity, Sadat cultivated the image of himself as the ‘believer President’ as part
of a wider framing effort to bestow Islamic credibility on the regime, which included
measures to infuse the state education system with more Islamic content. State schooling
21 Wickham (Note 6) p64.
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was predicated upon learning by rote, so pupils had little opportunity to develop critical or
analytical thinking;22 they were subsequently very receptive to Islamist teaching,
transmitted in a familiar discourse. This unintentional surrender of regime ideological
hegemony was to provide a ready resource for the radical Islamists in the future.
As the Sadat regime became increasingly illiberal, and more aligned with Western powers,
the true nature of reform became more widely understood and there developed in Egyptian
society what Wickham describes as a ‘Parallel Islamic Sector’ – a broad and varied network
of networks of different functions and objectives. It was independent of, and increasingly
in competition with, the Egyptian state; its efforts at coalescence and constituency building
were aided by Sadat’s attempts to boost the Islamic credentials of his regime and by the
availability of external funding generated by the regional oil boom of the mid-70s. Not only
had the resurgent Islamist movement become a political threat, but it had also
accumulated significant financial resources under the infitah policy – perhaps as much as
40% of economic ventures were controlled by Brotherhood – related interests alone.23 The
gains made by individual brethren explain why the Muslim Brotherhood collectively did not
oppose infitah, why the radicals gained support from the poorer classes, setting the scene
for an enduring split in the Islamist ranks, and why ideology within moderate movements
came to be consistently overshadowed by interests.
The peace negotiations with Israel cemented the regime’s unpopularity, even turning
previously co-operative moderates against it and leaving Egypt isolated among the states of
the Arab world. A popular religious revival was gathering momentum, and the Islamists
began to eclipse the Left as the leading opposition force. The state strategy of co-opting
the Islamic clerical establishment, intellectuals and moderates in order to contain the
radicals was failing, and Sadat decided to confront all Islamic activist movements,
moderates included. Under the legal and financial pressures applied by the regime, the
Islamic Group became more radical, more overtly political in intent and expanded its
support base well beyond the university campuses where it had originated. While the
Brotherhood remained a moderate organization, Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group
embraced ever more extreme and radical splinter groups, one of which (Tanzim al-Jihad)
was responsible for the assassination of Sadat. A historical progression is evident here,
whereby the ruthless crackdown of the Nasser regime gave birth to radical Islamism in the
late 1960s, and the subsequent removal of support for the broader Islamist movement by
the Sadat regime further reinforced the radical and militant tendencies within it
throughout the 1970s. They were bolstered by the more fundamentalist Arab states that
remained bitterly opposed to the existence of the state of Israel. Sadat was aware of this
22 Emmanuel Sivan, ‘Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Taking Over Governments’, Middle East Review of
International Affairs Vol 2 No 2 (May 1998). [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria598_sivan.html] pp3-4.
23 Wickham (Note 6) p95.
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exogenous influence upon domestic extremist groups and did not underestimate the
seriousness of it; it was an important factor in his decision to adopt a more confrontational
approach towards them.
Despite the unpopularity of the regime, the Islamists were unable to present a united front
and there remained a clear division between the moderates, rooted in the middle class,
and the radicals, who enjoyed support from younger, poorer segments of society. The
conflict quickly became polarized as one between the violent radicals and the regime.
When Islamic Jihad assassinated the President, hoping this audacious act would trigger a
popular uprising in Egypt, it illustrated quite how far removed from mainstream opinion and
aspiration the radicals were. Egyptian culture is deeply conservative, largely devout, and
not well disposed to internal revolt; at that time, ordinary Egyptians craved nothing more
than a simple means of improving their everyday existence. Because the radical groups had
deliberately cut themselves off from the middle classes and the ulema, they had no
realistic chance of ever instigating such an uprising; this disunity of the Islamist opposition
movement meant they could not even secure political access when Sadat was so
desperately unpopular. Also highlighted was the failure of the regime’s policy of co-option,
a fact noted by the successor regime of Hosni Mubarak.
The Mubarak Regime
Upon assuming the presidency in 1981, Mubarak pursued a flexible policy of supporting
moderate groups to a degree, including releasing many Muslim Brotherhood supporters
imprisoned by Sadat, and employing restrained repressive measures while the political
situation was favourable. The regime controlled Islamic activism within the legislative and
syndicate arenas with a combination of relatively low-key containment using restrictive
participatory laws, and a selection of co-optive methods. It is possible that Mubarak
believed the mass arrests of Islamists following the assassination of Sadat rendered them
unthreatening, and he concentrated upon establishing his personal rule within the political
apparatus of the state. This discreet and considered application of selective repression was
very effective and had partially inhibited the Islamists’ capacity to act as the major
catalyst for political change.24 Mubarak faced no immediate power struggle within the
regime, but did inherit a combination of socio-economic problems that posed potentially
serious challenges to the continuance of personal authoritarian rule. Sadat’s peace treaty
with Israel left Egypt isolated within the Arab world and had triggered widespread
resentment in domestic politics, the Nasserite Arab socialist experiment had produced
enormous national debts which had not been reduced by Sadat’s infitah policy, and the
multi-party political system perhaps hinted at a challenge to established rule. Not initially
24 Kassem (Note 4) pp148-151.
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concerned by the latter, Mubarak did allow a degree of political liberalization to take
place, primarily by allowing a small number of political parties to function, but only as a
means to legitimise his position and consolidate power.25 Continuity with the Sadat regime
is the defining, but not exclusive, characteristic of the Mubarak era. The class and special-
interest structure of the NDP remains much the same as it was during Sadat’s tenure, and it
continues to lack a clear ideology today.26 It still encompasses a collection of individuals
whose only common political aspiration is to cultivate and exploit patronage.
The Islamist moderates at this stage continued to pursue the introduction of symbolically
important elements of the Shari’a, whilst concurrently attempting to build the institutions
of an alternative Islamic economic and social structure (such as Islamic banks and
investment companies) in anticipation of securing real political power. They had by the
mid-1980s established themselves in the People’s Assembly and the professional syndicates
as the foremost opposition movement. In the People’s Assembly they did so by using
alliances of convenience with other parties and fielding independent candidates, as evident
in the 1984 and 1987 elections. However, while the moderates thus circumvented
restrictive electoral legislation, designed specifically to limit Islamist influence in the
formal political arena, voters still only enjoyed the means to select which party would
come second. Owen advances the view that even if the legislative elections had been truly
open and fair, the NDP may well have retained a commanding position. This is explained by
the close relationship between the regime and the NDP, the power of patronage politics
and the desire of the middle class in particular, after decades of protecting vested interests
shared with members of the bureaucracy, to preserve the status quo. Using superior
organizational and mobilizational skills, the moderates also made impressive gains within
the civil society institutions. The regime needed the professional classes to fulfil vital
functions within the state and society, and to preserve patronage relationships; it thus
allowed them a more generous degree of political manoeuvre compared with classes
regarded as unimportant. It was, nonetheless, very effective at controlling political
activity within the syndicates and, at best, Islamist activity in the professional associations
only facilitated the circulation of ‘zephyrs of change’ in Egyptian political life. There
existed no mass support for an Islamic state or the fundamentalists who aspired to it.
Radical actions, and the ambiguous attitudes of the moderate groups towards them,
repelled the more secular-minded members of the population, which made the
achievement of true political representation by the Islamists significantly more difficult
than it already was.27
25 Ibid p27.
26 Fahmy (Note 12) p65.
27 Owen (Note1) pp153-169.
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The Islamists recognised that the government would always attempt to use a ‘divide and
rule’ policy against such a large and disparate political alliance. As they all shared a
common aspiration to an Islamic polity, they initially refused to indulge in factionalism to
thwart any regime attempts to split their support. This was effective while political
activity seemed to bring collective benefit, as typified by electoral successes between
1984-87.28 It was not to last; the domestic effects of the deepening regional economic
crisis caused by falling oil prices strengthened the radical tendency of the Islamist
movement, as the regime further eroded the unwritten covenant forged with the people in
the Nasser era, and devalued by Sadat. This created mass dissatisfaction, as the sectors of
the populace hit hardest by these measures were already the most vulnerable. During this
period of state economic retreat from society, a powerful effect of the moderate Islamists
social programmes became apparent. The widespread failure of the state to provide such
services and goods was contrasted actively by the Islamists with their ability to provide
them at local level and their capacity to discharge the roles and responsibilities vacated by
the state in specific localities. This was a simple, yet highly effective ideological message –
the state has failed because of its moral turpitude and secular nature, whereas ‘Islam is the
Solution’. In response to this, Mubarak attempted to wrest the initiative from the Islamists
by distancing the regime from secular politics and culture and allowing Islamization of he
socio-political space. The Islamists interpreted this as a victory; the regime employed this
tactic as nothing more than a political expedient.29
Government tolerance of the Islamist gains was approaching its limit in 1986 when a new
and highly corrupt Minister of the Interior – Zaki Badr – took office and began to target the
means of Islamist ideological propagation. He understood how Social Movement
Organizations and Social Movement Communities were exploited by the Islamists for this
purpose, and initiated measures to control local mosques, or to close them down, to
prevent their use by Islamist ideologues and recruiters. He authorised large-scale arrests of
Islamists, followed by serious politically orientated charges, showing that the regime was
prepared to use the widest definition of ‘Islamic activist’ in its new repressive campaign.30
This was to have destructive implications; the Egyptian public were generally supportive of
regime actions against violent groups, but when state repression assumed this
indiscriminate and excessive nature, that support was significantly reduced, prolonging the
anti-extremist campaign that followed. Groups such as Islamic Jihad attracted more
support than they normally could have expected to, and it was only radical violence against
the domestic population and enforced ‘Islamization’ initiatives that began to erode that
support in the future. Kienle highlights the more subtle repressive effect of mass arrests
and military trials on the electorate - they would also signal to voters that the presence of
28 Kassem (Note 4) pp148-151.
29 Gerges (Note 20) p603.
30 Kassem (Note 4) p151.
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the Muslim Brotherhood would not be tolerated in the Peoples’ Assembly and therefore a
vote for them would be wasted.31 This was a convincing example of indirect regime
framing, demonstrated by the collapse in support for the Islamists and their allies.
Following the 1987 elections the state resorted to an even more careless and indiscriminate
policy of repression, typified by further mass arrests, torture and extra-judicial killings.
This initiated in turn the period of most extreme Islamist violence, and also infuriated a
large segment of the population, which though politically moderate, became embroiled in
the confrontations as a result of the government’s ‘catch-all’ definition of Islamic activists.
Thus, Mubarak faced an Islamist movement that was becoming more radical and extreme
than at any time previously. The number of domestic casualties of political violence began
to increase almost exponentially, illustrating the deteriorating relationship between the
regime and the Islamists, which was responsible for this and the resultant increase in the
number of political detainees. Mass military-run trials of civilians became routine, and the
radical Islamist movement firmly embraced terrorism. Mubarak was deeply suspicious of
all Islamist movements as the radical extremists were becoming increasingly active, and
domestic groups were attracting international support and sympathy. This could not be
controlled in the domestic environment by any other means than the resort to force which
was by now very evident. This was a factor of significant influence on the moderate
movement, because throughout the Mubarak era until the late 1990s, the relationship
between the moderates and the regime was actually largely defined by that between the
radicals and the regime. As long as the radicals presented a more immediate threat, this
determined regime responses and the moderates would frequently be portrayed as ‘the
‘acceptable’ face of terror’ in opportunistic repressive actions by the government. Guilty
by association, the moderate groups were repressed harshly by the regime, which was
supported by the secular opposition and the public, who believed that the violent actions of
the radical Islamists justified such a reaction. This became a self-perpetuating cycle of
atrocity and repression, the increasingly coercive and brutal nature of state responses
compounding the radicalisation of the Islamist movement, and leaving the moderates
politically marginalized in both formal and alternative political spheres. The regime-
generated moderate/radical link proved unbreakable in the public eye, a testimony to the
effectiveness and dominance of regime framing. The anti-democracy, anti-civil society
measures introduced by the regime were justified as ‘protecting Egypt’s nascent democracy
from the Islamists’, and government framing exaggerated violent radical excess while
ignoring or understating the positive contributions of the moderates to national order
(including supporting government action against Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group).32
SMT work on the power of activist framing does not fully explain this particular weakness of
31 Kienle (Note 14) p57.
32 Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2003) p193.
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the ‘power of ideas’, where the ideological message, no matter what familiarity and
authenticity it enjoyed with it’s target groups, did not overcome everyday concerns.
By 1992, the radical groups were operating openly in Upper Egypt and had established an
‘Islamic Liberated Zone’ in the Cairo suburb of Embaba. In addition, the government also
faced the increasing success of the moderates in raising support among the middle classes.
The regime responded with electoral manipulation, which limited the political impact of
the moderate gains, but did not prevent them from gaining influence through the
professional associations. The Islamist movement in Egypt then was broad and diverse;
there were moderate Islamist presences in the mainstream secular political parties, there
was the Umma party itself, the extra-legal Muslim Brotherhood and the violent radicals in
many small, secretive groups and cells. These groups were incapable of political unity
against the regime, reflecting the conflict of interests between internal factions, and this
vulnerability to divisions among component activist groups and social classes within society
at large was not lost on the government. When it adopted a policy of ‘total war’ against
the radicals in 1992, it also made clear that any further accommodation of moderate
opposition movements would be suspended until the radical threat had been eradicated.
The regime deployed 14000 troops and within 6 weeks had extracted the Islamists from
Embaba by force; this failed to trigger any wider revolt because violence used by the
radicals in controlling and ‘Islamizing’ the liberated zone had significantly weakened any
support they may have had.33 The radicals responded vigorously, but, by attacking a group
of foreign tourists at Luxor in 1997, killing 58 plus 4 Egyptians, they stimulated a popular
backlash against themselves more effectively than the government could ever have hoped
to do.34 A wave of moral revulsion, coupled with later economic hardship as the tourist
industry all but collapsed, destroyed radical support. The government, having maintained a
strategy of severe repression against them, crushed the radical movements, which began to
negotiate ceasefires and renounce violence within months, initiating what was to become a
new phase of Islamic activism in Egypt. Thus the years of worst violence from 1992-97 did
not trigger civil war or revolution; the principal reasons were the split between radical and
moderate Islamists, and the destruction of public support through the widespread use of
violence by the radical armed groups.
This opened the way in Egypt for government co-option of an Islamic activist movement for
which popular support was seriously eroded. Both Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group
recognised that the path to power lay in politics and formed political ‘parties’ in an
attempt to dissociate them from past violence, and to counter the view that their ceasefire
33 Gilles Kepel, Jihad:The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press 2002) pp276-298.
34 Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 2002) pp98-109.
41
was merely a tactical move. Confronted with irreversible defeat, they realised that to
secure any political success, they would have to forge a new alliance with the middle class;
they abandoned their radical ideology, rejected violence and began to embrace democratic
concepts and human rights. This was an astonishing volte-face, and many observers still
believe that it is intended to obscure the true Islamist agenda. The moderate influence
was greatly checked now the government was in a position of strength, and the Muslim
Brotherhood contained divisions of its own, between the traditional, elderly leadership and
a younger, more forward-looking generation that believed a new approach to opposition
was needed. Public support for the Brotherhood had been damaged by the ambivalent
attitude of some moderates towards the use of violence by the radicals, and the discrete
support extended by some members of its weakened leadership to radical groups.
Widespread aversion to radical violence had united the majority of opposition political
forces, and a sizeable proportion of public opinion, behind the government. While the
mainstream Muslim Brotherhood remained co-operative with the regime, and still attracted
a degree of support for their campaign to secure formal political status, the relationship
had become extremely one-sided and all Islamists had been greatly discredited.35
Another important advantage enjoyed by the regime was total control of the electoral
process; through what Kienle amusingly describes as ‘a discretionary approach to the
application of law’,36 it employed large-scale fraud, interference and irregularity to
manipulate electoral results favourably. It also controlled syndicate elections, by
implementing Law 100/1993 that was ostensibly aimed at preventing Islamist electoral
success in circumstances of low turnout. In fact, it deprived the Islamists of their last legal
platform in Egyptian politics. Islamist opposition to this simply strengthened regime
determination to deny them as much political opportunity as possible; several syndicates
dominated by Islamists were placed under direct judicial control and supervision.
Despite apparent signs of more pluralist politics in the 80s, when opposition parties secured
slightly wider representation in the Peoples Assembly, the subsequent elections of 1990,
1995 and 2000 betrayed a widespread ‘erosion of political participation and liberties’
resulting in reduced opposition minorities in the Peoples Assembly.37 The underlying
dynamic remained unchanged after the transition from Sadat to Mubarak, just as it had
done when Sadat replaced Nasser. Similarly, the power of the executive branch was
enhanced at the expense of the legislature and the judiciary, and the President expanded
the use of military courts to hear cases involving civilians in ‘acts of violence or terrorism’.
The expanded use of the ‘coercive apparatus’ of the military, security forces and police has
been a major feature of the Mubarak years, reflecting not only his protracted campaign
against radical Islamism, but his determination to deal with the Islamist opposition as a
35 Owen (Note 1) p185.
36 Kienle (Note 14) p60.
37 Kassem (Note 4) p30.
42
whole. Politically motivated arrests rose from 3600 in 1992 to 17000 in 1993, police and
Islamic activist deaths increased dramatically, and ‘mass Brotherhood trials became an
election-year tradition in Egypt’.38 This was the uncompromising backdrop against which
moderate Islamist politics was played, one made even more threatening by periods of
extreme Islamist radical violence between 1992 and 1997, which signalled the beginning of
the decline of the established Islamist movement in Egypt and the emergence of ‘New
Islamism’ as a potential political force in national politics. The end of the 1990s brought an
important change in the Islamist challenge facing the regime. Until then, the most
immediate and dangerous political threat to all three regimes had manifested itself in the
form of radical extremist groups with a hard-line, fundamentalist, undemocratic agenda.
They based their legitimacy on the Muslim duty to overthrow an apostate regime, and their
drive to achieve power did not include any serious consideration of what to do with it if
they were successful. Now the Mubarak government has defeated these groups, the new
threat to the regime, while at present much less significant, could nonetheless prove to be
more enduring and effective. A general, loosely defined democratic trend forming in Egypt
includes a changing moderate Islamist movement, the more forward-looking members of
which espouse a political programme more coherent than that of the regime itself and
profess objectives compatible in many respects with the wider regional aims of Egypt’s
superpower sponsor. This is examined in Part 3 of this Chapter and in Chapter 5.
It can be seen that a number of discrete factors have shaped the evolution of the moderate
Islamist movement within the Egyptian political environment, and thus determined the
impact of the movement on that environment, since 1952.
RQ 1:‘Which factors affected the impact of the moderate Islamist movement upon
Egyptian politics since 1952’?
The Nature of the Egyptian State and Civil Society
Civil Society and Access to Institutionalised Politics
Opposition access to formal political systems, which throughout all three regimes were
either closed or semi-open, has been severely limited; civil society, as a host for
alternative political opportunity structures for opposition groups, was similarly restricted.
The political environment in which the Islamist movement functioned may have been
subjected to different emphases by the individual regimes, but has remained resolutely
inhospitable to opposition movements. This has generated responses from the Islamists
ranging from the violence of the radicals to the acquiescence of those moderates who
38 Ibid p38.
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reasoned that all provocation of the state was counterproductive. It is the reason why
alternative political opportunity structures assumed significant and lasting importance to
the Islamists, even in view of the limited and conditional successes they generated. It is
certainly a major stimulus behind the emergence of the modernist trend among the
Islamists, discussed later in this chapter, all of whom believe that open, democratic
political systems must somehow come to change this self-perpetuating obstacle to political
progress and social and economic development in Egypt.
In the absence of true political access, the institutions of civil society have assumed an
importance in Egypt that reflects their de-facto status as an alternative political structure.
Civil society is broadly defined as a ‘melange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates,
unions, parties and groups that come together to provide a buffer between state and
citizen’.39 It represents the pragmatic, class-based interests of specific sectors of society
via trade unions and professional associations, for example. The apparent popularity of
Islamist movements during the mid-1980s brought some optimism about the emergence of
civil society in the region at large, although this was tempered by concerns about the
continuing activities of extremist minority groups which employed violence. Commentators
today use the example of Islamist social movements to underpin the contention that
genuinely autonomous groups exist in Middle Eastern society. This is somewhat misleading;
while moderate Islamist groups are to some extent organizationally autonomous,
operationally they are limited by ties of patronage, class and interest to the state itself,
and by the degree to which the state will permit access to alternative political opportunity
structures. In theory, the state apparatus is the neutral arena in which civil society
functions. But, in Egypt, the regime maintains tight control over civil society because it is
perceived to be a threat to its survival; regime members therefore wish to preside over one
that is fragmentary and lacking cohesion. While civil society has increased in size in Egypt,
this is not entirely the beneficial development it seems to be because the gain in extent
actually assists the regime to keep civil society fragmented. In their attempts to provide
an effective alternative opposition movement, the moderate Islamist movements
demonstrated an ability to mobilize support on a considerable scale. In so doing, they
relied almost exclusively on the institutions of civil society rather than those of the formal
political system. In common with secular parties in electoral authoritarian environments,
the Ikhwan have adapted, fending off state repression and retaining an organizational
existence. Driven by the motive of self-preservation, this adaptation has seen the
Brotherhood jockeying for domestic influence and seeking to influence important
international actors from a base in what passes for civil society in Egypt, rather than a
platform in institutional politics. This flexible, adaptive approach has been successful from
that perspective, so it is interesting to speculate what the Muslim Brotherhood and other
39 Kassem (Note 4) p87.
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moderate Islamist groups may achieve if subjected to the demands of open electoral
politics,40 freeing them from reliance upon alternative political opportunity structures
alone. The Islamists correctly identified the importance of a functional civil society, but
have so far been forced to use it as an alternative political opportunity structure because
of a lack of any alternatives. They are thus well positioned to exploit it in any future
process of democratic opening, but must remain cognisant of the fact that it is not a
substitute for openness in an institutional political system.
Egypt has a number of Laws that are designed explicitly to govern the formation of political
parties and to regulate their representation in Parliament. They provide various means by
which government control of the political space is guaranteed; politics in Egypt is a game
that is played on government terms alone. The government party, the National Democratic
Party (NDP), is faced by 4 major ‘opposition’ parties: the Liberal Party, the Nationalist
Unionist Progressive Party, the Socialist Labour Party and the New Wafd Party, plus the
largest extra-legal opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. None of the official
opposition parties provide credible opposition; in many respects they provide tacit, and
sometimes overt, support for government policy. Their very political viability is also
questionable, as they share with each other, the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime itself,
a number of serious shortcomings discussed in detail later in this chapter. This lack of
effectiveness of opposition parties in Egypt is as enduring as the state itself; it highlights a
political space that is dominated by the regime and typified by apathy and cynicism on the
part of the electorate, a significant factor partially overcome by the Islamists’ use of da’wa
to instil a sense of duty and responsibility in their followers. This perhaps explains an
ongoing reluctance by some moderate movements to abandon religious identity, even
though a significant degree of their support could also have originated from patronage
relationships.
Political and Institutional Failings
The compound legacy of all three regimes has resulted in major defects in the Egyptian
political culture, the political parties and the development of political opportunity
structures. A contradictory constitution, extensive Presidential political rights, a profound
imbalance of power between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government, and proscriptive party and electoral laws all conspire to weaken the
opposition political parties and groups in Egypt. The large ratio of independent to official
candidates (4:1 in 1990 and 1995) illustrates the weakness of the political parties and their
enduring failure to establish roots among the masses. This also indicates weak party
affiliation and loyalty, while the electoral success of many of the independents reflects the
40 Mona El-Ghobashy, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’. International Journal
of Middle East Studies No 37 (2005) pp391.
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failure to institutionalise the party system among the masses and within the political
culture as a whole. All of Egyptian politics is typified by a historical lack of any coherent
ideology, and is more a ‘politics of persons’ – parties function around the prominent
personalities of their leaders rather than a definitive ideology or programme. Of particular
relevance to the Islamists is the fact that the success of independent candidates who
possessed no electoral programmes shows that the criteria for support were clientelism,
kinship and religious sentiment. Even official party candidates succeeded on the basis of
personal reputation and charisma, or straightforward tribalism, or by distributing resources
in exchange for votes.41
Many of the Egyptian political parties exhibit inherent weaknesses; these are surprisingly
common and the Islamists are generally no better than their secular counterparts in this
respect:
Leadership shortcomings are prevalent – while actively criticising the government over the
length of time a President may hold office, many opposition leaders have held their
positions since 1976, and party regulations do not address the issue of leadership terms at
all. There is also a commonality in the dictatorial style adopted by leaders of both
government and opposition parties – even senior members of the leadership groups are
routinely excluded from the decision making process,42 and opposing tendencies or factions
within the regime and opposition movements are stifled by their respective leaders. This
failing in the Muslim Brotherhood led directly to the younger generation of activists within
it forming a distinct faction from the mid-1990s. This, and the Wasat Group which assumed
a distinct identity of its own from 1996, now comprise the core of the more democratic,
modernist trend discussed later in this chapter.
Lacks of unity, internal divisions and factionalism have been the plague of Egyptian
opposition politics; such infighting has done nothing to allow a supportive constituency to
develop. The government has keenly exploited this major weakness – to the extent that it
will deliberately encourage such factionalism in a classic ‘divide and rule’ approach. Such
a move was evident following the 1984 election when the Umma Party was allowed to form
by Mubarak with the intention of splitting the middle-class Islamist vote. The Islamists’
own internal disunity reflected the irreconcilable diversity of views and interests present
within their movement. All of this destroys the credibility of the parties concerned among
their supporters, and precludes any collective effort by opposition parties to present a
united front against the regime.
41 Fahmy (Note 12) pp89-92.
42 Ibid p95.
46
Despite cultivating a reputation for integrity among host communities and in municipal
politics, the Islamists have also shown themselves to be capable of all the fraud and
duplicity of the NDP and the secular opposition parties in parliamentary elections. The
Egyptian National Committee for overseeing the 1995 elections reported widespread use of
forgery and fraud by government and opposition candidates alike.43 While this is not
unusual in Egyptian politics, and it may thus be naive to expect opposition movements to
compete honestly in such a manifestly corrupt game, when malpractice is identified with a
political group that claims to be ‘cleaner’ than all its competitors it assumes a significance
it may otherwise escape. Corruption undermines the potency and effect of moderate
ideological framing, alienates their supporters, contributing to apathy and cynicism within
parliamentary and syndicate electorates.
The State / Islamic Activist Movement Relationship
The Importance of the Islamic Activist Movement as an ‘Opposition in Being’
The performance of the Islamist movement in Egypt was shaped greatly by the relationship
the various activist groups enjoyed with the state at the time. As Kienle explains44, the
illiberal measures taken by the Egyptian regimes since 1952 may be explained largely by
the conflict between the regimes and the Islamist movement. These measures were
applied to groups that were considered to reject liberal values and to be hostile to the
state. For example, during the Mubarak era repressive action by state forces increased in
response to the escalating use of violence by the Islamist militants. This approach was
always, and remains, an important element of regime framing, used concurrently to portray
the regime as seeking transition to democracy, while laying the blame for the lack of
progress towards it at the door of the Islamists. This is a transparent tactic, and overlooks
the illiberal trends that emerge in any case as entrenched personal-authoritarian regimes
seek to preserve their own power.
It does however illustrate the delicate balancing act played out by both Sadat and Mubarak
regimes, and to a lesser extent the Nasser regime following the 1967 war, which adopted a
more flexible approach to the Islamist opposition than the outright suppression of the early
Nasser period, perhaps in view of the increasing power and importance of the Islamist
groups. They had to keep the Islamists playing by the rules of the political game, which
they did by granting them just sufficient access and influence, whilst ensuring the Islamists
still functioned as an ‘opposition in being’ so they could be publicly portrayed as a threat to
national order.45 This latter tactic allowed the government to be seen as a lesser evil in
43 Ibid p97.
44 Kienle (Note 14) pp 4-5.
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the public eye, a useful bonus to their framing campaign. Their efforts to resolve these
apparently contradictory aims were greatly aided by the gift of radical Islamist violence,
which allowed them to establish the important moderate/radical link – clearly advertising
the threatening nature of Islamic activism, yet allowing a variable approach to be taken to
the moderates whereby the regime could repress or accommodate them. The effect of
radical violence, even on a very small scale, should not be dismissed; all three leaders
ultimately became suspicious of all Islamists as a direct result of extremist activities. Both
Nasser and Mubarak faced assassination attempts from, and Sadat was murdered by,
Islamist extremists; it is unsurprising that their views of the Islamist opposition were
coloured in such a way.
Activist Violence and State Repression
Even when considering moderate Islamic politics, a consideration of the use of political
violence should not be omitted, on several counts:
Reformed radical movements have now aligned themselves closely with mainstream
moderate movements, but many see this as a tactical, temporary move; the radical
outrages directed against Muslims, and moderate association with these groups –
including some refusals to condemn outright their use of violence – damages the
moderate cause.
The use of violence by the radical groups provided the regime with a political
opportunity of significant value – the means to co-opt the moderates in order to
contain the radicals, and the justification to repress the moderate groups more
forcefully than would otherwise have been the case.
Moderate groups have used violence in the past and suspicion persists that they still
possess the capability to use it again, despite public rejection of such methods.
The state employs political violence as a selective tool of variable intensity in
repressive enterprises. It has apparent justification to do so: from the regime
perspective violence has a record of success extending over 50 years in Egypt.
State repression is frequently cited as the reason behind the lack of true political access
achieved by the Islamists. Fahmy outlines how government coercion and harassment prior
to and during elections may produce the desired result in the election concerned, but
contributes noticeably to the radicalisation of political society in the long run, especially
48
when directed against ostensibly moderate forces.46 This gives the radicals a justification
for violence that in turn damages the moderate cause and allows further repression – both
of which limit political access even more. Wiktorowicz and Hafez state that in Egypt
opposition political violence began in response to a broad governmental anti-Islamist
crackdown and was therefore a direct result of state repression.47 However, the ideological
foundation of both Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group, the two most violent factions,
evolved not only during periods of severe repression under Nasserite rule, but also in the
relatively liberal environment of the early Sadat era; it is therefore questionable that
Islamist political violence in Egypt was always the direct result of repressive measures
alone. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that repression often compounded existing
radicalism rather than always initiated it. Their suggestion that radical violence originated
from frustration among the younger elements of moderate movements at the lack of
political gain achieved by those organizations is probably supportable, but this was the
result of several influences, the main one being that the moderates themselves failed to
generate a sustainable constituency despite manifest skills and successes in mobilization.
The Muslim Brotherhood did attract a level of support large enough to concern the regime.
Thus, if an atrocity carried out by an extremist group presented an opportunity to discredit
the Brotherhood publicly, it was seized upon. Conversely, when the Brotherhood offered
utility to the regime in helping to contain the armed groups, they were treated more
leniently for as long as they remained useful. The conflict between the regime and the
radicals was therefore very different to that between the regime and the moderates, as
Kienle observes;48 but what is important is that the moderates could not extract any
political gain from this. The radicals triggered repressive responses and the moderates also
took the consequences; the utility of the moderates to the government served government
purposes alone. However, the moderate Islamists did indirectly benefit from government
crackdowns; the precarious security situation allowed them to exert pressure on the regime
for further liberalization and Islamization of the political system. The regime may have
been content to allow the latter to some degree, using the process of Islamization as a
framing device in order to protect its Islamic credentials. Furthermore, external pressure
on the regime for increased Islamization did not come from Islamic activist groups alone;
the Mubarak government needed the support of the ulema of Al-Azhar to bestow legitimacy
upon its campaign against the radical Islamists, and the clerics made clear that greater
Islamization would be the price of that support.49
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Most significantly, the radical Islamists’ use of extreme violence in the 1990s sounded the
death knell for wider Islamic consensus and public support. This illustrates the profound
difficulty faced by activist movements that incorporate armed groups; the use of political
violence will always be the act that gains public attention, attracts the harshest regime
responses and exerts the most vivid ideological framing effect. It can become the sole
determinant by which the overall state relationship with moderates and radicals alike is
defined, a ‘worst-case’ response that bestows a legitimacy and freedom of action upon the
regime that will be exploited in the widest and fullest sense. Once any moderate group
becomes associated with violent cells or splinter groups, it becomes an easy target for
persistent and effective state repression. Furthermore, radical groups, through violent
outrage, achieve an impact out of all proportion to their size, lending further urgency to
state efforts to control or defeat them, and limiting moderate impact in the public
consciousness. The whole Islamist movement in Egypt rapidly came to be associated with
the actions of terror groups. Even after the defeat of Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group
in the late 1990s, the influence of global Islamic groups ensured that the Mubarak regime,
and indeed others in the Middle East, remained extremely wary of accommodating
moderate, reformist Islamist trends. This persists; tentative reform initiatives by the
regime itself towards moderate groups may well be destroyed or delayed by events like
those in the Red Sea tourist resorts in recent months.
Ideological Dominance
All three regimes achieved and maintained almost complete ideological dominance; Nasser
exploited the power of radio and television to forge his popularity with the masses and
discredit his opponents, and, like his successors, closed off opposition access to all means
of mass communication such as professional syndicate newspapers. While moderate
Islamists attempted to spread their message through Social Movement Communities using
pamphlets and audio cassettes, the government controlled all the state media (by far the
most popular among the masses) and opposition views and interests were denied exposure
via these channels. The Muslim Brotherhood tried to overcome this by using the publicity
mechanisms of the secular parties with which it formed political alliances; it is arguable
that this was a partially self-defeating action, for despite the Islamization of politics they
helped to achieve, Islamic activists ran the risk of diluting their popular da’wa by
association with secular parties advocating Western political ideologies.50 Regime
dominance also extended to the educational and legal spheres, activity in the former arena
indicating awareness of the need not only to block channels for Brotherhood framing
efforts, but also to exploit popular receptivity to learning as a conduit for the propagation
of regime frames. The importance of government control in legal circles is illustrated by
50 Sana Abed-Kotob, ‘The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood
of Egypt’. International Journal of Middle East Studies No 27 (1995) pp 329-331.
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the frequent and effective efforts to control civil society groups and to manipulate
electoral law to its own advantage. It is difficult to gauge the precise effect of this factor
on the Islamists, as they limited their political activism to carefully selected communities
in order to preserve safety and to avoid areas where extant support for secular parties
reduced their chances of nurturing any themselves. This did not mean that Islamist efforts
to initiate and sustain a counter-hegemonic discourse were unsuccessful, however. Despite
regime interference, the Muslim Brotherhood message was disseminated directly, by
participation in parliamentary politics, which was regarded as a means in itself to offset
regime ideological dominance. Election campaigns allowed framing to be spread more
openly when Ikhwan candidates were entered as independents or in alliance with secular
parties, and gaining access to the People’s Assembly allowed transmission of the message
without fear of legal restriction. Moreover, it allowed the government to be held
accountable against a specifically Islamic yardstick, strengthening public perceptions of the
Islamists as a positive force for good, battling against an un-Islamic corrupt regime. Of
course, the lack of legal interference did not stop the regime from employing the many
extra-legal instruments at its disposal, but Islamists nonetheless saw political participation
as a crucial framing mechanism to promote wider societal awareness of their cause.51 It is
interesting to consider how this tactic to circumvent regime dominance helped also to
reinforce Islamist commitment to participatory politics, perhaps offering an example of
how involvement in institutional politics tends to normalize groups of more narrow
ideological foundation.
Personal – Authoritarian Rule and Patronage Politics
The Resilience of Personal – Authoritarian Rule
The contradictory Egyptian Constitution highlights the significant gap between theoretical
ideals and practical realities. The principle of division of power between the legislative,
executive and judicial branches is subjugated therein to the principle of overriding power
bestowed upon the President. As Kassem states: ‘…since Nasser ascended to the executive
branch in June 1956, the Presidency has developed and continues to be the most dominant
force in contemporary Egyptian politics’.52 Consequently, Egypt’s political system has
become one of the most resilient personal-authoritarian systems in the world.
All three Egyptian regimes since 1952 have been markedly authoritarian in nature, lacking
the bureaucratic institutions by which to control society effectively. This brought them the
requirement to mobilize support, which was satisfied by coercive or encouraging means –
ideally, by destroying opposition elements resistant to control, and imposing conformity
51 Ibid p331.
52 Kassem (Note 4) p11.
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upon those that were more amenable to it.53 The relative ‘liberalization’ of the Sadat and
Mubarak years has been largely illusory; even the conduct of multi-party elections, as
Hinnebusch states, concealed an ulterior motive: ‘the multi-party system is more than a
mere façade because notables and activists play the game, but……because it advances their
co-optation, it has……reinforced rather than undermined authoritarian rule’.54 As a result,
any political gain by the moderate Islamist movement was only ever what the incumbent
regime would allow at the time. Islamist parties have never succeeded in generating
enduring mass political support; through a process of ideological compromise and alliances
of convenience, they became the means by which the secular opposition parties they sided
with secured the largest share of the opposition vote.
It was explained earlier that the Nasser regime ‘targeted agents, sites and targets of
mobilization activity simultaneously’ and this illustrates an interesting dissimilarity with the
two successor regimes. It could do so as a function of the newly increased capacity of its
coercive apparatus and the adoption of economic policy options not available to Nasser’s
successors as they proved to be entirely unsustainable in the long term. The social contract
had served as a tool of both patronage and coercion, (coercive as it demanded the
unspoken surrender of rights for resources) but became a costly and damaging legacy to his
successors. This not only restricted the magnitude of government largesse under Sadat and
Mubarak, but perhaps also dictated a compromise between spending on patronage and the
coercive apparatus.55 Sadat attempted to circumvent this with his infitah policy and
Mubarak by courting US sponsorship, but the differing methodologies supported the same
aim of preserving regime power. Because of this preoccupation with the continuity of their
rule, the regime attitude to opposition groups was shaped in a very definite and predictable
form. The regime responded to threats, and threats alone. The nature of response was
determined by the perceived severity of the threat, and the form of that threat – in terms
of ideology, political orientation, or legal status of the organizations concerned – was
largely immaterial. Islamists became the target for the most severe repression when they
constituted the most severe threat, and the fact that they were Islamists was practically
irrelevant. This is not to suggest that the government did not tailor its repressive responses
to deal with such threats – the Islamists were subjected to quite specific ideological attack,
and the regime was sometimes skilled at co-opting Islamist ideological framing to provide
themselves with bogus Islamic credibility.
Kassem sees mass arrests, the implementation of restrictive laws to limit Islamist gains, the
use of military courts and related repressive measures as evidence of the ‘fragility’ of
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personal authoritarian rule.56 On the contrary, the willing resort to such extreme measures
is one of the techniques by which such rule is preserved – the Mubarak regime has been in
power for 25 years, and employed repression as one of several means to end effective
Islamist opposition. In doing so it merely continued the practices of the Nasser and Sadat
regimes, and this ongoing preservation of personal-authoritarian rule has been the
dominant obstacle to effective political opposition of all types.
Authoritarian Politics as a Catalyst for Change in Moderate Islamist Movements
The Ikhwan were not invulnerable to the political influences acting upon them and Egyptian
society at large, and have also been shaped by the institutional political environment. As
was the case with European political parties following World War II, Islamist movements are
collectively becoming less utopian, less oppressive and more flexible as they move closer to
the political centre in search of wider support. Reinforcing the SMT contention that Islamic
activist movements are not unique social movements, ideological imperatives have been
abandoned as Islamist groups seek credibility and inclusion in mainstream politics; if the
national political space becomes more democratic in Egypt, this transformation of the
Islamist groups can be expected to accelerate. Parties in authoritarian political structures
play dual ‘games’ – an electoral game to secure votes and a regime game. When played by
the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter originally tended to have a delegitimation focus, but has
been superseded by an emphasis on steady participation which seeks to achieve transition
to democracy. In authoritarian systems, movements play both games simultaneously, and
many of the internal struggles within the Brotherhood revolve around balancing electoral
and regime games. Social movements thus become dynamic organizations in ongoing
transformation, and Islamist groups are no exception.57
Patronage Politics
Both the Sadat and Mubarak regimes have skilfully and selectively employed patronage, co-
optation, legislative control and physical coercion to implement ‘contained pluralism’ – a
technique that allows the regime to adopt a camouflage of liberalization without having to
make any real concessions to such a concept. The dominant means of gaining support is
the practice of patronage politics; in the absence of democratic institutions, a credible
ideology and governmental accountability, clientelism prevails, and regimes distribute
resources and exercise influence in exchange for political support. This is illustrated by
Kassem in an observation of relevance to both Sadat and Mubarak eras: ‘…an authoritarian
regime’s monopoly of ……patronage can provide it with the flexibility to utilize even a
potentially threatening process such as multi-party elections very much to it’s own
56 Kassem (Note 4) p152.
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advantage……the fact that it can preserve the political status quo while ……holding multi-
party elections with minimal use of…… the coercive apparatus, highlights the power of
patronage as a mechanism of clientelist co-option and control’.58 Authoritarian states use
the coercive apparatus much more readily than do democratic ones, and this in itself
requires the use of extensive patronage to ensure reliable support for the regime.
This is something normally associated with regimes alone, but Islamic activists proved
equally adept at using similar methods to raise support. Social programmes and local
support networks were instrumental in propagating the Islamist message and distributing
resources to the needy. This powerful means of Islamist mobilization, wherein framing
spread by da’wa was reinforced by the stark contrast between widespread state retraction
of economic support and localized Islamist provision of it, was implemented through
alternative political opportunity structures offered by professional associations and
informal Social Movement Communities. So from the outset, this was a programme that
was limited in scope and local in focus - activities within the professional syndicates, for
example, were essentially directed at special-interest groups. The Islamists could not hope
to provide social support on the scale it was needed, and admitted that only the state
could attempt to tackle such extensive problems.59 The Muslim Brotherhood, in reality,
was practising the patronage politics of the state, without the resources of the state. The
people they supported were grateful for assistance from wherever it came – their
acceptance of it did not in any way signify an ideological alignment with, or political
allegiance to, the Islamist movements. Indeed, it is questionable whether such support
bought any enduring loyalty at all, as observations of a coercive aspect to Islamist
mobilization, including framing practices strongly reminiscent of those of the regime, are
not rare.60 In short, the long-term erosion of personal wealth and state services in Egypt,
bestowed a primacy upon need over any ideology. This is something the Islamists,
especially the moderates who were bigger social providers, seemed to have underestimated
consistently. Politics is both personal and local; while citizens may be prepared to vote for
Islamist candidates in local municipal or professional association elections, experience
throughout the Middle East and the wider Islamic world, especially Turkey, shows this is not
repeated in national elections where more purely political concerns predominate. In Egypt,
the principal reason not to vote for the Islamists arises from the widespread economic and
material disadvantages suffered by the electorate. They realise that the domination of the
government party, the NDP, brings about two considerations of direct relevance to them in
everyday life. First, regime legislative and electoral manipulation will ensure that a vote
for the Islamists is a wasted one; using independent candidates alone or in alliance with
58 Maye Kassem, ‘In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt’ (Reading, Ithaca
Press 1999) pp182-183.
59 Wickham (Note 6) pp192-193.
60 Ibid pp154-155.
54
other parties, the Islamists have never secured a majority in the People’s Assembly, and
have never challenged the NDP stranglehold; they remain an extra-legal political
organization. Secondly, despite the characteristic apathy of the public towards politics,
they see the NDP as the only means by which to gain access to government resources.
Owen outlines typical characteristics of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East; of
particular relevance to Egypt is the desire to systematically inhibit the development of
class-consciousness, preserving the middle class tendency to adopt an individualistic focus
determined by interests. Middle class individuals need to protect interests arising from
patronage relationships and authoritarian states need to exploit this dependency to retain
control. The state must therefore ensure that a degree of collective class independence
does not develop to threaten this control mechanism. Thus, public policy favoured the
accumulation of private wealth, ensuring that a mutual understanding between the middle
class and regime made the former supporters of the status quo.61 The government exercise
of patronage was not without effect in the moderate Islamist camp either, as the middle
class was far more dependent upon government resources and influence than the lower
class, which was regarded by the regime as politically unimportant. This was a
phenomenon mirrored in the professional associations, where established, middle-class
members failed to assist unemployed young professionals. It undermined the cohesion of
the Islamist movement within the syndicates, which it used extensively as alternative
political opportunity structures. This led to a comfortable acceptance by many moderates
that the regime was a better bedfellow than the radicals, and they settled into the
malleable practice of the ‘politics of permanent opposition’. This stimulated the rise of
the younger generation of moderate Islamist modernists who believed a new approach was
needed to overcome this political stagnation in their movement. A further consequence of
patronage politics is economic underperformance by the state. Inconsistent economic
reforms, dictated or diluted by the demands of patronage, bring injustice and disadvantage
to many segments of the populace, and can exacerbate rather than eradicate the root
causes of political extremism. All three regimes faced economic crises at various times,
and none of them demonstrated truly competent management of the economy. In
authoritarian contexts, this matters less than it does in democratic ones, and only the most
severe economic hardship constituted a threat to the incumbent regime; a general
economic ineptitude has become an apparently permanent feature of Egyptian governance
as policy is driven by the more immediate priorities of patronage politics.
61 Owen (Note 1) pp35-39.
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Regional and International Influences
The state/activist movement dynamic throughout all three regime periods illustrates that
exogenous factors affected both the state and the opposing tendencies within it, and that
these factors may thus be considered constants.
To varying degrees, all three leaders attracted hostility from others in the Muslim world as
a consequence of Egypt’s political individuality. In forming relationships with world powers
(either the USA or the USSR – both seen as secular, Western and antithetical to Islam), they
were accused of betrayal by those who believed the nature of Egyptian society should be
Islamic. Nasser was less Western-aligned than his successors, but was nonetheless a very
secular-minded leader and this aroused significant antagonism in regional Islamic states.
His forays into Pan–Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism were interpreted by many in the
region as the pursuit of Western ideological aims. Sadat and Mubarak faced much greater
antipathy, domestically and regionally, for their support of a peace agreement with Israel
and their pursuit of Western investment in Egypt. This led directly to the assassination of
Sadat, and an attempt on Mubarak’s life in Addis Ababa in 1995 by Islamic jihadis. A
persistent thread of Islamist framing has highlighted this Western alignment unto the
present, and Mubarak’s regime is one of the most important targets for global jihadi groups
seeking to rid the Arab world of what they consider to be apostate regimes. This in turn
ensures the threat of radical extremist groups continues to serve as justification for the
continuance of authoritarian government and the suppression of moderate Islamist activity.
Regional economic underperformance, especially in those states without significant rentier
income from oil and gas exports, also generated conditions of concern to both the regime
and Islamist movements. Economic crises directly resulted in the emergence of social
elements of young, unemployed university graduates ripe for political mobilization,
demanded unpopular austerity measures of the state and severely restricted external
funding available to Islamist opposition groups. They strengthened the stranglehold of
patronage on Egyptian political life, and a continuing lack of improvement remains without
doubt a stimulus for radical opposition activity.
The Israeli/Palestinian dispute is widely reflected in Islamist framing throughout all three
political eras, with the US/Israeli ‘conspiracy’ a favourite target of vitriol that highlights
the complicity of the Egyptian regime within it. This is effective primarily because it
exploits the pre-existing sense of inferiority in the Arab mindset explained in Chapter 3. It
also exploits a wider anti-US sentiment among the masses that has been used by both
regimes and activists alike when it suited their purposes, and has grown into an entrenched
facet of Arab public opinion - even among some modernist Islamist reformers, although the
more pragmatic among them do hold a more nuanced viewpoint. An anti-US stance is
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evident even in the pro-democracy, more secularly inclined organizations, and the
significance of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was a major factor in the transformation of
the major radical Islamic groups. After years of struggle against the Egyptian state,
militant Islamists concluded that the ‘external enemy’ was the most dangerous one and
only by political integration within Egypt could they hope to influence efforts to combat
the US/Israeli axis.62 An anti-US stance is thus present across the entire range of Islamist
politics in Egypt; given the pivotal importance of US foreign and economic policies for the
Middle East, Islamists aspiring to power in Egypt must dwell on their policy towards the US.
PART 2 – THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERATE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN EGYPT
Following the development of the moderate Islamist movement since 1952, the defining
characteristics of the movement at present may hint at the strengths and weaknesses of
the movement in a future political environment.
RQ 2: ‘What relevance have the existing characteristics of the moderate Islamist
movement to it’s potential future political role’?
Interests vs Ideology: Islamist Political Motivation
The Islamists greatly underestimated the degree to which conservative Egyptians would
follow class-determined interests, with the moderates attracting support in the middle
class and the radicals becoming entrenched in the poorer classes and areas. Consequently,
there was always a conflict between ideology and interest; fundamentalism proved to be
transient and abstract to many followers, and there always existed suspicion of, and
sometimes open opposition to, an Islamic state governed by Shari’a – moderate recognition
of which was illustrated by their notable reluctance to advertise the importance they
attached to it in electoral campaigns. This was clear in the middle class who remained tied
to the governing NDP through business interest and patronage networks, and also at times
among the lower class, as evidenced by the collapse of support for the radicals in the
Islamic Liberated Zone of Embaba, where the violent enforcement of Islamic practice soon
alienated the established family, clan, business and criminal groups. More evidence is
provided by the fact that the Islamists targeted their social support at very carefully
selected areas of urban conurbations where poor provision of state services and the
absence of secular self-help organizations and political parties left an institutional void. In
areas where these groups existed, resistance to Islamist activism was clearly evident.63 The
primacy of class-based interests over ideological commitment among Islamists became an
enduring weakness that would be exploited by the government. The moderates were
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frequently co-opted by the regime in order to contain the radicals; their conservative,
middle-class base led them to accept this imposition as the preservation of the status quo
was far less threatening to established interests than revolutionary upheaval. So while
their gradual transformation of society was designed to lead to the removal of the regime
in the long term, it would also ensure continuity and the protection of interests.
The moderate approach to achieving their objective of an Islamic polity was gradualist,
long-term, generally non-violent and based within the existing political structures. Many of
the leading moderates rejected an overtly political approach, aspiring instead to transform
a corrupt society into an Islamically pure one; once this was achieved, a truly Islamic state
would be the natural consequence. This unworldly objective meant that their project
concentrated upon the trivial and politically irrelevant and largely avoided the social,
economic and political realities of 20th Century Egypt and the wider world. This was
another factor leading to the practice of the ‘politics of permanent opposition’ - a tacit
recognition by the moderates, perhaps, that the essential compromises demanded by real
politics would entail at least a partial retreat from their moral high ground – thereby
introducing public doubt about their real commitment to either democratic politics or
fundamentalist Islamic purity. Wickham observes that the Muslim Brotherhood ‘was the
only opposition movement capable of mobilizing substantial popular support for an
ideological programme distinct from that of the Mubarak regime’ and that it was ‘the only
opposition party with a programmatic alternative to the incumbent regime’.64 The
moderates ‘ideological’ programme was certainly different from that of the regime, with
da’wa introducing the idea of personal and civic duty, but neither the Islamists nor the
government possessed an ideology worth the name. The Islamist message was usually
secondary to competing class-based interests within the movement, an occurrence that is
to some degree at variance with SMT work on the ‘power of ideas’ within activist
movements. Ideas are powerful, but only when complete and well defined to those likely
to analyse them in detail. This includes those with interests and patronage relationships to
preserve, not only potential political activists. Common concerns arise commonly;
effective solutions to them are thus more likely to earn political capital for those who
provide them than any abstract ideology, no matter how vividly it is conveyed.
This primacy of interest over ideology is something that any new Islamist political entity
will have to be fully aware of and plan for; decades of patronage, and persistent need,
have bred a mentality that will be most resilient in the face of change. This highlights the
importance of tackling modern socio-economic problems with modern policies derived from
a realistic and consistent ideology; only then can the root causes of radicalism and the




The moderate political programme never matured into anything remotely realistic or
capable of tackling the foundations of extremism; the concept of both an Islamic state and
Shari’a law has remained unelaborated throughout the three regime periods to date, and
the Brotherhood continue to use ambiguous terms such as ‘Islamic Democracy’ and ‘Islamic
frame of reference’ in their theocratically-toned discourse. The arguments associated with
an Islamic state and the place of Shari’a within it are well beyond the scope of this paper
and both concepts enjoy as much variation as does the Islamist movement itself;
interpretations of Shari’a range from a primitive list of punishments for transgressions, to a
sophisticated framework for the formulation of a contemporary legal code. For the
purposes of this study, the issue is what degree of import and relevance to the moderate
programmes do these concepts enjoy? Essentially, they are becoming increasingly
symbolic, and while it is unrealistic to expect acceptance of the complete severance of
religion and politics, even the older generation of the Ikhwan were consistently careful to
avoid pressing for implementation of anything other than the more symbolic elements of
Shari’a. Kurzman usefully identifies three ‘modes’ of liberal Islam by their relationship to
Shari’a. He uses the categories of ‘Liberal Shari’a’, ‘Silent Shari’a’ and ‘Interpreted
Shari’a’ to illustrate the approach of different groups to this important issue, but,
arguably, the one theme common to all of them is that of human interpretation. Indeed,
the modernist Islamists espouse views that are spread among all three modes and to some
extent overlap. However, they share several basic principles within the framework of
Shari’a and Islamic state concepts – they reject theocracy, champion democracy, hold a
modern view of women’s rights, take an inclusive stance over the rights of non-Muslims,
advocate freedom of thought and do not fear modernity.65 While their views on these
subjects may not closely conform to Western liberal democratic norms, it is important that
they do not, certainly in the near term. Muslim democracy must be definitively Muslim,
and the retention of religious and cultural identity is an essential ingredient of that; in
turn, implementation of Shari’a is a symbolic manifestation of that identity. Intelligently
applied, it can also be much more and Islamic modernists stress the utility of Shari’a in
providing a modern and relevant rule of law for Muslim democratic societies. The key to
integration of the Islamic state and Shari’a concepts within a modern political system is
thus informed contextual interpretation; this has the potential to allow a degree of
religious identity to be retained and exploited without inducing conflict with the
unavoidable realities of the 21st Century.
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Reliance on Patronage Politics
There are two significant disadvantages of patronage politics that affected the entire
Islamist opposition. First, a dependency upon patronage dictates a contrary, short-term
determination of priorities and formulation of policy that can help to bring about the
downfall of the patrons as a result of the unpredictable and fluctuating demands of the
patronage process. This is a facet of more relevance to a regime, which at least ostensibly,
is pursuing a formal policy under the public gaze. The Islamist opposition, lacking any real
policies, was less threatened by, but not immune to, such inconsistency. It will, however,
be forced to confront such issues if it ever assumes even shared political power. Secondly,
patronage is clearly dependent upon the provision of resources, and is thus a means of
generating support that is far more useful to an established regime than a repressed
opposition movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, whenever it was allowed to do so,
practised patronage politics only to find it could not meet the demands of its own,
relatively small, special-interest communities. When external influences such as the
collapse in oil prices during the 1980s restricted funding from sources like Saudi Arabia, the
opposition practice of patronage became much more vulnerable than that of the state.
Such use of patronage rendered the moderates’ underlying mobilizational power difficult to
quantify, despite its singular importance to their effort. The multi-party system
established by Sadat never permitted representation of the masses precisely because it was
never intended to; Islamic politics therefore offered the only alternative to the regime and
support for them must be viewed in that context – it is unwise to interpret such support as
unqualified endorsement of an Islamist agenda. Moderate social support programmes thus
represented in many cases the only alternative to paltry or non-existent state provision.
They were ad-hoc, localised and short-term; they were intended to mobilize support and
were not part of any political strategy to be implemented in the event of assuming power.
As a consequence, the methods of mobilization the Islamists developed as a counter to
repressive politics proved to be unsuitable for converting mobilizational power into
sustainable political support. Thus, movements aspiring to political power would be unwise
to rely extensively upon patronage at the expense of realistic, relevant policies of direct,
everyday emotional appeal to a significant section of the populace.
Mobilization Structures and Resources
SMT illustrates that grievance alone cannot explain the participation of individuals in
activist organizations. For a movement to have political viability and impact, the aggrieved
must be able to act collectively and to do so they must have access to political opportunity
structures, to the resources needed to gain and retain support and to channels of
ideological propagation.
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The confrontational relationship between the state and the Islamists during all three
regimes forced the Islamists to adopt techniques common to non-Islamic social movements,
which were designed to meet the needs of mobilization, not participatory politics. In their
choice of alternative political opportunity structures they unintentionally limited their own
impact. The primary alternative structure they chose was that provided by the foremost
Social Movement Organization of Egypt’s restricted civil society – the professional
syndicates. This parasitic approach, by which the Islamists penetrated the syndicates
extensively, allowed them to capitalise upon a long tradition of politicisation among the
syndicates themselves.66 Many commentators suggest that Muslim Brotherhood activity
within the professional syndicates was a unidimensional initiative, a measure of last resort
in the face of effective government denial of mainstream opportunities to the opposition
groups. Fahmy believes this was, in fact, part of a wider, co-ordinated campaign by the
moderates to increase overall political support across all segments of society.67 She
believes the Islamists pursued the support of the population at large through alliances of
convenience with other political parties, that of the poor masses through voluntary and
social work undertaken by Islamic NGOs, and the influential middle class vote through
activity in the professional syndicates. Certainly, Brotherhood activity within the most
politically influential syndicates began to bring ascendancy from about 1984 onwards; they
went on to achieve their maximum representation in the People’s Assembly during the 1987
alliance with the Labour Party, strongly suggesting the complementary approach that
Fahmy outlines.
The Brotherhood demonstrated in this campaign an organizational ability that
overshadowed that of its competitors, utilising both Social Movement Organizations and
Social Movement Communities within and beyond the boundaries of the syndicates
themselves to mobilize support and propagate it’s ideological message. However, it is
questionable whether such activity brought the moderate Islamists any lasting political
benefit, for two main reasons.
First, Fahmy outlines convincingly the political failures of the syndicate organizations and
these are closely comparable with those of the political parties discussed earlier – rigid,
undemocratic leadership, divergent objectives, corruption and financial mismanagement,
factionalism, intolerance, and extensive disunity among the syndicates collectively.68 In
reality, the Islamists’ behaviour in the syndicate electoral processes was far from the
example of integrity, honesty and transparency promoted by their apologists. The Muslim
Brotherhood proved adept at fraudulent practice, and an examination of financial activity
undertaken by the organization in pursuit of religious and political objectives entirely
66 Kassem (Note 4) p112.
67 Fahmy (Note 12) p143.
68 Ibid pp 144-146.
61
unsanctioned by syndicate membership, shows irregularity on a huge scale.69 These
internal shortcomings facilitated external interference and control from the regime,
reducing the effectiveness of what could have become an active and significant political
counter-structure. This seemed to be a possibility when the professional associations
became increasingly important to the moderates during the Mubarak era; however, the
growing number of disenfranchised young graduates within the associations exacerbated
class-based differences, illustrating the dominance of such interests over ideological
motivation or the lure of da’wa. It is doubtful that the associations ever represented true
political opportunity structures at all; in view of the readiness of government responses to
Islamist gains, they seemed to offer, probably via middle-class patronage networks, a
means by which the government could monitor any emerging Islamist threat. The less
formal, more loosely structured Social Movement Communities were much harder for the
state to penetrate and tended to be more closely associated with the lower class. While
they proved effective channels for ideological dissemination, the means by which this was
delivered – social support programmes – was popular because of extensive need among the
target populace, not necessarily because of any inherent receptivity to the Islamists’
message. While the Islamists could mobilize support on the political periphery therefore,
the professional associations did not constitute a political opportunity structure in the
centre by which such support could be converted into political effect.
Secondly, the moderates’ gains were not as dramatic or significant as many observers
claim. They must be seen in the context of extensive political apathy, and a small core of
well-organised and able Islamists exploited a very specific, and ultimately short-lived,
opportunity to gain control of syndicate councils. Typical turnouts in the council elections
(expressed as a percentage of the total syndicate members) were frequently below 15%,
and even when this increased in the early 1990s to over 20%, this was partially as a result of
pro-regime membership efforts to counter the influence of the Islamists.
While professional syndicates were de-facto political bodies, syndicate elections remained
precisely that and their results did not reflect the development of a core of support for the
Islamists that would be significant nationally. The political opportunity structures
exploited by the Islamists were therefore of limited use in the closed or semi-open
environments of Egypt between 1952 and the present. As a means of political access
utilised as a response to repression, they are of no relevance to legal political organizations
operating within a truly democratic system. This strongly emphasises the importance of a
genuinely independent civil society as a foundation of any pluralist political system.
69 Ibid pp141-147.
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Guilty by Association with Radical Islamist Violence
This has been one of the most persistent and effective elements of regime framing directed
against the moderate Islamists, and must be overcome if future productive development of
Islamist politics is not to be compromised. If the causes of political violence are not
related to state repression alone, then when repression is abandoned during any
democratic transition, the problem of political violence may be ameliorated but is not
automatically solved. Indeed any such transition may be a trigger for violence in itself. For
the entire Islamist moderate trend in Egypt (i.e. the ‘Old Islamist’ moderates, typified by
the older generation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the reformed radicals and the Islamist
modernists), this poses the question of what relationship the Old Islamist moderates and
the Islamist modernists should have with the reformed radical movements in any future
pluralist political environment? The answer should be based on a purely rational balance of
political advantage. Essentially, despite the abstinence from violence they have
maintained since 1997, the reformed radicals are simply too great a political liability to
Islamist politics in a pluralist or transitional democratic setting. Their previous violence is
not forgotten and their reformation is still treated with widespread suspicion, because it is
thought to be insincere, or enforced under state-applied duress. The radicals could thus be
damaging to the moderate cause in the future as they have been in the past. As they
always represented a tiny hard-line fundamentalist minority, and destroyed most of what
little support they had, the support they are likely to attract is outweighed by that they
may repel. The moderates, therefore, should unequivocally reject any idea of a coalition
with the reformed radicals.
Cultural and Ideological Framing Processes
Islamist movements in Egypt share a common historical and cultural context within which
they all compete for power in national political arenas defined by particular state borders.
Roy highlights that some of them have challenged the legitimacy of the state concept itself
and pursue the formation of a Muslim community that transcends it, but the great majority
of Islamic activist movements pursue political aims within one given system. This has two
apparently contradictory implications:
First, competing in the 21st Century, the Islamists share vocabularies, ideas and
organizational structures with their secular opponents within these political arenas.
Democracy, civil society, human rights, just and accountable governance are all concepts
that feature in their discourse. They share a generally nationalist view and a concern with
the ‘national project’, even though they may declare they observe a different type of
patriotism/nationalism.
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Secondly, despite a stated desire to do so, religiously motivated actors have failed to
translate their theological principles into programmes for creating institutional structures
that are significantly different from those of the secular nation state – no Islamic movement
has ever produced a convincing alternative.70 This lack of definition of what an Islamic
polity might really be, and of precisely what form Shari’a might assume in the 21st Century,
is an enduring feature of Islamist politics and largely explains the reservations held by many
towards those who advocate an Islamic state. The challenge for the Islamist modernists is
to pursue truly democratic ideals and realistic priorities within a demonstrably Muslim
framework, while tempering these reservations and making their own aspirations a more
coherent and important objective for the populace at large.
PART 3 - ISLAMISM IN TRANSITION
Since the defeat of the radical terror groups towards the end of the 90s, the failure of
Islamist groups to overcome the power of a repressive, authoritarian state in Egypt, the
dilution of purely Islamic ideology in pursuit of a more pluralist and inclusive one, and the
renunciation of violence by the two most powerful radical groups indicates that Islamism is
in a state of flux and transformation.
By the end of the 1990s, the mainstream moderates had little to show in terms of forcing
change upon the autocratic Egyptian regime, and it is initially tempting to suggest they had
failed in their political mission as a consequence. The support they attracted because of
the apparent (and sometimes illusory) distance they maintained from ‘dirty politics’ gave
them a moral free hand, exploited during years of repression, but not carried into the 21st
Century. Radical intolerance, religious policing, public beatings and stoning, and violence
against civilians, intellectuals and foreign tourists have persistently devalued any
achievements made in the social and community spheres by the moderates. Islamic
activists are aware that despite manifest successes in mobilization, they never attracted
sufficient mainstream support to bring them an electoral majority. The authoritarian
nature of moderate leadership has limited their organizational flexibility, undermining their
political impact. The Old Islamist moderates and radicals thus presided over the failures of
the last decade of the 20th Century. However, the moderates had contributed to the
Islamization of the political environment within Egypt, and, more importantly, had evolved
after years of failed opposition to regime repression. While the Muslim Brotherhood
remains excluded from the political sphere and is still repressed by the regime, and other
moderate Islamist initiatives are obstructed by the regime at every turn, democratic
Islamists have maintained their commitment to political reform. This underpins the latest
70 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press
1996) pp11-16.
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evolution of Islamic political thinking, which Shadid suggests is based on 4 precepts:71 it
recognises and seeks to exploit the ongoing religious revival, it focuses upon the state
system as the unit of activity, it is democratic in intent and aims to achieve a diffusion of
religious authority. This latter point identifies a desire to break the patronage relationship
between the regime and the ulema, rather than the total separation of church and state.
The moderate Islamist alignment responsible for this new thinking is part of a wider nascent
political trend including less significant Arab pro-democracy groups such as Al-Ghad and
Kifaya, which could perhaps be considered ‘no’ vote organisations; they are all, however,
concerned with a political system of genuine benefit to Muslims in the 21st Century, rather
than one that is rigidly Islamic. For simplicity, this Islamist alignment within the wider
democratic trend will be referred to as the ‘Islamist modernists’. While many moderates
continue to call for the establishment of an Islamic state, this is increasingly symbolic
language alone; in real politics, these ideals are subordinated to the priorities of liberal
democratic reform. Islamic rhetoric maintains the distinctiveness of religion-based politics
and sustains the appeal of the Ikhwan among its followers; while the moderate Islamists are
embracing pluralist politics, they do not all surrender their religious legacy. In reality,
promoting democratic reform and developing pragmatism are becoming additional
components of a comprehensive Islamist modernist agenda.72 It would be unrealistic to
measure the ‘success’ of the movement against a yardstick of political impact on the
regime and institutional politics in authoritarian Egypt; no opposition group was ever likely
to be afforded the political opportunity to threaten the regime in any way. To do so in the
future will require commitment to participatory politics, well-reasoned policies of popular
appeal and engagement with international actors such as the USA in order to bring about
regime concurrence for democratisation. That the moderates have emerged from over half
a century of repression to demonstrate such commitment is arguably far more significant
than past pursuance of a delegitimation campaign against the regime and a utopian
religion-based ideology.
The Muslim Brotherhood began a process of ideological transformation in 1994; their
statement on party pluralism and women’s rights illustrated the developing generational
cleavage in the movement. This was followed in 1995 by a ‘Statement on Democracy’
which outlined new thinking on the issue of the status of non-Muslims, the relationship
between religion and politics, political violence and human rights. Significantly the
statement asserts that ‘there is no ineluctable contradiction between…popular sovereignty
and a Shari’a based system’. The impact of the new thinking was subsequently attenuated
by frequent uncompromising statements from the ruling generation of the Brotherhood,
especially the General Guide, Mustafa Mashour, which raised enduring doubts about these
71 Shadid (Note 34) p71.
72 Amr Hamzawy, ‘The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists’. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Policy Brief No 40 August 2005 pp2-3.
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ideological revisions,73 leading a group of moderate Islamists to conclude that a new Muslim
political initiative was needed in Egypt. Originating in the centrist Islamic mainstream –
the Wasatiyya – a group of intellectuals known as the New Islamist Trend (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘New Islamists’) outlined a detailed political ideology that could propel
the more democratic and inclusive Islamist political groups to popularity. These are the
younger, more politically dynamic generation of the Brotherhood, plus the Wasat Group, an
even more moderate and inclusive organisation that sprang from this younger generation in
a widely reported ‘split’ in 1996. The Wasat group was immediately noteworthy for its
stance of religious toleration and rejection of privileged interpretation of religion by the
ulema, and its stated objective to ‘go beyond the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’’.74 There is
a clear distinction between the two; the New Islamists are intellectuals, not political
activists, whereas the younger Ikhwan faction and the Wasat Group comprise moderate
activists with very definite political ambitions. A further distinction needs to be
highlighted here: the Wasat Group recognise the similarities between themselves and the
younger, more progressive generation of the Brotherhood, but highlight their own desire to
separate da’wa and political activity, in contrast to the continuing combination of the two
in the Muslim Brotherhood. Whereas the Wasat Group thus portrays itself as a civil party, it
believes the Ikhwan’s religio-political character is threatening to both state and
Brotherhood alike, and perpetuates the ambiguous vision of an Islamic state held by the
latter. The Wasat group published two versions of their political programme – the first by
Rafiq Habib (a leading Protestant intellectual) in 1996, updated by ‘Abd al-Karim, a
professor of aeronautical engineering, in 1998. This is unusual in itself, and both versions
elucidate a clear project based on a modernist interpretation of Islamic law, to be
implemented in a way that ‘does not hinder progress’. The entire thrust of the programme
stresses the importance of tolerance, diversity and pluralism. Religion is seen as a
fundamental component of pluralism, but religious practice and political orientation can
vary within it. Shari’a is seen as a valuable collection of principles, but the application of
them requires the production of laws by human beings. However, while secular reformers
such as al-Naggar consider the Wasat programme to be a significant initiative, other
secularists voice concern that Shari’a remains a pillar of the group’s ideology75.
Rashwan suggests that the ideological orientation of the Islamist groups will be the ultimate
determinant of the development of them; the moderates may differ in the way their
political and social enterprise relates to the tenets of Islam, they may also differ in their
interpretation of some of those tenets themselves. They are united, however, in their
73 El-Ghobashi (Note 40) pp382-386.
74 Augustus Richard Norton, ‘Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egypt’s Hizb Al-Wasat’ in Robert W
Hefner (Ed) ‘Remaking Muslim Politics’ (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2005) pp133-134.
75 Ibid pp143-144.
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conviction that their respective projects are ‘Islamic’.76 The Old Islamists tend towards a
religious interpretation of this, while the Wasat/New Islamist grouping hold a firmly
civilizational view; the young generation of the Brotherhood fall between the two, their
viewpoint being less refined than that of the latter, but showing more flexibility and
capacity for contemporary contextual interpretation of the Islamic state and Shari’a
concepts than the former. They, in common with the New Islamists and the Wasat group,
show a willingness to adapt ideas from other cultures and show a continuing commitment to
align the Brotherhood with the profound changes taking place in the early 21st Century.
Collectively, the Islamist modernists recognise many of the limitations of Islamist thinking
and activity outlined previously in this chapter and seek to broaden the impact of Islamist
modernist politics beyond the mere continuance of patronage and the ‘politics of
permanent opposition’. Their outlook is rooted in the concept of social justice rather than
individual liberty; the Wasat Group, especially, advocates a rigorous, modern and
contextual interpretation of the Islamic sources in an attempt to define a political creed
that will stand the test of the global age, in strong contrast to that of the old generation of
the Muslim Brotherhood. It recognises the importance of Christian and other minorities
within the national community, and argues that a distinctly ‘Muslim’ democracy is an
essential foundation of any contemporary Egyptian society. Muslim democracy is not a
mature concept, and will be explored further in Chapter 5.
The New Islamists aspire to develop a ‘system of government [that has] respect for all
freedoms, collective and individual, [and] pluralist elections within the rule of law’77 and
seek to engage the widest political cooperation and participation in pursuit of this aim.
The response of the Muslim Brotherhood suggests it was aware of the support this viewpoint
had the potential to attract. Publishing a reform plan with a strong emphasis on
democratisation in 2004, the Brotherhood placed itself within the emerging Egyptian reform
consensus and among liberal opposition movements in order to bridge the religious-secular
divide as a prerequisite to forming genuinely democratic alliances. In turn Arab liberals
also recognise the potential of the New Islamist initiative, and the reality that excluding
Islamist moderates from the political arena will only diminish the prospects for democratic
transformation. Secular-religious national alliances are considered by Hamzawy to be
instrumental in contesting state power and articulating popular consensus over the need for
political change.78 The New Islamist programme is ideally suited to serve as a foundation
for such an alliance of Muslim Brotherhood, Wasat Group and Arab liberal democrat secular
groups.
76 Diaa Rashwan, ‘Islamism in Transition’. Al-Ahram Weekly Issue No 420 11-17 March 1999.
77 Joshua A Stacher, ‘Post Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party’, Middle
East Journal Vol 56 No 3 (Summer 2002) p417.
78 Hamzawy (Note 73) p5.
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Stacher postulates that the emergence of the Wasat group is driven not only by the ideas of
the Wasatiyya intellectuals, but is also a response to three possible stimuli: the politicising
influence of the professional associations, the exclusive, autocratic internal nature of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and government repression. During the 1990s, when Muslim
Brotherhood influence in the professional syndicates was prevalent, a generation of
younger moderate activists was exposed to political activity in that environment; they
gained valuable experience and a desire to participate in politics that distinguished them
from their colleagues in the Muslim Brotherhood.79 Despite considerable acrimony between
the new Wasat group and the established Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime, swift to stifle
any potentially threatening development, withheld formal recognition as a political party
from the Wasat group on the basis that they ‘failed to add anything new to the existing
political parties’, eventually granting the group the status of a NGO. At the same time, the
regime also attempted to fragment the Brotherhood by mass arrests of members, including
carefully targeted young moderate ‘rising stars’, prior to the 1995 and 2000 elections,
recognising that the modernist influence was not something confined to the Wasat Group
alone. Stacher argues that a desire to form a more distinctly independent and moderate
grouping, to avoid the wrath of the state, could have developed in consequence.
Determined to avoid the ‘guilt by association’ suffered by their moderate predecessors, the
New Islamists have been publicly critical of those who exercise political violence; also, they
have been consistent critics of the Mubarak government’s indiscriminate repression and
suppression of even moderate political activity. Their political ideas show a definite real-
world grounding and can be summarised as: ‘an inclusive project based upon cultural
commonality rather than religious difference, seeking extensive educational reform as an
essential first step, before building a national community which includes a functioning civil
society and is subject to modern and effective socio-economic policies’. 80 Their acute
awareness of the dangers of the extremist views of the Old Islamist radicals, which
traditionally find a receptive audience among the disenchanted, underprivileged young
Egyptians, explains the importance they assign to educational reform. They believe that a
balanced and broad education can allow people to see propaganda and corrupt ideology for
what it is. This stress on education as a fundamental of the civilizational project is
politically highly astute; state education at present is woefully under-resourced and this
particular breach of the social contract has been an enduring cause of resentment and
discontent throughout the Mubarak era. It is also inimical to developing independent
critical thought in pupils, and contains an undue religious emphasis stemming from the
Sadat era. There is clear political potential in an approach that has strong and direct
popular appeal by offering the masses not only what they want in terms of a basic state
education, but if implemented correctly, extends the hope of developing a new generation
79 Stacher (Note 78) pp415-416.
80 Baker (Note 32) pp39-40.
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of young Egyptians with the ability to evaluate for themselves any political ideology,
secular or religious. The New Islamists ‘educational solution’ thus compares very
favourably with the regime’s ‘security solution’, - the latter given new impetus by the
Global War on Terror and US support for Mubarak’s government.
The New Islamists, even moreso than the Wasat NGO, seek to distance themselves from the
Old Islamist moderates; they highlight the unrealistic programme of the latter, which is not
based on any coherent political platform. The New Islamists seek to provide intellectual
and ideological guidance to moderate social forces from all trends in Egyptian society,
allowing a consensus on national identity and political direction to serve as a baseline for
cooperative coalition politics, free of the sterile ‘secular vs. Islamic’ debate.81 They
contrast this with the political stalemate between the government and radical Islamists in
the mid-1990s, which in their view destroyed the hopes of the masses by also preventing
the development of any viable moderate alternatives. However, they give insufficient
credit to the fact that established movements such as the Ikhwan are well-rooted in
Egyptian society and must therefore possess significant potential for constructing broad
alliances for political change. Most importantly, with the selection of Mohammed Akef as
General Guide in 2004, the Ikhwan for the first time publicly adopted ideas developed by
the younger generation of the movement. This was a move aimed at several audiences, not
least the Egyptian government and the Bush administration and its ‘Forward Strategy of
Freedom in the Middle East’. This strengthens the case of the Ikhwan for inclusion as an
important element of any democratic alliance in the future.82
The Islamist modernists’ collective approach to contemporary socio-economic issues is
increasingly realistic. They believe that only scientifically sound policies have utility in this
respect, and acknowledge that Western expertise can be used to achieve economic
development. However, they add the proviso that this must be done ‘in ways consistent
with the values and purposes of Islam’,83 illustrating that Muslim democracy may evolve
with a moral dimension, and an appreciation of collective responsibility, that is arguably
lacking in Western liberal capitalism. This ethical emphasis does not dictate a repeat of
previous experiments in Islamic economics and banking; the modernists believe commercial
and economic activity can take Western or Islamic forms provided it does so within a
framework of social justice. They do not restrict this pragmatic outlook to domestic
economic policy alone, recognising and advocating the need to participate in the global
economic system. However, they stress the need to break the dependency of Egypt upon a
superpower sponsor, and to set economic objectives based on national priorities wherever
possible. They admit their thinking on this subject requires further elaboration, but the
81 Ibid pp41-46.
82 El-Ghobashy (Note 40) p390.
83 Baker (Note 32) p131.
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fact they have started from a scientific and pragmatic baseline is a development in the
Islamic sphere that is particularly noteworthy.
So, regardless of whether political Islam can be considered to have failed or not, it is
evident that a process of profound change is underway. The suggestion that the Islamists
collectively are solely responsible for an Islamization of the national political environment
is not completely supportable; it is more accurate to suggest that they responded to, and
exploited, a process of Islamic resurgence that was already in train among the populace.
The Egyptian regime, during both Sadat and Mubarak eras, was aware and suspicious of
this, but ultimately contributed to the Islamization process as a political expedient in order
to gain support from the ulema in combating the Islamic radicals and to give the impression
of beating the Islamists at the religious game. This is not to suggest that the moderates did
not achieve anything noteworthy since 1952. Even acknowledging that changes evident
since 1996 are as much a product of the realities of political participation and the
restrictions of authoritarianism as of any process of considered change among moderate
Islamist groups, the more modernist, democratic and pragmatic trend that has emerged
from within the Muslim Brotherhood is testament to some kind of enduring commitment to
non-violent, participatory, inclusive politics. This is commendable, and the consequential
wider acceptance afforded to the modernists by secular Arab liberal groups offers hope for
the future.
This must, however, be interpreted in context. The modernists represent the only
significant strand of Islamist thinking grounded in contemporary political and economic
reality to emerge from the tenure of these three consecutive regimes. Persistent
undemocratic personal-authoritarian rule, supported by near complete ideological
dominance interlocked with domestic class interests, and perpetuated by superpower
regional policies, provides a difficult obstacle to be overcome.
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CHAPTER 5 – THE FUTURE – DEMOCRATIZATION, MUSLIM DEMOCRACY AND
ISLAMIST MODERNISM
In Chapter 4 the historical evolution of the Islamist movement, and the factors that shaped
it, were considered in conjunction with an analysis of which characteristics of the
movement may prove significant in any future political environment. It is now necessary to
examine how factors in the wider political sphere in Egypt and the Middle East may
influence the development of the modernist movement, and indeed be exploited by it.
RQ 3: ‘What exogenous influences are likely to be most significant to the future of
moderate Islamic politics’?
Many of the factors that shaped the evolution of moderate Islam to date are indicated in its
future development. Despite the fact that the nascent Muslim democratic trend is small
and lacks an organised constituency, the regime appears no more likely to allow it political
space than it did the moderate Old Islamists, and actively associates the Islamist
modernists with their traditional forebears in its framing activity. Muslim democracy is a
concept which is gaining some support throughout the Middle East and is potentially a
promising development; the Mubarak regime sees it as simply another threat to the
continuance of established rule and strives to stimulate popular fear of an Islamic state in
attempting to stifle it. This direct connection with a rigid Islamic state is thus a political
liability of which the Islamist modernists must divest themselves; their future is
inextricably linked with the growth of a tolerant, inclusive, Muslim democracy. Their
civilizational project includes many ideas – especially the power of balanced education and
modern economic policies – that could prove instrumental in eradicating the causes of
extremism. To implement them, they must attract a constituency and bring about a
process by which democratic governance can take hold. Coalition politics, within and
beyond the Islamist movement, appears to offer the only realistic course by which to
pursue this aim. Despite the restrictive political environment within Egypt, pressures for
democratic reform are growing as never before throughout the Middle East, US Foreign
policy is evolving in response to harsh lessons from the War on Terrorism and military
adventuring in Iraq, and radical Islamist groups remain an ongoing concern for the Egyptian
government and public alike. The development of the Islamist modernist movement cannot
occur in isolation from these influences, and democratization in Egypt represents an
essential component of it; the commonality of these issues across the region strengthens
the contention that eventualities in Egypt may enjoy significantly wider relevance.
Democratization as a Catalyst for Political Reform
A positive future for moderate Islamic politics is entirely dependent upon the emergence of
democracy and in Egypt this will be subject to two competing influences – the interests of
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the entrenched regime and the aspirations of the opposition political movements. The
process of democratization in itself is the catalyst by which moderate Islamism could
achieve broader political acceptance, and by which the enduring commitment to
democracy of its adherents could be demonstrated and tested. Similarly, the interest
democratization is attracting nationally, regionally and internationally cannot be ignored
indefinitely by the Mubarak regime. Balancing these influences in any transitional process
will be challenging, but recent developments in US foreign policy may offer potential to
assist with providing that balance. The importance of developing political constituencies
within an independent civil society as an element of such a process cannot be overstated,
and US regional policy may also evolve to be a more significant factor in this respect.
Regime Interests - The Durability of the Egyptian State and the Influence of US Foreign
Policy
In many respects the emergence of democracy throughout the entire Middle East is
hindered by entrenched regimes more than by radical Islamist movements. Indeed,
Abootalebi concludes that the disproportionate power of the state over society leaves the
latter at the mercy of the former, and that the major obstacles to the emergence of
genuine democracy are rooted in the endurance of authoritarian states, especially ones
wherein there are no truly effective civil society groups to counterbalance state power.1
For those who contend that the Islamist social support networks constituted a significant
part of Egyptian civil society, this ignores the fact that these networks were to a
substantial degree based upon dependency and patronage, and were acutely political
vehicles for the propagation of the Islamist agenda and the delegitimation of the regime.
As such, they were subjected to sustained scrutiny and repression by the regime and could
not function in the way Abootalebi describes as ‘truly effective’. They cannot therefore be
considered an entirely satisfactory model for an emerging civil society despite the fact that
they indisputably brought benefit to some of the most vulnerable groups in Egyptian
society. Ideally, states and regimes should play a full and constructive part in developing
the concept of Muslim democracy, including human rights and political and economic
modernity, while recognising the important religious and cultural influences that
differentiate such a concept from a Western secular one. However, this is unlikely, and
when the tenure of these regimes is perpetuated by US foreign policy, especially so since
the outbreak of the War on Terrorism, how can they be encouraged to undertake
meaningful reform? In order to exert leverage on the Egyptian regime in a non-threatening
way, the modernists need to attract the political support of the US; in turn, the US must
revisit its foreign policy towards the region and develop a more detailed understanding of
1 Ali R Abootalebi: ‘Civil Society, Democracy and the Middle East’. Middle East Review of
International Affairs Vol 2 No3 Sept 1998.
[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria98_abootalebi.html] p2.
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the ongoing transformation of Islamist movements. In distinguishing between Islamist
rhetoric for domestic consumption, and the real-world foundations of pragmatic Islamist
modernist policies, the US may come to lose its fear of the Islamist movement in its
entirety and recognise the enormous diversity that exists within it.
US foreign policy has long been a contentious factor in Middle Eastern politics and remains
so; it is concurrently a major stimulus for democratic change and a significant obstacle to
it. The US administration does recognise that the persistence of undemocratic states and
personal-authoritarian rule are major contributors to the growth of Islamic extremism, but
also has superpower interests to protect. Khan is alive to the degenerating credibility of the
US administration in the Middle East but believes it possible to recast US policy; he stresses
the importance of overcoming Muslim antipathy as a precursor to, and part of, that aim.
Thus, he links the realization of a Palestinian state, and the urgent need to dispel the
notion that the War on Terrorism is actually a war on Islam, to any initiative to implement
real democracy in the region. Khan proposes a future US policy based upon a principle of
‘compliance for security’ whereby states in which democratic governments are less
prepared to comply with US interests, actually contribute to stability and security in the
Middle East by removing the major stimuli of radical extremist groups. Thus, the promotion
of democracy in the region no longer remains inimical to US national security interests.2 If
this premise is accepted, it overcomes the two main inconsistencies inherent in the US
approach to establishing democracy in the region:
The ‘inconvenience of democracy’ was an argument advanced originally during the Cold
War as the US sought to balance power between itself and the Soviet Union. Democracy
was too unpredictable a force to allow it to threaten this aim. That imperative has been
replaced by the need to court undemocratic allies in the War on Terrorism whilst at the
same time imposing ‘democracy’ on Iraq and forcefully advocating change elsewhere in the
region. While the US drive for democracy is ideologically genuine, the protection of
superpower interests does place a premium upon political stability rather than change.
This pragmatic outcome, if not the reasons for it, is not lost on Arab populations; if they
wish to restore their regional credibility, the US authorities must pursue democratic change
at the expense of stability and recognise the importance of nurturing a form of democracy
rather different to that enjoyed by US citizens – specifically, a definitively Muslim
democracy. Ideally, any revised policy must avoid direct association with those groups or
political alliances most likely to pursue this objective, and accept that they may not
achieve power alone, or even at all, in the near term. Muslim democracy is not only
compatible with Khan’s ‘compliance for security’ proposal, it should be a pillar of it.
2 Muqtedar M Khan, ‘Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of US Policy’, Middle East Policy
Vol X No3 Fall 2003 p85.
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Islam and democracy are considered to be incompatible by many US advisers. This is not
the case. There is nothing in Islamic sources to support the incompatibility argument; it is
based instead on narrow, exclusive and out-of-context interpretations that are widely
discredited in the Muslim world, especially so by Muslim modernists. The key to democracy
gaining credence is precisely what form it takes. It is presently popularly considered to be
a ‘Western’ concept, with all that implies; however, it need not remain so and a more
obviously Muslim form of democracy, with a focus on societal justice rather than individual
liberty, offers a realistic proposition as elaborated by the Islamist modernists. Such a focus
is exemplified by the Refah party project in Turkey, which is also much more loosely tied to
Shari’a and has earned widespread electoral support.3 Whilst a dislocation from Shari’a is a
step too far in Arab countries at present, this outlook does indicate the appeal of fair and
pragmatic political programmes; thus, Muslim democracy must come in concert with
sustainable political and economic policies or it will fail to address the underlying problems
affecting Egypt and the wider region that were never resolved by Nasserism, Arab Socialism
or nationalism.
In turn, the US must resist the urge to transplant ‘Western’ democracy into Muslim
societies, and should recognise that the concept of democracy is contextual. With
reference to Egypt specifically, but also as a template for wider reform, US aspirations may
be partially satisfied by a further development of the New Islamist project – one which
recognises the real-world focus of the latter, while acknowledging also the need to
incorporate Old Islamist support. Indeed, many commentators suggest that the only
realistic option for future US foreign policy towards the region is to accept that cooperation
with moderate Islamist movements is indispensable if progress is to be made. In fact,
excluding the Islamists from the political sphere probably undermines the possibility of
democratization taking place more than anything else. The perceived challenge that
Islamist organizations pose to democracy cannot be met by befriending moderate but
marginally important groups, and the US must not make the mistake of using Arab Liberal
groups as a counter to religious movements on the false assumption that the latter are all
anti-democratic. It can only be met by dealing with mainstream, powerful organizations
that will ultimately determine the future of Middle East politics, the most significant of
which is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.4 The US could therefore discreetly promote the
concept of an Islamic coalition within a national democratic, multi-party, cultural and
civilizational political project, taking care to preserve regime options for the future while
still allowing political openings to materialise. Signs that such a course of action may be
3 Anthony Shadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats and the New Politics of Islam (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press 2002) pp146-148.
4 Marina Ottaway, Islamists and Democracy: Keep the Faith The New Republic Vol 232 Issues 4716
and 4717 June 2005.
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under consideration come from the new Strategy Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)
apparently being developed by the US State Department, which together with the Moderate
Muslim Outreach programme forms components within the overall Forward Strategy of
Freedom in the Middle East. In this strategy, announced by President Bush in November
2003,5 which appears to incorporate thinking closely aligned with that of Khan, the
immediate military emphasis of the Global War on Terror will be replaced by a more
considered, cultural and educational approach which includes a strong emphasis on
‘moderate Muslim outreach’ to discredit extremist ideology.6 In a striking ideological
opportunity, the Islamist modernists’ proposed educational reforms could be used as a
foundation of this ‘battle of ideas’ against the hateful precepts of radical Islamic terror
groups, and as such could actually form an integral element of the SAVE initiative.
Importantly, domestic Initiatives are much closer to the roots of radicalism and are likely to
be better received than any perceived as imposed solely by the US; this suggestion may also
allow direct US association with the Islamist modernists to be avoided, which is an
important consideration for the future. This is recognised among the Islamist modernist
community; Abu Ela Madi, a founder of the Wasat Group, holds a balanced and nuanced
appreciation of the West, in common with many of his modernist contemporaries.
Acknowledging that ‘America is not the West, the US public is not the US government’ and
that Egypt’s present relationship with the US discourages reform, he reasons that serious
efforts by the US to broker reform would be well received.7
If this is so, the proposed US SAVE initiative and the Egyptian Islamist modernists’
educational emphasis, may together offer a unique confluence of thought that could be
combined effectively within the ‘compliance for security’ proposal advocated by Khan.
However, how can these strands of thought be integrated and transformed into workable
policy proposals without alienating the Mubarak regime? The US must overturn the overly
secular focus of current policy that may exclude the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat
Group from future developments and instead of regarding with fear ‘parties with an Islamic
character’, recognise that they may invoke creative political ideas and pragmatic
principles.8 A possible solution is a graduated approach with intermediate priorities, in
which a long-term objective is pursued in realistic stages. At first, the US could
appropriate the educational ideas of the New Islamists and attempt to persuade Mubarak to
implement educational reform designed specifically to counter radical Islamist ideology.
5 Jeremy M Sharp, ‘CRS Report for Congress: US Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East:
The Islamist Dilemma’ Washington DC, Congressional Research Service June 15 2006 p5.
6 Guy Dinmore, ‘US Shifts Anti-Terror Policy’, Financial Times 31 July 2005.
[http://FT.com/terror/London blasts-business impact-US shifts anti-terror policy] p1. Date accessed 01
Aug 05.
7 Augustus Richard Norton: ‘Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egpt’s Hizb al-Wasat’ in Robert W
Hefner (Ed) Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton,
Princeton University Press 2005) p149.
8 Ibid p157.
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Realistically, effective reform will require substantial investment, and a re-evaluation of US
aid priorities may be required. This can only be attempted with the complete concurrence
of the regime, and will not ameliorate widespread public perception that the latter is too
closely aligned with the US. Therefore, as the next stage in the process, that perception
must be tempered by bringing material improvement to the lives of ordinary Egyptians
while exerting pressure for real democratic change upon the regime. Given the national
respect for education in Egypt, careful educational reform could serve both purposes.
Through increased provision of quality state education, the consequences of a retreat from
Nasser’s social contract may be reversed, democratic ideals may gain a degree of
governmental and popular support, and the cultural and anti-radical thrust of the New
Islamists’ project may gain credence, providing continuity with a future social-democratic
coalition. Ideally, the long-term US aim must be to overcome Arab hostility, and SAVE can
thus be only one part of a wider overhaul of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Indicating
that such an overhaul may be underway within the Greater Middle East Initiative, Secretary
of State Rice has served notice upon the Mubarak regime that it must deliver genuine
democratic reform in Egypt,9 signalling the primacy of change over stability in emerging
policy aims. But, in the short term, the key to any educational and cultural solution is the
ability of the Islamist modernists to generate a domestic constituency and encourage
support for Muslim democracy; part of the US effort should thus include a much more
critical evaluation of the development of civil society permitted by the regime in order to
facilitate this, and the re-prioritization of US aid to Egypt offers a potentially very effective
mechanism by which this may be achieved. Ultimately, a future coalition government less
aligned with US aims than the current regime is not a disastrous prospect, and a focus on
defeating violent radicalism in itself serves US security interests. While the US
administration may be reluctant to see the Mubarak regime replaced, it also recognises the
potential consequences of preserving authoritarian rule against the popular will.
Furthermore, there is no reason why the NDP could not compete in transitional elections.
Overall, this strengthening current of change could help to transform US policy into a
positive external influence, with the power to overcome negative internal influences, in
the Middle East democratization process.
Opposition Aspirations - The Democratic Concept and Constituencies
One of the difficulties faced by the pro-democracy community in the Middle East is
illustrated by the situation in Egypt, where the strongest advocates of democracy form a
tiny intellectual elite that enjoys little political affinity with the masses - far from an
organised constituency with the power to achieve change. As Ottaway contends, unless
such broad-based constituencies as political parties, trade unions and social movements are
9 ‘Does He Know Where it’s Leading’? The Economist 30 July 2005, p24.
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allowed to develop freely, they will never provide an effective balance to authoritarian
government; from the Islamist perspective, the future of the modernist trend is entirely
dependent upon the provision of legal political space for opposition movements. As pro-
democracy movements exist in the form of regime-approved NGOs in Egypt, they exert
little impact upon the domestic audience; Islamist preachers still hold the ideological
advantage over the liberal/centrist democrats. Organizations with broad support do exist,
the Muslim Brotherhood being an obvious example, but the older, controlling generation
hold ambivalent and sometimes unclear views on democracy; they also prefer obedience in
their supporters to free political thought. In this discouraging environment there are
nonetheless possibilities worthy of further exploration. The growth of democracy, suggests
Ottaway, depends on the development of domestic constituencies dedicated to it (ideally)
or at least prepared to pursue it as a road to power (realistically). She recognises here the
main worry of democrats concerning an Islamist ascendancy to power – the possibility that
they will abandon democracy once in control of the political process. However, there are
procedural and constitutional safeguards that can be utilised to prevent this and the recent
pragmatic shifts among the Islamist modernists are likely to continue, mirroring
comparative experiences in activist movements outwith the Islamist sphere where the
tensions inherent in moving from religious ideology to pragmatic policies usually result in a
more real-worldly orientation of the movement concerned. Moderation and pragmatism in
the Islamist movement will emerge from an extended and uneven process. A key step in
facilitating this is the inclusion of Islamist modernist movements in the political sphere,
confronting them with the challenges of managing contemporary societies. This is far more
conducive to democratic opening than the authoritarian-sustained illusion of entirely
religion-free Arab politics.10 The key question, in Ottaway’s view, is how to develop
political constituencies that are capable of implementing and sustaining political reform.11
In a study of Capitalist Development and Democracy, Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens
conclude that the real source of persistent democratic drive is an effective combination of
working-class mobilization and middle-class activism.12 However, they identify in Egypt
two significant obstacles to this process: first, the state control of resources and
independence of the ruling elite from other social classes helps to preserve personal-
authoritarian rule; secondly, the dependent position of Egypt in the global geostrategic and
economic environment generates circumstances that impair the genesis of democracy. The
Islamist experience supports this view, as both working class mobilization and middle-class
10 Amr Hamzawy, ‘The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists’ Carnegie Endowment for
Internatonal Peace PolicyBrief No 40 August 2005 p3.
11 Marina Ottaway, ‘Democracy and Constituencies in the Arab World’ Carnegie Papers No 48 July
2004 pp5-6.
12 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D Stephens, quoted in Abootalebi (Note 1)
p3.
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activism were present in the movement, but were never sufficiently co-ordinated to
threaten the elite or overcome the imperative to protect it’s international sponsorship.
Pro-democratic constituencies will only develop if the popular perception is that all other
alternatives to an unacceptable status quo have been exhausted, or if democracy can be
associated with other ideologies of immediate impact. The notion that all other realistic
alternatives have been tried is held mainly by the small, liberal, intellectual community;
they do not share the more prevalent view that a virtuous Islamic state is a viable
alternative to the corruption of existing regimes. Furthermore, the status quo is not
regarded as unacceptable by all segments of society, especially those with interests to
protect. Therefore, can any popular ideology in the Arab world offer the potential to
partner democracy, remove it’s Western liberal association and transform it into an idea of
mass appeal? In the post-independence era, nationalism can be ruled out. Pan-Arab
nationalism may persist on the sidelines as long as the Palestinian dispute remains
unresolved, but there is a profound difference between rhetoric and action in Arab
attitudes to this issue; it is not an idea around which a mass political movement will
coalesce in any Arab state. In view of the blight of economic stagnation and inequality,
high unemployment and social injustice – common to most Arab states – socialism offers,
apparently, an appealing populist solution. Ottaway suggests that a competent leadership
‘could build this aspiration for a better material life into a demand for democratic political
participation, giving rise to ……… movements that might advance both the cause of
democracy and that of socio-economic justice…’.13 However, such a suggestion must
acknowledge the typical weakness of socialist movements across the Middle East, and the
fact that socio-economic precipitants can lead to very different outcomes than democracy
alone. Thus, while socio-economic factors could foment exploitable discontent, an
organised, co-ordinated effort is required to facilitate change, and the only political
movement with the support and capacity to assume a leading role in this process is the
moderate Islamist grouping. The popular support of the Muslim Brotherhood, enhanced by
the wider appeal generated by the Islamist modernists, could underpin the core of a multi-
party democratic coalition with the power and credibility to achieve change. Secondly, this
needs a permissive environment in which to occur – a civil society, notable at present for
its absence in Egypt.
Civil Society
Before the onset of genuine political liberalization, the establishment of civil society is
considered essential to constrain state power and improve prospects for democratization.
The ability of the state to control those prospects is perhaps underestimated, illustrated by
13 Ottaway (Note 11) p13.
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the fact that some observers interpret the emergence of ‘contained pluralism’ in Egypt as a
move from one-party rule to genuine pluralism. What is really evident in Egypt is that it is
possible for the societal preconditions for democracy to exist and personal-authoritarian
rule to persist. The development of civil society institutions has been controlled closely by
the regime, which has encouraged the growth of civil society groups for it’s own purposes -
there are now 14,000 of them in existence. However, the underlying aim has been to
ensure that a large number of small, diverse groups exist in circumstances that are unlikely
to allow them to coalesce into an effective opposition or reformist voice. External support
and influence channelled through domestic NGOs is thus difficult to co-ordinate and utilise,
allowing the regime to take a stance that is not overtly obstructive, knowing that such
investment is unlikely to bring political cohesion among the opposition. As a result, US aid
to Egyptian NGOs is of limited effect in stimulating the growth of a genuine civil society. A
reconsideration of aid priorities could be carried out as part of the educational initiative
suggested above, allowing US leverage for reform to be exerted on the Mubarak regime,
and more effect to be realised from the aid programme.
A meaningful and sustainable civil society will only develop in Egypt when properly
institutionalised, well-organised groups gain sufficient power to pressure the regime to
open the political system in a genuine way. In view of the persistence of the state, and the
awareness of the regime of the dangers for them inherent in such a development, this is an
unlikely proposition in the short to medium term. Intellectual effort, extra-legal
fundamentalist groups and compliant, restrained NGOs alone will never develop the
political constituencies needed to challenge authoritarian rule and support democratic
evolution. Regardless of this, the New Islamists see a role for themselves and their national
project in the development of such a society, and the way in which it may be used to bring
realistic and sustainable change. This is reasonable if they are prepared to develop an
appeal that is more emotional and less intellectual, and to undertake grassroots
organizational and mobilizational activity; the internal divide between fundamentalists and
modernists must also be bridged if contemporary Islamist groups are to attract enough
support to exert political pressure on the regime. In the progression towards democracy
the development of a healthy civil society is important in its own right; in view of the lack
of formal political access in Egypt, it becomes an essential conduit for the development of
modern Islamist politics.
RQ4: ‘What capacity has the moderate Islamist movement demonstrated to formulate a
modern, realistic political project that will contribute to any process of democratization
and attract a politically meaningful constituency’?
If entrenched regimes can be persuaded to enter into a process of transition, the nature of
the transitional process, and the eventual political system, must be considered. The
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particular role of the moderate Islamists within both process and polity will determine to a
significant degree their future political utility. The movement contains disparate elements,
which, if organised into a cohesive whole, could form a central pillar of a future democratic
government with real potential to reform and endure.
Modernist Islam as a Potential Democratic Alternative to Authoritarian Rule
Democratic transformation is generally a process of conflict and upheaval. This is why
many commentators advance the concept of a multi-party, social-democratic coalition as
the best means of achieving it. Wide representation allays the majority of political fears
and facilitates the expression of the widest range of views. No single interest group or
ideology is allowed to dominate, and the democratic process is protected and
strengthened. A carefully orchestrated process of ‘interest bargaining’ is required to
reassure the existing regime that transition will not lead to total loss of vested interests, or
worse, while tempering the more unrealistic aspirations of those who seek power.
Those who do not subscribe to Roy’s view that political Islam has failed, see in the Egyptian
Islamist modernists not only a further stage of the evolution of Islamic activism but also a
potential first step towards social-democratic politics. Their moderate, inclusive and
realistic outlook offers great potential to contribute to a democratic coalition government.
The Old Islamist fundamentalists of the Muslim Brotherhood also have a role to play,
however, as they command significant popular support and harbour mobilizational
expertise; any attempt at coalition building without them would be a risky undertaking.
Despite their previous ambivalence towards democracy, they should now be able to make a
more constructive contribution to such a process if they can be convinced that it does not
threaten the essential tenets of Islam and avoid association with the reformed radical
movements in any coalition setting. Hawthorne challenges the notion that any coalition
between secular and religious groups is possible at all, as ongoing polarization between
liberals and fundamentalists is simply too great.14 The opposing aims of the Old Islamists
and the Islamist modernists concerning the primacy of a Muslim democracy or an Islamic
state do indeed represent a significant ideological cleavage. This, essentially, revisits the
compatibility of Islam and democracy argument; the ijtihad (intellectual effort in the
interpretation of Islamic sources) of the New Islamists, especially in its innovative work to
use Shari’a as a means by which secular and religious demands may be reconciled, and
their reflective development of Muslim democracy, coupled with the emergence of secular-
religious political modernist alliances, could help to overcome this. Moreover, successful
initiatives for democracy generally take place in societies where no single group, including
the regime, has a monopoly of power; importantly, this structural explanation is
14 Amy Hawthorne ‘Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment’? Carnegie Papers No 52
Oct 2004 p15.
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independent of cultural considerations, allowing suggestions that Islam itself is an obstacle
to the development of democracy to be rejected. Herein lies a strength of the Islamist
modernist approach; as an unthreatening part of a democratic coalition, they demonstrate
not only to their detractors, but also to reluctant potential allies such as the Old Islamist
moderates, that the idea of incompatibility is ill founded.
The Role of the Islamists
It is only in a social-democratic coalition that the Islamist modernists collectively have any
political future in Egypt; even if in the long term they achieve an independent and
sustainable following, coalition membership is an unavoidable hurdle on the route to that
status, and the pursuit of political changes that will help to realise that aspiration is where
their focus must be directed.
When considering their potential to assist a transition to democratic politics, the Wasat
NGO should not be seen simply as the activist wing of the New Islamist intellectual circle.
The sophisticated thinking of the latter is not fully apparent in the Wasat platform, and less
so in the younger generation of the Muslim Brotherhood from which the Wasat Group
evolved. However, Stacher emphasises what this author believes to be one of the most
important differences between the Wasat NGO and the young generation of the
Brotherhood and their various moderate predecessors: the fact that they have written
political programmes in which their conceptualisation of democracy is explained. Neither
is without shortcomings; the treatment of Christian and other non-Muslim minorities, and
the status of women, provide two examples. The difference between them and their Old
Islamist predecessors however, is that the former are making open efforts to tackle these
problems from a civilizational, not religious, approach. Indeed, the fact that they have
openly aired such issues in public does suggest a more inclusive and liberal attitude towards
them.15 A continuing and increasingly close dialogue between the Wasat group, the young
modernists of the Brotherhood and the New Islamists can only improve and consolidate the
moderate position, but neither of these elements can bring sufficient organizational
expertise or mobilizational capacity to develop a viable constituency. The moderate Old
Islamist mainstream is the source from where this must come. While retaining the emotive
‘Islam is the Solution’ slogan, even the ruling generation of the Brotherhood sense the
inevitability of change, and their programme now assumes a focus tending towards liberal
reform. Mohammed Habib, the Brotherhood vice-chairman, identifies the movement’s
priorities as, inter alia, the abolition of restrictions imposed upon the establishment of
political parties, repeal of Emergency Law, and increased powers for Parliament and the
15 Joshua A Stacher, ‘Post Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party’, Middle
East Journal Vol 56 No 3 (Summer 2002) p425.
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Judiciary at the expense of the executive.16 This is reinforced by the statement of Saad Al-
Kattatni, the head of the Ikhwan parliamentary bloc, that the organization is keen to
cooperate in Parliament with secular parties.17
None of the individual Islamist elements has the influence (or in the case of the New
Islamists, the desire) to succeed in the political arena; it is certainly also arguable that
they may not acquire it collectively or be able to dispel the misgivings that many Egyptians
harbour about an Islamic state. The New Islamists’ rational, pragmatic aim to establish a
centrist coalition of mixed political persuasions recognises and addresses both these
limitations. The concept of an ‘Islamic coalition within a centrist democratic coalition’
seems to offer Islamic activism a future, and the chance to contribute to a genuinely
democratic politics. While any Islamist coalition probably does not have the ability to
become a dominant element of a democratic transformation, and indeed the possibility of
it achieving dominance is in many respects an electoral disadvantage, it does have the
potential to be a catalyst for change as part of a wider centrist political grouping.
A consistent theme of Egyptian regime framing as it seeks to limit the potential of the
Wasat NGO has been to identify it as a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood, and
therefore no different to it, or even its radical offshoots. This is not a valid viewpoint; the
Wasat group, and their ideological mentors, offer something very different to the other
moderate groups, and have a contemporary relevance that their competitors do not. As a
government-approved and monitored NGO, they have little real influence or mobilizational
capacity and it is difficult to imagine change in the near future, but this may not be the
disadvantage it appears to be. The current low level of political support of the Wasat
group paradoxically renders it an ideal component of any social-democratic coalition
because it is unlikely to be destabilizing, even in alliance with the modernist elements of
the Muslim Brotherhood. The grassroots support and mobilizational abilities of the Old
Islamists are useful in constituency building, which could be complemented yet balanced
politically by the moderating ideological collective outlook of the modernists. Thus, the
overall Islamist element of any such coalition need not be threatening if it is balanced as
such internally, and externally by secular parties of moderate, realist orientation.
Muslim Democracy
Variations in the definition of Muslim Democracy among the modernist camp alone are
significant. In this paper it is a term used primarily to differentiate between an essentially
16 Nathan Brown and Amr Hamzawy, ‘Take Advantage of Brotherhood Gains’, Daily Star Egypt,
December 9th, 2005. [Electronic copy at: www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm ]
17 Omaya Abdel-Latif, ‘Egypt: Brothers Trigger Debate but Cannot Pass Legislation’, Arab Reform
Bulletin Vol 4 Issue 3 April 2006.
82
religion based concept of an Islamic state or polity, used by the Old Islamists, and a
civilizational, community-based concept of an inclusive, democratic system based on
Muslim social justice in a contemporary setting. The idea of Muslim democracy recognizes
the popular appeal of a distinctively Muslim society and political system, the dangers of a
total separation of church and state, and the importance of factors central to Muslim
identity such as Shari’a. It embraces aspects of Western liberal democracy that can be
allied with Islamic notions of social justice, but seeks to avoid an uncritical adoption of
Western political systems perceived as having already failed in Egypt. An essential
foundation of Muslim democracy is the concept of ‘Islam – rightly understood’. Its New
Islamist proponents condemn the corrupt and inexpert interpretations of Islamic sources
that have led to the backward and defensive outlook of many in the Muslim world, and to
the violent expression of radical political Islam. They believe that a political system that is
both modern and Muslim in character is achievable and deny absolutely that Shari’a
precludes any compatibility with democracy. Instead of rejecting modernity, they embrace
it, aiming to combine the integrity of the pious with the political abilities of the liberal
modernists. Most tellingly, they recognize the need for legal, democratic participation
within existing state structures, and the development of a viable, independent civil society
as a precursor to democratisation on any scale. This reflects the wider shift in mainstream,
non-violent Islamist movements towards increasing pragmatism, and acceptance that
democratic reform is the only viable approach to challenge persistent authoritarianism.
The conceptual basis to this new pragmatic thinking is anything but new itself, being based
upon elements of Islamic jurisprudence that are centuries old. Ghannouchi argues that on
the basis of these long-established principles of Islam, every Muslim has a duty to help to
establish an Islamic government; however, if this is not possible, Muslims must accomplish
whatever they can in pursuit of that ideal. If this involves power sharing in either Muslim
or non-Muslim environments, in order to establish a social order, it is incumbent upon
Muslims to partake of it; more importantly, it does not have to be based upon Shari’a and
no temporal stipulation is made for the ultimate achievement of an Islamic state.
Participation must instead be based upon a form of shura, which is the authority of the
community of believers. This is not the exclusivist provision it initially appears to be; in a
modern interpretation, this means ‘the authority of the people expressed by democratic
means’ and by definition includes all who comprise the body politic, illustrating the
potential contemporary utility of shura in formulating a distinctive Muslim democracy if it
is interpreted and applied in an entirely contextual way. Specifically, it is the duty of all
Muslims to pursue and contribute to the development of secular, democratic systems if it is
in the interest of the community at large to do so. A just government, in the most
contemporary sense, is considered to be very close to an Islamic one as social justice is the
most important principle of Islamic government. In Egypt, the Islamic majority of the
population is ruled by an authoritarian regime and is not able to bring about Islamic
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government or democracy. In this case, Shari’a does not preclude cooperation with secular
groups to establish a secular democracy that would guarantee human rights and liberties.18
This can be seen as an end in itself, or as an interim step on the route to an Islamic state –
a fear voiced by critics of the Islamists. The choice in Egypt’s case, and one not in any way
inimical to the precepts of Shari’a, is between authoritarianism and democracy. The
eventual transformation to an Islamic state need not occur at all if secular democracy
satisfies the Muslim requirement for social justice, and exposure to democratic governance
tempers demands for it as part of the normalization process such exposure often triggers.
The modernists’ concept of Muslim democracy avoids historical limitations, as it does not
consider shura alone as a suitable democratic process for the modern world. Instead, they
acknowledge the achievements of Western democracy, encouraging the selective adoption
of what they see as it’s strengths, while rejecting features that conflict with their concept
of a Muslim democratic political system. In particular, they have identified the following
characteristics of Western liberal democratic systems as suitable for utilisation within such
a framework: the separation of powers, multiple political parties, competitive elections,
constitutionally protected rights of free speech and association, an independent judiciary
and limited terms for the highest political offices. However, their aspiration to ‘a
democracy of just outcomes’19 precludes an adoption of the liberal/capitalist model on
several grounds, most notably the materialist, consumerist mentality with which it has
become closely associated, and the injustices they believe result in consequence. What
further sets the New Islamists apart is their insistence that what is important about
political power is the use to which it is put, not the simple acquisition of it – often the only
stated aim of Old Islamist groups. Nor is their conception of Muslim democracy without
shortcomings; even one of the most lucid and intellectually gifted Islamist modernists,
Essam el-Erian of the younger generation of the Ikhwan, has difficulty in conveying the
specifics of this vision. It is clear however, that the effective fusion of Islam and
democracy is seen as the main reference point of it, and Muslim democracy may be
considered to be the hallmark of modern Political Islam.20
Any truly democratic state incorporates the rule of law as an essential building block; in
the conceptual development of an Islamic state the conflict between Shari’a and secular
law has proved to be profound and enduring. The precise place of Shari’a in the Muslim
democratic state envisioned by the Islamist modernists, and its relationship to secular law,
prove to be as difficult to determine for them as for any moderate Islamist group. In an
18 Rachid Ghannouchi ‘Participation in Non-Islamic Government’ in Charles Kurzman ‘Liberal Islam:
A Sourcebook’. Oxford, Oxford University Press 1998 pp 92-95.
19 Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2003) pp171-172.
20 Caryle Murphy, ‘Passion for Islam: The Egyptian Experience’ (New York: Scribner 2002) pp129-
131.
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attempt to solve this, the New Islamists advocate a process of genuine ijtihad to set any
application of Shari’a in a modern and relevant context. Shari’a has never been a detailed
exposition of law, personal or political. It comprises guiding principles alone, and therefore
skilful interpretation is indispensable if a truly viable system of law is to be formulated.
This has been noticeably lacking from moderate Islamic political thought to date, but it is
an area of crucial importance and latent benefit. It will be especially significant in
reconciling the competing secular and religious demands of any social-democratic coalition,
and compliance with the precepts of Shari’a will be a strong motivator for those who still
believe it to be a foundation of just governance in an Islamic state – regardless of the basis
of that belief, intellectual or dogmatic. Applying Shari’a is seen as strengthening Egypt’s
Islamic identity and is a cultural as well as political issue. The question, therefore, is what
exactly what form and purpose does Shari’a assume in the modernist conception, not
whether or not it should be abandoned entirely.21 Finally, the advantage that a rational,
modern definition of Shari’a would bestow upon a Muslim democracy – that of unequivocal
separation from its Western-liberal sibling – should not be overlooked. If the Islamist
modernist movement is able to achieve this admittedly challenging undertaking, it will
confer a political utility upon their movement that was never enjoyed by any Islamist
predecessor, setting a firm foundation for an enduring political platform.
Islamist Economics
One of the most frequent, and just, criticisms of Islamic activist movements is their lack of
real-world, detailed political programmes, especially in the economic dimension. This is
something acknowledged by both the younger generation of the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Wasat group, and they advance broad proposals to arrest Egypt’s economic decline and
aid the poorest elements of society within a framework of social justice. The Brotherhood
place a more noticeable emphasis on the fact that they believe a society based on Islamic
precepts would promote social security for all citizens and narrow economic differences
between classes. Their economic programme makes individual and state alike active
participants in the pursuit of social justice, making Muslims mutually responsible for one
another. While accepting the principle of private ownership, the Ikhwan policy assigns a
role to the state of owning and managing enterprises that should necessarily remain within
the public domain. Themes that recur in their pronouncements concerning economic
development are:
 Reduce government bureaucracy and the size of the public sector.
 Official attainment of high levels of productivity.
 An economy based primarily upon the private sector.
21 Ibid pp182-184.
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 A non-interest-bearing banking system.
 Zakat (almsgiving).
 Independence from foreign economic intervention.
In this latter objective, the Brotherhood seeks to achieve Egyptian economic integration
with other Muslim economies as an alternative to the present reliance upon ‘foreigners
from the West’.22
However, Richards and Waterbury believe that as Islamist politics is ‘primarily the politics
of culture,’ then economics attracts lower priority than matters of collective and individual
behaviour, social mores and religious piety.23 This suggests that should an Islamist
organization secure a pivotal role in the Egyptian government, economic consistency may
well be sacrificed for expediency. While this may bestow flexibility in reconciling disparate
economic interests in a coalition scenario, it is unlikely to satisfy the individual economic
interests of diverse groups. Economic development is thus likely to be hindered by the
religious and moral focus of many Islamist groups; efforts of professional economists are
likely to be scrutinised more for religious compliance than scientific validity or political
viability. Richards and Waterbury see the ‘Utopian assumptions about human behaviour’
made by Old Islamists as the core theoretical problem with previous Islamic approaches to
economic issues, and they conclude that the Islamist mainstream has thus far failed to offer
any coherent and consistent theory of economics. They believe that ‘the configuration of
specific interests that undergirds any Islamist government, combined with institutional
structures and the political exigencies of the moment, will be far more important than
ideology in determining that government’s economic policy’.24 Another key determinant of
any future Islamist economic policy is likely to be the demands of coalition formation and
maintenance. These demands will take precedence over economic logic whenever the
implementation of economic policy brings significant hardship to many people – not a rare
occurrence in Egypt to date, and a likely outcome of any future economic reform. The
drivers of economic policymaking for Islamist regimes or coalitions in Egypt are thus similar
to those faced by extant regimes, and Islamists can consequently be expected to match the
dismal economic performance of those regimes.
A common theme among Islamist groups has been the tension between the moderate,
conservative, merchant middle class and the young urban poor. As discussed earlier, these
interest groups will oppose each other within the Islamist movement; it is precisely because
economic politics is secondary to cultural politics that such movements remain viable.
22 Sana Abed-Kotob, ‘The Accomodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Egyptian Muslim
Botherhood’, International Journal of Middle East Studies No 27 (1995) pp326-327.
23 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press 1998) p351.
24 Ibid pp354-356.
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Internal conflicts invariably hinder economic reforms; a regime that pursues a cultural
ideology will oscillate between market and state control. This is not unusual in Middle
Eastern countries; what makes it potentially less consistent under Islamic rule is the fact
that bureaucrats will be subjected to more ideological pressure than under a secular
regime, perpetuating contradictory, ineffective economic policy.25 The key issues in this
critique are ‘a cultural ideology’ and ‘Islamic rule’. While the Islamist modernists’
programme is founded upon a cultural base it differs from that discussed by Richards and
Waterbury in that it includes all elements of Egyptian cultural influence, including
secularists and Christians and is therefore not intended to support an exclusively Islamic
politics. This is no guarantee of sound economics, but does indicate that a freer hand may
be extended to professional economists; the key determinant in the development of
Islamist modernist economic policies is thus not the demands of religious ideology, but the
pragmatic considerations of coalition building.
Against the prevailing political background in Egypt and the region, the predicted economic
mismanagement under Islamic activist influence may not be that significant politically in
the short term. Such mismanagement is widespread, and has been for decades, under the
existing regimes. Under personal-authoritarian rule, buying support is more important to
regime survival than economic efficiency or growth. While an Islamist government, or a
coalition with a significant Islamist element, may be less repressive than the existing
regimes, it will almost certainly continue to practice in government the patronage politics
it learnt to use in opposition. In view of the current and projected regional pressures
highlighted in the UN Arab Human Development Report for 2002,26 it is conceivable that
Islamist economic practice will do nothing to slow the progressive economic decline of the
Middle East. This is a well-known precipitant of radical sympathy, and even if any future
centrist coalition extends more professional freedom to economists than authoritarian
regimes have done, an overnight transformation will not occur. A challenge facing the
moderates in Egypt is thus the construction of policies that address the economic woes of
their country in a manner designed to preserve internal stability. Their resistance to an
economic alignment with their national superpower sponsor may be the first casualty of the
test of reality imposed by political power.
THE FUTURE OF MODERATE ISLAMIST POLITICS IN THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST
Having established that the future of the moderate Islamist movement in Egypt hinges on
membership of a broader coalition pursuing democratic ideals, the question arises of
whether such a course of action is applicable in the wider region. Hamzawy argues that the
25 Ibid 357.
26 UN AHDR 2002 (Note13) pp4-5; 143-163; among them population growth, rising inflation and
unemployment, scarcity of water and increasing consumption of other natural resources.
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new pragmatism of modernist Islamists creates an atmosphere of relative openness to US
and European policies in the Arab world and an initial willingness to engage Western
countries less ideologically. He suggests the possibility of Islamists becoming key players in
Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen amid processes of substantial political transformation
cannot be ruled out. This apparent willingness of Islamic modernists to develop ties with
the US and Europe should not be misconstrued as trust however; doubts about Western
objectives in the Arab world remain deep across the entire Islamist spectrum.27 Despite
calming statements from the Brotherhood General Guide, Mohammed Akef, in which he
indicated the movement would respect extant treaties signed by the Egyptian government,
including the peace agreement with Israel, the Brotherhood still assumes political positions
and uses rhetoric hostile to the US and Israel.28
It is apparent from the study of Egypt that the problems the Islamic activists made for
themselves were compounded by the institutional shortcomings of the state, the iron grip
of personal-authoritarian rule, and wider regional and international influences. A study of
the wider Middle East reveals a political picture that is depressingly similar, thus suggesting
that potential solutions to the Egyptian situation may also apply elsewhere if adapted to
local circumstances. Generally, while some apparent structural concessions to democracy
have been made, none of them generate political openings that threaten the power of the
incumbent regime. It has been suggested that the passage of time or the assumption of
power by younger generations of Arab leaders may bring about more democratic systems of
governance; this is not evident so far. Bashir Assad’s Syria offers an example of a leader
constrained by vested interests within an autocratic regime in order to protect his own
power. While tentative economic reform has taken place, this is not matched with political
pluralism. Two of the brightest hopes for democratization, King Mohammed VI of Morocco
and King Abdullah II of Jordan, have proved reluctant to surrender the historical reliance on
Islamic legitimacy that has always preserved the power of the Monarchy. In Morocco,
Islamist opposition parties at odds with royal policy are excluded from the institutional
political process;29 Jordan’s emerging plurality is possibly the most advanced in the region,
but does not in any way reduce or limit the power of the King.30 Furthermore, Algeria
remains locked in a stalemate between a military regime and an Islamic opposition of the
kind that raises all the worst fears of an Islamic state, and while Lebanon enjoys a
functioning parliamentary system, true democracy is still a long way off. Such structural
shortcomings raise the question of how any transitional process can be initiated without
27 Hamzawy (Note 10) pp 3-7.
28 Brown and Hamzawy (Note 16).
29 Sharp (Note 5) pp10-12.
30 Kamel S Abu Jaber, ‘The Democratic Process in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan’ and Tom Pierre Najem,
‘State Power and Democratisation in North Africa: Developments in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and
Libya’ in Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel (Eds), Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences,
Struggles, Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2003) pp 133-134, 136-139 and pp187-
190.
88
threatening stability. (In this context ‘stability’ means the avoidance of violent disruption
during transition, as opposed to the concept of stability enshrined in former US foreign
policy towards the region, wherein it came to mean ‘no change’). Should any reform be a
product of a top-down process instigated and directed by the existing regime, or a bottom-
up evolution driven by opposition movements?
What is missing at present is an institutional framework in both the state and civil society
by which such processes can function. Schnabel highlights the existence of an independent
civil society, and a civic political culture that is receptive to change, as important
steadying influences in transitional processes.31 The lack of these throughout the region
means that any transition will be protracted, especially as each nation possesses
characteristics that will dictate the emergence of a singular form of pluralist or democratic
governance to meet its own specific needs. As Tehranian argues, ‘the vehicle, speed and
route taken……on the journey toward democratization are as individual as are the end
results’.32 Top-down democratization has yet to produce truly democratic political
institutions; Schnabel illustrates the discontinuity between political democratization and
social and economic democratization responsible for this.33 Despite these problems, there
is broad agreement that a gradual, controlled process of democratization is required, and
that one implemented from the top down is therefore necessary. The advantage of top-
down approaches to democratization is that they can, if managed correctly, prevent
reversion to violence and disruption. This necessarily limits public participation, and may
require recourse to undemocratic measures in order to contain those who seek to
undermine the transitional process, but may also lead to a more enduring democratic
system. Top-down approaches have been tried – Egypt is a prime example – but what has
been provided through them is nothing more than sham democracy with no redistribution of
power. Egypt has also illustrated that top-down attempts can be jeopardised by a political
culture that is not fully developed in society at large – reform championed by the regime
alone is greeted with popular suspicion in a political atmosphere typified by cynicism and
exclusivity. However, even such mechanisms may serve a purpose; Schnabel suggests that
a period of top-down rule as part of the democratization process may balance and stabilize
the effects of political, economic and cultural reforms.34 Gradual, top-down processes do
risk reversal as a result of their very gradualism; however, the influence of anti-democratic
radical movements can be effectively countered by processes of economic development,
run in parallel with those of democratization – if material living standards are improving,
support for extreme movements usually suffers as a consequence. The Algerian experience
31 Albrecht Schnabel, ‘A Rough Journey: Nascent Democratization in the Middle East’, in Amin Saikal
and Albrecht Schnabel (Eds), Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2003) p2.




shows that the stability of the state must take priority during any democratic transition and
that rapid political democratization alone can be disastrous. Priority should be given to
permitting other political forces to develop a meaningful and independent social presence
so that a credible number of options become available to society.
The more optimistic commentators do believe that democratization is possible in the
region, and, provided such optimism is tempered with a realistic assessment of the time
and effort such a process will consume, this is not an unreasonable viewpoint. There are,
however, a series of obstacles to be overcome. Piecemeal attempts at democratization
through political liberalization, without any surrender of power or the development of civil
society, will hinder the process rather than encourage it, and will stimulate the use of
violence in the repertoires of contention of both sides of the regime/opposition divide.
Islamic fundamentalism must be sidelined from political debate if the clash between
Western and regional values and norms is to be resolved satisfactorily; this will not be
straightforward while Old Islamist support remains an indispensable component of any
transitional coalition. Additionally, great power interference must be replaced by policies
that consider regional interests in a long-term perspective alongside those of the US. The
two need not be mutually exclusive, and if American efforts at promoting democracy are to
be taken seriously, such a remoulding of policy is essential.
What does the Egyptian experience have to offer that may be of utility in the regional
development of democracy? Primarily, the Islamist modernist movement typifies more
realistic, pragmatic political thinking defined by 21st Century realities. It’s inclusive,
civilizational project offers a means to encourage the cultural aspects of democratization,
and it recognises that any split between the Islamic foundations of society, and the
majority of the members of it, is an entirely counterproductive proposition. However, the
New Islamist emphasis on thorough and expert interpretation of Islam in a modern context
offers the potential to assuage traditional discomfort with the concept of democracy. This
is not to suggest that Islamist modernist politics is the cure for all ills. Their economic
thinking in particular needs to be elaborated into real policies; however, their recognition
of modern influences suggests that they will seek the guidance of professional economists
in formulating, and directing, such policy. This is of signal importance, as economic
development must be pursued in parallel with political democratization in an attempt to
generate the most fertile medium possible in which to nurture progress. The willingness of
the Islamist modernists to acknowledge Western expertise in this area, and lack of
reservation about using such expertise within an Islamic framework of social justice, does,
however, offer more hope than outdated communist practice, Islamic fundamentalist
utopianism or the existing conflict between the demands of patronage and economic
development. The importance of a sound economy as a prop of the democratization
process may expose a weakness of the modernists programme – their insistence on the
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severance of economic links with the US. In Egypt, US financial aid is of too great a
magnitude to be ignored. Moreover, given the need for a reassessment of US regional
policy, there exists perhaps more room for international interest bargaining than was the
case previously. As part of a ‘compliance for security’ arrangement, it is conceivable that
the US would perceive benefit in providing the economic cement for the structural stability
needed in the political environment to facilitate lasting change.
All the same, at a time when Arab democratization is attracting more emphasis than at any
time before, Western policy must still be extremely carefully framed. It should not endorse
current inaction, but the US in particular should not attempt to dictate the pace and
content of any reform to, or worse still seek to by-pass, the Egyptian government. Such a
course of action would aggravate the regime ‘legitimacy deficit’, subvert any ability to
implement bold reform measures, and associate genuine reformers with foreign
intervention.35 The legacy of current US policy, evidenced by the overt anti-American
posture of Arab pro-democracy movements such as Kifaya and Al-Ghad, and the
prominence of anti-American framing in the recent perceptible hardening of traditional
Islamist attitudes in general, indicates that change is long overdue. The Islamist
modernists, therefore, would be better served by casting their policy towards the US in the
light of US policy towards them; there is no doubt, at the level of individual bilateral
transactions, who has the most to gain. This is not suggested as a permanent arrangement,
but as an integral part of the transitional process that should not be discarded in favour of
cultivating domestic popular support. A successful accommodation of this kind in Egypt
may well pave the way for wider acceptance of realistic international politics, and
recognition of the continuing importance of US interests in the Middle East.
In the face of so many challenges, where should any coalition attempt to focus it’s efforts?
Surprisingly, Nasser’s social contract may offer an idea. According to Hinnebusch, Nasser’s
‘populist coalition’, based on the social contract and his charismatic leadership, ‘included
the majority of the populace’36 and the ability to do so now would be of inestimable
advantage to the modernist movement. Despite it’s deficiencies, the social contract
nonetheless offers an instructive insight to the Egyptian political psyche that may be of
relevance if the turbulence of any transition to democracy is to be negotiated successfully.
If a moderate, democratic, inclusive Muslim politics is to gain support and acceptance, the
presence of a respected, well-known charismatic leader to advocate such a programme
would be a huge advantage. Despite it’s intellectual status, the New Islamist movement
has included influential people of both religious and secular professional backgrounds who
35 International Crisis Group, ‘Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt’s Opportunity’ Middle East and
North Africa Briefing 20 April 2004 p3.
36 Raymond A Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an
Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1988) p29.
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have attracted wide national attention as part of their efforts to disseminate their ideas,
and can command impressive attendances at public meetings. Also, many original members
of the Wasat group were considered to be rising stars of the new generation of Muslim
Brotherhood activists before they became part of the Wasat initiative; they too cannot be
without ability in this respect. A starting point for a 21st Century social contract with
political relevance and strong popular appeal would be the educational programme of the
New Islamists. This would serve many mutually reinforcing purposes, leading to a long-
term and constructive re-alignment of political and social thinking. It should prove far
more attractive than the fundamentalist concept of an Islamic state governed by Shari’a,
and is not likely to prove objectionable to secular opposition groups. The religious
sensitivities of the fundamentalists could be soothed by the implementation of an agreed
curriculum including Islamic teaching. Indeed, if the crisis of theology apparent in Islam at
present (where literalist, ultra orthodox Islam is gaining the upper hand) is to be overcome,
then the obstacles to intellectual and theological advancement posed by authoritarian
government and the self-interest of the ulema must be circumvented.37 A balanced
educational programme can only contribute positively to any initiative to do so. This
element of the New Islamist project perhaps offers a real opportunity to reconcile US and
Arab differences over US regional policy, through it’s potential within the SAVE initiative.
However, proponents of a modern social contract should note above all else the dangers
associated with any retreat from it; it must therefore be funded adequately for a realistic
period of time to allow stability following transition – and for that reason alone, the New
Islamist relationship with the US, and the importance of the economic aid it delivers, must
be reconsidered. If the intent of their programme is the stated outcome of enduring
societal change, then the realities of international relations could be included as part of it.
This is not to suggest such an international alignment will be admired, but it may at least
be understood. In the longer term, only sound economic and social policies will enhance
the future of democratic politics and marginalize radical discourse, and these are essential
precursors to any reduced dependency on foreign aid. Perhaps a source of partial funding
may arise from a reduction in government spending on the coercive security apparatus; this
would also send a powerful message to the electorate that democracy is associated with
institutional changes of measurable benefit to them.
In their choice of routes towards democracy, if they decide to take one at all, the states of
the Middle East have no example to follow from among their own. Egypt could fill that role
if the incumbent regime can be persuaded to initiate such a process. This is perhaps not as
unlikely as it may initially seem. Despite wishing to be seen as an ally of the US against
terrorism, which breeds anti-democratic initiatives, Egypt also needs to project a
37 Murphy (Note 20) pp 276-279.
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favourable image abroad, must respond to US and European pressures for real
democratization as opposed to piecemeal liberalization, and must resolve pre-existing
socio-economic pressures from before September 2001.38 This suggests some change may
have to occur, despite government rejection of ‘outside interference’. If such an
eventuality does arise, then the Islamist coalition within a democratic centrist coalition
proposed in this thesis offers a model of wide regional utility. It harbours the potential to
accommodate and balance ethnic, religious, class and political differences within a
framework of Islamic cultural commonality that is present in no other alternative – indeed,
after half a century of repressive regional politics it is questionable that viable alternatives
exist at all. It embraces modernity, and envisions an educational foundation of pivotal
importance to long-term socio-political evolution that has been absent from any
programme before it. In short, it offers the only genuinely conceivable route to sustainable
democratization; it is far from free of hazards or obstacles, and it will be long and
tortuous, but if this road is taken it should start from Egypt, and should be navigated using
the vehicle of the Islamic/centrist coalition. This inclusive, reconciliatory solution is seen
as idealistic by some and it is possible that less complete solutions may materialise;
Schnabel offers the example of the Jordanian monarchy allowing a controlled expression of
the Islamist voice, leading to it’s deflation and internal disintegration.39 He also suggests
co-operation between secular groups may reduce the influence of the Islamists and thereby
induce them to interest bargaining. This is unlikely, given the fragmentation and weakness
of opposition groups, which tend to lead them into short-lived alliances of convenience
with different partners. So while the solution offered by the Islamic/centrist coalition may
well be idealistic, it is no less realistic than other possibilities.
Ultimately, this is where the future of Moderate Islam lies. If the movement is to be
judged on the basis of its past ability to shape Egyptian government policy, to secure
institutional representation and to force political opening, it cannot justifiably be
considered a political force for the 21st Century. However, if the enduring democratic
commitment, realistic policies and inclusive, cooperative stance of the contemporary
movement are considered in the context of the democratic groundswell slowly gathering
momentum in the region, it has real potential to act as the foundation of a genuinely
participatory political system in Egypt.
38 Hawthorne (Note 14) pp7-8.
39 Schnabel (Note 31) p38.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION
Violent Confrontation, Political Stalemate, Economic Decline
The Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak regimes have consecutively reinforced a largely unchanging
system of undemocratic, personal-authoritarian rule since 1952. Egypt is ruled by an
unaccountable elite that subscribes only to the ideology of patronage, and practices social
and economic policies determined by the need to preserve that rule. Despite variations in
strategies adopted by individual Presidents, the regime/Islamic activist dynamic has been
one of effective and frequently brutal regime repression, underpinned by ideological
hegemony and lasting class and patronage relationships, countered by Islamist violence,
anti-regime and anti-US framing, and semi-covert mobilization activity. Opposition
movements, including the Islamists, have had no more a coherent ideology than the
regimes, and all the individual, group and institutional failings of the state and its servants
have been replicated among them. Political access via formal or informal political
opportunity structures remains denied to anyone except the ruling NDP. Religious
fundamentalism has proven abstract and unappealing to large segments of the Egyptian
populace and has become closely associated with violent extremist excess; a corrupt thread
ran through mainstream Islamist politics, and combined with patronage, internal disunity
and inflexible leadership, raised questions about the real ability of the Islamists to bring
beneficial change. Secular political parties are similarly weak and divided, serving no
demonstrable purpose in opposition. Gathering demographic and economic pressures lend
increasing urgency to the need for reform, and support for democratic transition
strengthens despite the lack of political representation and a genuinely independent civil
society. However, this pressure for change may be interpreted as no more than a ‘no’ vote
in many cases, given the lack of realistic projects on offer from many opposition groups.
Crucially, democratisation requires organized constituencies of activists from lower and
middle classes to bring pressure for change, and the few that exist at present in Egypt are
harassed and obstructed at every turn.
Egyptian politics has emerged from destructive conflict into entrenched stalemate, with
reversion to the former state an enduring possibility. The unpredictable and fluctuating
demands of patronage have exerted a disruptive influence upon the Egyptian economy –
regimes have steered it from crisis to crisis, and have survived purely because
undemocratic elites are less susceptible to the political consequences of economic
mismanagement than are democratic governments. Even US support has not halted a
steady economic decline that has been one of the principal causes of mass disaffection.
This domestic situation serves as a template, in some respects, for the Arab Middle East as
a whole; any postulated solution to it may therefore be relevant elsewhere in the region.
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The Failure of the Security Solution
The future of moderate Islamic politics is inextricably linked to the emergence of
democracy, or at the very least pluralist transitional politics. Problematically, democracy
exists only as a concept before it becomes a reality, and in the Middle East at large it is a
concept that, at best, is simply obscure to large numbers of people, and at worst is
considered ‘Western’ and consequently greeted with open hostility. If democracy does not
take hold, then personal-authoritarian rule will most likely persist until a crisis forces a
transfer of power in entirely unsatisfactory circumstances. The state attitude to the
Islamists is encapsulated in a policy based upon security rather than dialogue. The Islamists
remain closely monitored and contained; despite exploiting the popular revival of personal
Islamic practice to achieve an Islamization of the sociopolitical space, the modernists show
little ability to marshal a politically meaningful constituency behind their modern and
relevant political project, while the Old Islamist moderates are unable to overcome internal
division and increasing indifference towards their utopian vision of an Islamic state. This
leaves the radicals, their groups fragmented by the regime and forced to adopt an overt
political path that meets with even more suspicion than that of their moderate
counterparts. The military defeat of the radicals gave the Egyptian government a great
opportunity to steer Egyptian politics in a positive direction and also offered the Islamists
the chance to embrace modern political reality. The at least partial failure to do both is
fuelling a hardening of Islamist dogma and anti-Western attitudes, leading discontents into
international jihadi activity, and may also be facilitating a local reversion to extremism.
Increasing regional interest in democratisation is also reflected in Egypt, but the political
elite remains to be persuaded of the benefits democracy may bring them.
Egypt’s superpower sponsor may have a significant role to play in any process to do so, and
the process itself may prove to be an important stimulus for any reform of US foreign policy
towards the region at large, the fundamental precepts of which must incorporate a more
complete understanding of the contextual nature of democracy itself. Failure to recognise
that Muslim Arab interpretations of democracy are very different to that of the US State
Department will rapidly negate the genuinely democratic aims from which the policy is
derived. The prospect of a return to radical Islamist outrage is viewed as too damaging to
contemplate by most political actors, but this does not indicate a unanimous acceptance of
an ideological, political and economic programme to prevent it. The regime may
conceivably interpret past victories against the radicals as an indicator of future potential,
and thus be tempted to enter into a conflict similar to that of the mid-1990s. However,
demographic and economic trends in combination may work against them to a greater
degree than they did then, and the burden of such an extensive security and coercive
apparatus could prove unsustainable if US financial aid comes to be distributed on a more
conditional basis as part of a revised foreign policy agenda. It is also possible that the
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Mubarak regime is playing a straightforward waiting game, recognising that Islamist politics
presently exploits a popular religious revival. Islamist legitimacy stems from mass
adherence to Islam, and if the revival wanes, the regime perhaps assumes that support for
the Islamists will decline accordingly. Thus, in the absence of any democratic initiative,
the more convulsive transfer of power alluded to above would be a likely outcome.
Ultimately, the security solution is not a solution at all; what then, are the realistic
alternatives?
The Potential of the Cultural and Educational Solution
The US State Department’s proposed SAVE project, and the educational element of
Egyptian Islamist modernists’ political programme, extend in combination the opportunity
to facilitate democratic transition, encourage the development of civil society and, at least
partially, to meet US foreign policy aims. By pursuing a long-term objective in realistic,
achievable stages, the US could undermine radical Islamist ideology through educational
reform in Egypt, a process of benefit to regime and populace alike. If implemented
ostensibly by the regime, such reform would not directly associate the Islamist modernists
with the US, avoiding damaging political consequences for them in Egyptian politics. This
educational project will necessitate substantial investment, which could also be used to
bring progress towards democratisation as it will involve a careful re-assessment of US aid
priorities, a bonus of which may be more effective use of that aid to develop civil society
within Egypt. The inclusion of some elements of New Islamist thought in a projected wider
reform of US foreign policy that may bring beneficial change to Egyptian politics, may also
attract more mainstream political support for the New Islamists and hence provide
continuity with a future social-democratic coalition. A transitional coalition government in
Egypt, even one less prepared to accommodate US wishes than the Mubarak regime, is
considered by the US administration to be a risk worth taking in order to defeat violent
radicalism by addressing the underlying causes of it.
Muslim Democracy and Democratic Coalition Politics
Any democratic political movement in Egypt will probably have to exist in alliance with a
locally acceptable political entity, secular or religious, in order to overcome Western
association and attract broad support. Socialism may have some potential to resolve the
many inequities of Egyptian life, but it too suffers from being identified with Western
political systems and the record of ingrained weakness of the socialist parties does not
suggest this is a realistic outcome. The Islamists are the only grouping that enjoys wide
cultural coherence with the majority of the populace, but they have yet to resolve the
ideological dichotomy surrounding the relative importance of a modernist Muslim
democracy or a fundamentalist Islamic state. This is the most immediate challenge to a
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truly viable Muslim democratic movement, and the nature and role of Shari’a in a modern
polity require long overdue definition in order to defeat it. The definition of a distinctively
Muslim democracy will have to be formulated around a framework of Shari’a if it is to be
authentic enough to satisfy the moderate Old Islamist camp and large segments of the
population; at the same time, it must be practical enough to function politically amid the
realities of the 21st Century. Despite increasingly symbolic pursuit of Shari’a
implementation by the moderates, it remains a powerful manifestation of Muslim identity;
it will not be abandoned, so it will have to be made to function in a modern democratic
context. As there is nothing in Islamic scripture that is antithetical to democracy, even
secular democracy, and Shari’a is a human, not divine, construct, then definitively Islamic
underpinnings of Muslim democracy could come from an embrace of social justice that
many Muslims believe to be largely absent from Western liberal, capitalist, democratic
practice. Bridging this ideological chasm will be an enormous undertaking. It is one that
cannot be avoided if moderate Islamic politics is to play any influential role in the future of
Egypt and the Middle East; radical Islam and personal-authoritarian rule have in
combination produced a mutually-destructive politics of violence and repression. If a
coalition of Old Islamist moderates and Islamist modernists is ultimately possible, this does
not address the broad concerns that many have about a state that is anything other than
secular in nature. Even the dilution of traditional Islamic fixations with piety by New
Islamist economic and democratic thinking is unlikely to convince entirely; something more
is needed.
A wider democratic coalition, including secular parties, could assuage fears about an overly
Islamic influence in any transitional government, and bring stability to the interest-
bargaining process that would be a part of the transition itself. It would provide important
lessons to the Islamists about the necessity of compromise in democratic politics, and
would lessen the likelihood of any single group dominating the transitional process. This
represents the most pragmatic and workable manifestation of Islamist political thinking to
date; it comes, however, without mainstream support. This is why clarification of the
content and role of Shari’a in Muslim democracy is so important if the mobilizational draw
of the Old Islamist moderates is to be integrated with the avant-garde political thinking of
the Islamist modernists.
Government policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood have progressively established the
practice of channelling social discontent towards a movement that cannot bring political
change. Even to the Mubarak regime, the perils of limiting Islamist representation to the
banned Muslim Brotherhood, and thus by default also to violent jihadi groups, must be
apparent. Denial of political party status to the Wasat NGO has deprived the most liberal
and forward-looking expression of Egyptian Islamic activism of a political outlet, prolonging
this impasse. If political progress is to be achieved, and the recourse to radicalism
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stemmed, then Islamist modernists must be exposed to the realities of democratic politics
in a coalition environment. They will sink or swim, giving the truest indication of
competence on their part and receptivity to their policies on the part of the masses. This
in turn will influence directly the possibility, or lack of, of spreading democratic transition
in the Islamic societies of the Middle East while seeking to protect and include the many
and diverse minority groups that exist within them.
Moderate Islam failed, politically, to provide ‘the solution’ in that it was unable to exert
sufficient pressure on the regime to force significant change of policy or to gain access to
the formal political system, and the persistent lack of any clear ideology, political project
or realistic polices made this failure all the more likely. In trying to balance political
pragmatism with Islamic purity they achieved neither, strengthening public doubt about
their commitment to both democratic politics and an Islamic state. It would be
unreasonable to suggest that this means the moderate Islamists achieved nothing since
1952, however. They helped to bring about a process of Islamization of the sociopolitical
space, even allowing for the fact that this process was to some extent politically expedient
to the regime. Of greater and more enduring significance is the fact that the moderate
Islamist movement ultimately proved receptive and adaptable, recognising its own
limitations within the authoritarian environment, and initiated change through the
emergence of the modernist elements. They seek, to varying degrees to avoid the
dichotomy between religious purity and political pragmatism by taking a civilizational
approach to the construction of a distinctive Muslim democracy that will emphasise the
commitment to democratization and pluralist participation they have maintained
throughout years of repression and exclusion.
Regional Prospects
Egypt can be seen as the test case in the evolution of Muslim democracy; despite promising
developments in countries like Jordan, the main regional Islamic opposition groups are
derivatives of the Old Islamist movement and have yet to develop programmes as modern
and liberal in outlook as that of the Egyptian Islamist modernists. Moreover, the Mubarak
regime is as entrenched as any in the region, and any process by which it is brought to a
negotiated transition must offer great utility elsewhere in the Middle East. This does not
ignore the fact that national factors will play a significant part in the evolution of
democracy throughout the region, but illustrates the primacy of Islam over nationalism as a
belief system, and the commonality of Arab Islamic historical and cultural influences.
Democracy will no doubt attract different interpretations in different states, but this is an
outcome no different to that seen in Europe throughout the last century, for instance.
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The Future Utility of Moderate Islam
Moderate Islam therefore cannot yet be described as an independent mainstream political
force, but offers potential to act as a catalyst for democratic change and development as
part of a wider, balanced and inclusive political movement. That potential could be
enhanced by a revised US regional policy, which acknowledges the primacy that inertia has
enjoyed over democracy in that policy in the past. The US Secretary of State has very
recently established a team to develop a strategy for US outreach to moderate Muslim
groups as part of the evolving SAVE initiative. This proposal could provide the economic
means and political opportunity to implement in Egypt an interim educational programme
championed by the New Islamists. If implemented, this suggested arrangement could
engage the Islamist modernists in a graduated progression to political reform of benefit to
Egypt, the US and the Middle East region and elevate the domestic political profile of the
modernists to the mainstream. This would also provide continuity in their political
development while preserving a definitive Muslim character in their activities, at the same
time serving US security interests in Egypt. However, the internal divisions and ideological
stalemate evident at present in the Islamist movement must be overcome, and the pursuit
of an inclusive Muslim democracy, as opposed to an exclusive Islamic state, must be an
agreed objective. If agreement is not reached, radicalism still lurks just below the surface
of regional politics; economic stagnation, population growth and social injustice could
easily propel it into view again, signalling for certain the loss of the most significant
opportunity for Muslim democratic politics in the last half century.
